STANDING UP AGAINST THE EMPIRE
A PALESTINE SOLIDARITY GUIDE: FROM UNDERSTANDING TO ACTION

PALESTINE SOLIDARITY SEMINARS
WORLD SOCIAL FORUM III
PORTO ALEGRE, BRAZIL
26–27 January 2003
STANDING UP AGAINST THE EMPIRE: A PALESTINE SOLIDARITY GUIDE: FROM UNDERSTANDING TO ACTION
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Palestine Solidarity Seminars

At World Social Forum III
Porto Alegre, Brazil • 26-27 January 2003

Organised and sponsored by

Habitat International Coalition

Housing & Land Rights Network
Foreword

The coordination office (Cairo) of the Habitat International Coalition’s Housing and Land Rights Network organized the Palestine Solidarity Seminars in cooperation and consultation with numerous members and local organizations in the Middle East/North Africa region as a service to World Social Forum III participants. HIC-HLRN conceived it as a source of needed information and analysis, but also as a venue for practical solidarity with Palestine. The Seminars were planned in accordance with the World Social Forum theme “Democratic world order, combating militarisation and promoting peace,” and related to subtheme: “How to stand up against the Empire and the war.” The Seminars, in their small way, coincide with all of those imperatives.

The seminar idea arose from the experience of the previous World Social Forums, wherein the participants’ solidarity with the Palestinian struggle was manifest, even emblematic of the World Social Forum itself. However, understanding, articulation and action on the Palestine question and struggle were naturally uneven across the countries and communities represented at the Forums. Nonetheless, we who participated in WSF I and II had heard repeated comments of participants from everywhere such that the dramatic images of Palestine come filtered through ideologically biased media and that there is insufficient access to information locally, notably in the Americas and in the Spanish and Portuguese languages.

While the Seminars were intended prima facie to convey needed information, it also served us as a further needs assessment. The Seminar discussions and, particularly, the final session on “practical solidarity” form guidance on the work and informational services that make sense for Palestinians and the Palestinian rights community to offer to colleagues and friends in the Americas. Thus, the organizers and resource persons of the Seminars envision that this event at WSF III should lead to actions that consolidate solidarity for Palestine in tangible ways.

To implement any complex task, it is essential to understand the relevant theory. For those participants new to the subject of Palestine, and for those veterans of the cause new to the communities represented in the Seminars, a critical treatment of the factual background laid an essential foundation and revealed WSF participants’ interests, priorities and questions. For those already doing the advocacy work, those revelations pose a challenge to fill existing needs and opportunities.

The Seminars’ first two sessions presented the Palestine question both chronologically and thematically. The first focused on the Zionist program, the enduring Palestinian refugee situation and—importantly for its typical omission from the story—the fundamental and continuous institutionalised discrimination against the indigenous Palestinian people remaining (as citizens) inside what is now the State of Israel. The second covered the territories of Palestine that Israel’s military has occupied since 1967.

The third and final session was dedicated to the practical actions and methods of cooperation that would transform empathy—whether impulsive or factually grounded—into effective, kinetic solidarity with measurable results. The final session was smaller in participant number than the two foregoing substantive sessions. (There were many prominent WSF events competing on that day and time.) Nonetheless,
the practical discussion was focused on action areas and identified the kind of tools and strategies needed for several future campaigns, exchanges, information programs and network relationships involving individual and collective initiative.

Organising the Palestine Solidarity Seminars required overcoming the challenges of short time and long distances to bring speakers and participants together. That coordination formed part of a larger effort to ensure a representative voice and effective contribution of the Arab world to the World Social Forum. Our efforts were shared and supported by the Ford Foundation (Cairo) and ICCO (The Netherlands), to whom we owe a debt of thanks. The joint efforts bore fruit by bringing together some of the most expert and locally grounded civil society representatives with long experience in the Palestine question in all its aspects. Just as important, it convened those resource persons with newcomers as well.

The WSF III participants who joined the Seminars were equally representative of the world’s civil society and social movements. The 125 organizations that signed in came from 21 countries, representing North, Central and South America, Europe, Asia, North Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and Australia. The register of participants will serve as a further tool for networking and practical solidarity, in addition to the resource materials provided in this volume.

The present report memorialises the proceedings of the Palestine Solidarity Seminars. It is intended to provide a factual record, as well as a future reference tool. Therefore, we have introduced sidebars with useful information additional to that covered in the short session. The six annexes to these proceedings are intended to serve as a guide to partners, potential actions and existing campaigns to join and/or replicate. These include a bibliography of both new and classic titles for further reading. They also serve to expand further on the subject of questions that the participants raised. In essence, the proceedings record what the Seminars offered at WSF III, and the annexes are a response to demands arising.

From the perspective of Habitat International Coalition and the Housing and Land Rights Network, the Palestine case embodies one of the richest examples of destruction to a people’s habitat in favour of a predatory objective. The home and the land are at the heart of the conflict over Palestine, and defending and implementing the indigenous people’s right to their housing and land form the very essence of a just resolution to the conflict. It is hoped that this contribution will help to open channels for new relationships, ideas and, most importantly, solidarity actions toward that end. The contradictions between the official story and the people’s reality of Palestine have never been clearer, nor has the link between imperial designs and Palestine’s colonisation.

Joseph Schechla
Coordinator
Housing and Land Rights Network
Habitat International Coalition
Key Terms

**Closure**: The Israel occupation authority practice applied first in 1988, and consistently since 1993 that denies Palestinians in the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip passage through other areas of historic Palestine under Israeli jurisdiction. This involves separation of the residents of both territories from each other, and affects tens of thousands of Palestinian workers access to their jobs in Israel, and who lack other options because of the well-entrenched dependency of the occupied territories on the Israeli economy. Closure and separation also affect a variety of rights, including by denial of freedom of movement and closure/separation as a form of collective punishment. Closure has led to the aggravated illness and death of medical patients, who also are not spared this stricture, except in rare cases. Children are denied normal life, including family life, under closure, and are regularly denied access to education and other basic services.

**Curfew**: Absolute denial of the population to leave their homes or other structures into the public space for a specified period. Curfew is often imposed on entire villages and cities, enforceable by lethal force. Typically, the occupation authorities impose this extreme security measure as a form of collective punishment. Lifting of curfews typically takes place on a periodic basis one or two hours to allow essential civilian functions only.

**Green line**: Borders determined by Armistice with neighbouring States (1948–49), separating the State of Israel-controlled territory from the other areas of Palestine (Jerusalem, West Bank & Gaza Strip). Indigenous Palestinians remaining inside the “green line” became citizens of Israel; Palestinians in the other areas came under the administration of Jordan (in the West Bank) and Egypt (Gaza Strip) until Israel conquered those territories in the 1967 War.

**Jerusalem**: UNGA resolution 181 determined that Jerusalem was to come under an international regime. However, Israel conquered the western part of Jerusalem in 1948, incorporating the then-occupied city into the State as its capital. (The international community generally rejects that under international law doctrine of the unacceptability of the acquisition of territory by force, recognizing instead Tel Aviv as the capital of Israel. When Israeli forces conquered the rest of the city (East Jerusalem) in the 1967 War, Israeli pursued Jewish settlement of the area and applied Israeli domestic law to the area in 1981, thereby “annexing” it (“annexed Jerusalem”).

**Occupied Palestinian territory (OPT)**: The lands that Israel controls as a consequence of the 1967 War. These include lands acquired by force and where Israel maintains effective control through its Military Government. These remain: the West Bank, including Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip in Palestine; and the Golan Heights of Syria. Subsequent acquisition of lands in southern Lebanon through gradual conquest in the 1970s and through its 1982 invasion of Lebanon have been reduced through Israel’s July 2000 withdrawal. However, the territory of Shiba’ Farms remains under Israeli military occupation, which neighbouring States assert to be sovereign Lebanese territory.

**Areas of Jurisdiction: A, B and C**: Gradations of Israeli and Palestinian National Authority jurisdictions in the occupied Palestinian territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip as defined in the interim agreements signed by the two parties since 1993. Within the Oslo Interim process, four spheres of jurisdiction were created in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, defined as the following areas:

A. Closed Palestinian jurisdiction (Area A): In these lands, the Palestinian Authority had full effective and theoretical (de facto and de jure) jurisdiction. Israeli troops and military withdrew fully until late 2000. Until then, Israel did not exercise
jurisdiction over this area, except with reoccupation or Palestinian consent. Today, these areas remain under Israel's control, and several areas are under Israeli military siege.

B. Overriding Israeli jurisdiction. In those areas, the Palestinian National Authority held partial personal, functional and geographical jurisdiction, as Israel retained overriding security jurisdiction manifested by troops and the Military Government. The overriding jurisdiction encompasses all components and actions that form clear violations of human rights, as house demolitions, for example, occur in those areas in particular with the Israeli authorities' full resolve and jurisdiction. This area is about 10% of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and is inhabited by approximately 20% of the Palestinian population.

C. Where Israel held functional, geographical and personal jurisdiction. The Palestinian Authority had claimed personal jurisdiction, awaiting withdrawal of Israeli troops and Military Government. The size of this area is theoretically undefined; it is open to speculation by both sides, with the continuation of supreme Israeli jurisdiction as the occupying power along with jurisdictional category “A” (total Israeli jurisdiction). These areas constitute more than 73% of land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip and are inhabited by some 24% of the Palestinian population.

Final-status territories: These are categories of land that Israel reserves under its total control and jurisdiction awaiting their status to be determined through negotiations that are scheduled to begin in 1999 to determine their status following the end of the current interim process, the framing agreements of which expire on 4 May 1999.

These are lands that fall under sole Israeli rule and are excluded from the Interim Process as final-status lands: (1) lands of settlements, (2) lands of annexed Jerusalem, (3) lands of military areas, and (4) borders. Israel enjoys all aspects of jurisdiction in these areas and is, thus, fully responsible as the occupying power. The spatial definitions of all these areas remain ambiguous.

Settlements and settler colonies: For the purposes of this report, “settlements” is the social science and planning term for areas of human habitation, irrespective of the ethnic or religious composition of their population. "Settler colonies" is the term used in reference to wholly illegal settlements of the Occupying Power's population, violating IV, article 49 and constituting "war crimes," and forming part of the practice of population transfer, recognized also as a "crime against humanity" under the Rome Statute (1998).

Unrecognised villages: These are hundreds of settlements of indigenous Palestinian habitation inside the "green line" that almost-exclusively predate the 1948 establishment of the State of Israel. For no other criterion but because that their residents are Arab citizens, and not “Jewish nationals,” these villages do not benefit from the common services enjoyed by other settlements of similar and smaller Jewish populations. As such, the “unrecognised villages” have been excluded from master plans and, consequently, the Zionist-dominated planning regime considers their existence illegal. They face demolitions and other bureaucratic means of forced removal amounting to internal population transfer. Regional and national-level Israeli development plans call for most “unrecognised village” Arab populations to be transferred to what Israeli planners call “concentration points” (planned townships) designated elsewhere in Israel where they would live in zero-growth zones with no secure land tenure.
27 January 2003, AM session: Origins and original sins

Introduction and welcome

Joseph Schechla
Coordinator
HOUSING AND LAND RIGHTS NETWORK
Habitat International Coalition

These sessions of the Palestine Solidarity Seminars are sponsored by HIC-HLRN, but are the product of many different partners. These include HIC members and nonmembers, local organizations throughout historic Palestine, national networks such as Ittijah: Union of Arab Community-based Associations (Israel), and organizations with regional programs such as the Arab NGO Network for Development and the Cairo Institute for Human Rights Research and Studies. Many voices contributed to forming the Seminar program, and a diverse group will be delivering it. By way of coordination, personal meetings, consultations and telecommunications, this event within WSF represents a true community effort.

Within that frame, HIC has its own approach of the Palestine question. HIC, as a global movement of diverse member organizations concerned with human settlements and the right to housing, has been engaged in the subject of Palestine since 1989. That period saw the evolution of HIC as a collective agency for the poor, the homeless and those deprived of adequate housing. In many ways, Palestinians represent the epitome of that deprivation. Like other peoples, include those of Kurdistan and Tibet, their country has been under occupation and foreign domination for generations, while the international state system remains ineffective to uphold the most fundamental of their rights in their case.

Indeed, the opportunities, resources, alliances and political motivations of states make the sharing of deprivation strategies a fact. Victimized people lack comparable means and opportunities to share strategies, despite their overwhelmingly common plight. HIC is dedicated to creating the context for peoples’ much-needed solidarity and strategic cross-fertilisation. However, for this to work, we must first recognize the commonality of this deprivation and its strikingly similar manifestations, whether in Palestine, Kurdistan, Tibet, or elsewhere in the indigenous world.

Recognising that land, as a place for people to dwell, is at core of these issues, land is also very central to globalisation and subject to globalised economic pressures. That is why we consider the question of Palestine to be very symbolic, central and intensely meaningful for us all.

It is also more than symbolically important that we are discussing Palestine in Brazil. Palestine is also an American issue. It is an American issue not only because of the geostrategy of the United States allied with Israel. Nor does it affect the Americas merely by the fact that that geostrategy now seeks to engulf the entire planet into war. Nor is Palestine an American issue just because if Israel’s military and covert role in support of the most nefarious forces in the hemisphere’s recent conflicts: in Haiti, El Salvador, Guatemala, the “Contras” in Nicaragua, to name only a few.
Whether we recognize it consciously or not, the concept of Israel is imbedded in the deepest fabric of American thought, especially in North America. There, colonists arrived, Bible in hand, to build a “new Jerusalem,” a “city on the hill,” whose model they said could be found in Old Testament descriptions of a Hebrew conquest of the Philistines. In Massachusetts Bay Colony, as in Virginia, early English colonists referred to themselves as the “New Israelites,” and the indigenous peoples as the “New Canaanites.” Analogising the biblical scenario of the believers “smiting the Canaanites” evolved to become a cant of conquest, replicating its genocidal self across the vast continent and soon beyond, to the Hawaiian Islands, Philippines and Vietnam.

Be it known that this practice was crude only in the application of brute force. Its ideological tools were honed already for a hundred years in Ireland before being transported to the New World. For the English colonizers of Ireland, they drew their philosophical reasoning from the Iberian colonists who preceded them where we now meet. Jesuit scholars there had been particularly helpful in devising thoughtful ways to dismiss the humanity of the indigenous Arawaks, Araucanians, Incas and Guaranís.

That ideology and its consequences are alive and well in the Zionism of the current age. We, as Americans from Brazil, Canada, Chile or the United States, are fed on the putative sanctity of an Israelite model of conquest in the Americas. As a consequence, individually and collectively, we are products of the enduring crime against indigenous peoples where we Americans live. Moreover, we are integral to the (active or passive) public that uncritically condones and/or aids these crimes elsewhere. In the particular case of modern Israel’s conquest of Palestine, our American states also allow the operation of Zionist public institutions, such as the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency and Jewish National Fund and their affiliates lavishly to collect and transfer tax-exempt finance capital to the State of Israel specifically to conduct that colonization.

In this further sense, too, Palestine is an American issue.

This Seminar promises to bring home—at this meeting in Brazil—an issue that is not so very far away. The objective here is not only to fill any informational gaps we may still have about the situation, but also to give the participants a chance to transform knowledge into solidarity in deed. The last session, therefore, should proffer some already-implemented tools for action, and initiate a brainstorm about concrete ways to build solidarity among the participants. Whether Brazilian, South African, Cuban, Palestinian or estadounidense, we are all in this one together.
“The Jewish question” and political Zionism

Michel Warshawski
Alternative Information Center (Jerusalem)

What is Zionism? It has been conceived as an attempt to respond to the “Jewish question” in Europe at the end of the 19th Century; that is to say anti-Semitism. One of the common hypotheses at that time was that a normal society is homogenous, which had as a logical consequence the rejection of minorities in society as a natural—even moral—choice. The Catholics in Europe typically reviled Jews, for example. The only solution was to find a place where they would comply with this pattern and be the majority, without any one else.

Thus, Zionism had set as an objective to create a Jewish state by gathering all the Jews of the world. That was to be through a colonial process, since it could not happen but by conquering a land. Quite rapidly, Zionism became connected to Zion, the name of a hill in Jerusalem. Therefore, the colonization of Palestine became the aim. All other aspects were deemed secondary inside the Zionist movement.

A second objective has not to be forgotten. The creation of a new Jewish man, as Theodor Herzl, the founder of Zionism, defined him. This vision actually adopted all the anti-Semitic clichés. For Herzl and, thus, the Zionist Movement, (European) Jewish society was too feminine, too weak and not productive enough. The new Jewish man would be strong, less preoccupied with intellectual things. He would be blond with blue eyes! These images dominated the Jewish colonial movement in Palestine and remained so in Israel until the end of the 1970s. In this way, Israeli posters in the 50es always used to show Jewish men as blond body-builders.

This image and the continuity of the Übermensch stereotype are very important to understand. Zionism is an ideology of internal contradictions. It claims to be the continuation of Jewish history, but its negation at the same time.

The Jews of the Arab world had never heard of Zionism, and those of Western Europe were integrates in the societies they were living in. The most important part of Zionism supporters was in Eastern Europe. There, 90% of them were either influenced by rabbis and religion, or were part of a strong modern working class.

The Zionist movement actually was a kind of hippy dream that saw the Jews of eastern Europe carving out a new colony called “Israel.” However, Nazi holocaust transformed this joke into a real project. From 1930 to 1940, a couple of thousand Jews went to Palestine with huge capital and modern technologies and transformed the “hippy” community into a very modern society. It was a revolution!

The second part of the project was to struggle against the British administration, which was the prevailing power in Palestine under the post-WWI mandate of the old League of Nations. Thanks to their alliance with the British colonial society and by being the major broker in suppressing the Arab Uprising (1936–39), the Jews in Palestine took control of the territory. This gave the material basis for the transformation of the dream into a very real project.

From then, building the Jewish entity was concentrated around three campaigns:
1. redemption of the land through its purchase by any possible means
2. conquest of the labour market, because Zionism sought to exclude indigenous workers so as to create a society that would be Jewish from top to bottom. However, in agriculture and construction the Jewish labour force was less productive than the Palestinians. Therefore, Zionist institutions subsidized Jewish employers for their productive disadvantage and then physically beat those who kept Arab workers.
3. economic boycott, sometimes accompanied with violence, not to buy Arab products.

Fascism had a tragic result for Jews in Europe: six million people massacred and three to four million without any homeland anymore. To support a Jewish State was a very good way for the Europeans to get rid of European Jews the remnants of their massacres.

After the Declaration of the Establishment of Israel, the Zionist project went on with building a national army and economy. A very important prerequisite for that was the ethnic cleansing of the indigenous Palestinian people. What is important to understand here is that, to the Zionist, the Palestinians have been part of the problems on the landscape just as the mosquitoes.

This mentality is worse than racism. Racists acknowledge and identify the victims as subjects of their hatred. Until the new generation of Palestinians and the PLO, the Jews did not hate the Palestinians; they simply did not exist. They were nowhere in the books. They were transparent. They simply were not. The Zionist Jews were actually thinking that they were giving a land without a people to a people without a land, since they were not seeing the people living on it! That is how people claiming to be socialists and open-minded can destroy whole villages. It took them 50 years to begin to realize what they did.

In 1998, Israel celebrated 100 years of Zionism and 50 of colonization. All Jews, but also well-known characters, celebrated the success of the State of Israel. In Israel though, this was the saddest birthday the society never had. All the discourse was talking about the deep crisis inside the Israeli society. This contradiction can be explained by Israel's double aim: to be a Jewish State, this has been a huge success (with strong army and economy and even trying to dictate a peace process with the whole Arab world), but also to build a new Jewish nation. That has been a big failure. The Israeli society was not more united in 1998 than in 1948!

The basic objective was to integrate everybody and initiate a big melting pot that would produce the perfect Jew. However, the society is actually very divided and totally dispersed into small communities. A deep gap is dividing the society into two antagonist blocs: the "real" Israelis—that is the founders and their children, modern and liberal—and the Israelis of the periphery; that is, all the others. The later are religious, some with an Arab culture, and are just not as they should be in an idealized Zionist perspective. Despite the efforts of the State of Israel, Zionism’s integration machine, the gap between the two circles has been exacerbated.

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1 See this concept explained in Israel Shahak, “Ideology of the redeemed land,” in the text box below.
The Ideology of “Redeemed” Land

By Israel Shahak

Israel propagates among its Jewish citizens an exclusivist ideology of the Redemption of Land. Its official aim of minimizing the number of non-Jews can be well perceived in this ideology, which is inculcated to Jewish schoolchildren in Israel. They are taught that it is applicable to the entire extent of either the State of Israel or, after 1967, to what is referred to as the Land of Israel. According to this ideology, the land that has been “redeemed” is the land that has passed from non-Jewish ownership to Jewish ownership.

The ownership can be either private, or belong to either the JNF or the Jewish state. The land that belongs to non-Jews is, on the contrary, considered to be “unredeemed.” Thus, if a Jew who committed the blackest crimes that can be imagined buys a piece of land from a virtuous non-Jew, the “unredeemed” land becomes “redeemed” by such a transaction. However, if a virtuous non-Jew purchases land from the worst Jew, the formerly pure and “redeemed” land becomes “unredeemed” again. The logical conclusion of such an ideology is the expulsion, called “transfer,” of all non-Jews from the area of land that has to be “redeemed.”

Therefore, the Utopia of the “Jewish ideology” adopted by the State of Israel is a land that is wholly “redeemed” and none of it is owned or worked by non-Jews. The leaders of the Zionist labour movement expressed this utterly repellent idea with the greatest clarity. Walter Laquer, a devoted Zionist, tells in his History of Zionism how one of these spiritual fathers, A.D. Gordon, who died in 1919, “objected to violence in principle and justified self-defence only in extreme circumstances. But he and his friends wanted every tree and bush in the Jewish homeland to be planted by nobody else except Jewish pioneers.” This means that they wanted everybody else to just go away and leave the land to be “redeemed” by Jews. Gordon's successors added more violence than he intended, but the principle of “redemption” and its consequences have remained….

It is this exclusivist ideology, rather than all the “security needs” alleged by Israeli propaganda, that determined the takeovers of land in Israel in the 1950s and again in the mid-1960s, and in the occupied territories after 1967. This ideology also dictated official Israeli plans for “the Judaisation of Galilee.” This curious term means encouraging Jews to settle in Galilee by giving them financial benefits. (I wonder what would be the reaction of U.S. Jews if a plan for “the Christianisation of New York,” or even only of Brooklyn, would be proposed in their country.) But the Redemption of the Land implies more than regional “Judaisation.” In the entire area of Israel, the JNF, vigorously backed by Israeli state agencies (especially by the secret police), is spending great sums of public money in order to “redeem” any land that non-Jews are willing to sell, and to preempt any attempt by a Jew to sell his land to a non-Jew by paying him a higher price.

The late Israel Shahak was professor of chemistry, Hebrew University, and author of many critical works on Zionism and the Palestine question. The present extract appeared as Chapter I, “A closed utopia?” in Israel Shahak, Jewish History, Jewish Religion. The Weight of Three Thousand Years , Pluto Press, England, 1994
The year 1995 has already marked a turning point. It was the end of the power of the founders, at all levels. The so-called peace process ended, the attempt to secularise Israel and create a modern occidental community too. The processes of liberalization and democratisation were also ended with Prime Minister Yitzhaq Rabin's assassination. Israel is now becoming a more and more religious State with a colonization process that had never been so clear, to the point of promoting a new Nakba. The main slogan today is to colonize the remaining 15% of land, but also to conduct a total war with the Arab world.

Here we close the contradictory circle. Zionism was trying to save the Jews. It created a big ghetto and an open war with all Arabs and Muslims in the process. Today, the Israelis have destroyed Gaza again. Curiously, however, it is not the Palestinians who are in real existential danger, but the Jews.

Wherever the Palestinians live in the Arab world, they are, at least in some sense, at home. Israeli Jews, as long as they are living in others' land and property, remain alien.

The existential problem remains: what can be done for the remaining Jewish presence in the Arab world? That is how Zionism has created the biggest threat to the existence of Jewish people since Nazism.
Population transfer: Palestinian refugees, right of return and prospects of implementation

Qasim ‘Aina
Coordination Forum of NGOs Working among the Palestinian Community (Beirut, Lebanon)

At a total of some four million, the Palestinian refugees represent nearly one-fifth of the world’s recognised refugee population and, as such, constitute the largest unsolved refugee problem of this century.

When the League of Nations mandated Palestine under British administration in 1917, Jews formed 10% of Palestine’s population. From 1922 to 1947, Jews immigrated, above all from Eastern Europe. A Zionist settler wave during 1924–29 brought 82,000 Jews to Palestine, of whom 23,000 later left. Within a four-year period (1933–36), 174,000 Jews settled in the country. During—and especially after—the Nazi holocaust, immigration increased dramatically. By 1940, nearly 250,000 Jews had arrived (20,000 of them left later) and the yishuv (Jewish community in Palestine) reached a total of 450,000. The number of immigrants during the entire Mandate period—legal and illegal alike—was approximately 480,000, close to 90% of them from Europe. The population of the yishuv expanded to 650,000 by the time Israeli statehood was proclaimed.

Palestinians people demands for independence and resistance to Jewish immigration and control of the productive resources of the country led to uprisings by Palestinians in both 1929 and in 1936–39, but both were unsuccessful because the British supported the Jewish military forces.

The date 29 November marks the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People. That was the day in 1947 that United Nations General Assembly adopted resolution 181, partitioning Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish state. The GA assigned 46% of the territory to the Jewish state, leading to the escalation of violence and the withdrawal of Great Britain on 15 May 1948. It also led to the of the “Nakba” or catastrophe, characterised by the expulsion of two-thirds of the Arab population, mostly coming from 538 villages that the Israelis depopulated and/or destroyed.

On 15 May 1948, the British Mandate came to an end with Zionist forces occupying Palestinian territories well beyond the areas allotted to the “Jewish state” in resolution 181, and expelling two-thirds of the Palestinian Arab population. These refugees originated from the 538 depopulated and subsequently destroyed Palestinian villages, as well as from the larger towns and cities of Jaffa, Haifa, Safad and Lydda.

On 11 December 1948, GA resolution 194 affirmed all refugees’ rights to return to their original homes, restitution and adequate compensation. The letter and principle

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2 See the definition of “population transfer” in international law in the text box below.
3 About the definition and protection of the Palestinian refugees, see Annex 4.
4 About the right of return for Palestinian refugees in international law, see Annex 4.
5 For figures about the Nakba, the depopulation of villages and massacres, see the text box below.
of that resolution have been repeated over 55 times until 2000. The UN also has reaffirmed many times the integrity and ownership of Palestinians’ lands and properties as an inalienable right in law. The international community of states bears the responsibilities to ensure the implementation of the rights grounding these resolutions.

The Palestinian refugees now mostly live in various Arab countries, and part of them inside their own country; that is, within the West Bank and Gaza.

**UNRWA Registered Palestinian Refugees** (December 2002)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of Exile*</th>
<th>Registered Population</th>
<th>% in Camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>389,233</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>405,601</td>
<td>30.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1,698,271</td>
<td>17.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>639,448</td>
<td>27.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>893,141</td>
<td>53.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,025,694</strong></td>
<td><strong>32</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Note: The foregoing table details the refugee population registered with the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Registered refugees comprise approximately 89% of the refugee population in the areas of UNRWA operations.*

*Source: UNRWA (2002).*

In additional to these official numbers, an estimated 50,000 Palestinian refugees live in Iraq. Egypt hosts approximately 50,000 more, and 850,000 in other countries (see table below).

The severity of the deprivation of human rights for the Palestinian refugees depends upon where they live. The worst situation is to be found in Lebanon, since they do not have any right there, except to live, while those how live in Jordan and Syria have the same rights as citizen of the country. The highest concentration and the greatest proposition of Palestinian refugee with respect to the local population is in Lebanon, “they are 11% of the Lebanese population” where 55.8% of the Palestinian refugees live inside 12 official camps exceeding Gaza’s 54.8% the average size of the refugee camp dwellings in 40m² with 2.2 rooms, and a density of 5.6 inhabitants per unit. Only 57% of camps shelters have access to sewage facilities. Only half of the households have drinking water piped into the dwelling, and nearly 70% of the dwellings are cold and difficult to heat in winter.

In Lebanon, Palestinian refugee camp dwellers have an illiteracy rate of, 13% for men and 26% for women. Some 21% of children, ranging in age from 7 to 18, did not attend school. Student dropout rates in UNRWA schools in Lebanon are 6% at the elementary level, and 14.8% at the intermediate level. These rates are around double those of other UNRWA areas of operation. Only 21% of Palestinian camp residents attend high school, with only 10% of males and 7% of females completing this stage.

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The UN Relief Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) is a body specially created for Palestinians under GA 194 to provide service. However, that history sets them apart from all other refugees, who are covered by the 1951 Refugee Convention, and leaves them uniquely outside the mandate of UN High Commission for Refugees and without an agency responsible for their protection.

Over the long term, the present system offers no relief and solution to the Palestine refugees. In 1951, the UNRWA was giving US$200 for each refugee per month, but it now provides only US$7. That is why we ask all civil society actors to defend and support our right to return. We have a dream to return, but, more importantly, it is our right.

The world population of Palestinian refugees is distributed in the following countries:

Global Palestinian Refugee Population (31 December 2000)
(1948 refugees)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Refuge</th>
<th>Refugees*</th>
<th>Registered Refugees (RR)*</th>
<th>RR in Camps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Israel***</td>
<td>258,750</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>820,690</td>
<td>824,622</td>
<td>452,186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>699,354</td>
<td>583,009</td>
<td>157,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>1,865,856</td>
<td>1,570,192</td>
<td>280,191</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>437,068</td>
<td>376,472</td>
<td>210,715</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>476,610</td>
<td>383,199</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>43,350</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>295,332</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>36,818</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Gulf</td>
<td>113,098</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq, Libya</td>
<td>79,575</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Arab</td>
<td>5,939</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Countries</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>185,378</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Countries</td>
<td>236,057</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Grand Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>5,552,875</strong></td>
<td><strong>3,737,494</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,211,480</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: Collection of accurate statistics is difficult due to the absence of a comprehensive registration system and anomalies in the existing registration system. UNRWA registration is based on assistance needs rather than refugee status.


*** There is no registration system for internally displaced Palestinians inside Israel. The figure used here is based on estimates for 2000 and updated based on a 3.5% natural population growth.

It is important to understand the source of the Palestinians’ flight, that is to say largely military acts and fear. The map also charts 33 cases of massacres, sometimes of entire villages. This practice has been referred to more recently as “ethnic cleansing,” borrowing from a latter-day Serbian term for its application in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, the practice has deep historical precedents and, since the post-WW II International Military Tribunals, “population transfer” has been codified as a war crime and crime against humanity.

For details, see “al-Nakba: Massacres and Depopulation of Villages” in the text box below.
Population Transfer in International Law

Resulting from an initiative of the UN Subcommission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities [currently known as the Subcommission on Promotion and Protection of Human Rights], two special rapporteurs undertook to study the human rights dimensions of population transfer within the legal norms developed to date. The preliminary report of Mr. A.S. Al-Khasawneh and Mr. R. Hatano on “The human rights dimensions of population transfer, including the implantation of settlers” was presented to the Subcommission’s forty-fifth session (1993) has constituted the first attempt at a comprehensive study and definition of the phenomenon of population transfer in a UN body. Already in their preliminary report (1993), the special rapporteurs found that population transfers are “prima facie unlawful.”10. The term population transfer is found in the International Military Tribunals (Nuremberg and Tokyo)11 and in the 1998 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court12 among the list of prosecutable war crimes and crimes against humanity. Notably, Articles 49 and 147 of the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (1949), codify illegal population transfer as a grave breach of the Convention. Based on the legal definition in intentional law as developed, and provided in the special rapporteurs’ preliminary report, the phenomenon of population transfer involves the following features:

“Population transfer and the implantation of settlers imply an intention from the State or the state-recognized agencies. They are therefore the demonstration of a political will. They are the results of economical or political processes. They are systematic and coercive. They affect a whole group of people, since they are basically discriminatory, but can be incremental.

Population transfer may occur in many different circumstances: peacetime or wartime, in internal or international conflicts, under occupation, through territorial changes or population-exchange treaties (which today would be a violation of human rights and legally null and void).

It can be carried out with a purpose of demographic manipulation with a greater goal of denying to the indigenous people the opportunity to exercise its right to self-determination. It can be rationalised in terms of state consolidation, or “national development,” thereby to assert control over a territory and to exploit its resources or the indigenous population. In these purposes, population transfers can be carried out under the guise of national security, military imperative or other public purposes.

Population transfer can be direct, by way of military operations, deportations (in this case they are often conceived as punitive transfers), expulsions, evictions or implantations, or indirect, through administrative measures, impoverishment, degradation of the environment or other economic incentives (particularly favouring an alien, implanted population). They can finally be the result of mass or incremental actions and the commensurate consequences.

11 The IMT Charter introduced into international law the notions of crimes against the peace, war crimes and crimes against humanity. It defined “war crimes” as follows: “Murder, ill-treatment or deportation to slave labour or for any other purpose of civilian population of or in occupied territory ...” Article 6 (b) of the Charter of the International Military Tribunal; International Military Tribunal, Trial of the Major War Criminals before the International Military Tribunal (IMT), Nuremberg (1945–46), 42 vols. (London, H.M. Stationery Office, 1947–1949) vol. I, p. 11. Article 6 (c) of the Charter defined “crimes against humanity” as: “Murder, extermination, enslavement, deportation and other inhumane acts committed against any civilian population before or during the war ... in execution of or in connection with any crime within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal ...” Ibid. Source: Preliminary report prepared by Mr. A.S. Al-Khasawneh and Mr. R. Hatano on “The human rights dimensions of population transfer, including the implantation of settlers” and presented to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Forty-fifth session (2–27 August 1993).
12 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (17 July 1998): Part 2. Jurisdiction, Admissibility and Applicable Law defines: “Deportation or forcible transfer of civilian population” as crime against humanity (art. 7, 1.d); “Extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly” as war crime (art. 8, 2.a [iv]); “The transfer, directly or indirectly, by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies, or the deportation or transfer of all parts of the population of the occupied territory within or outside this territory” as war crimes (art. 8, 2.b [viii]); “Ordering the displacement of the civilian population for reasons related to the conflict, unless the security of the civilians involved or imperative military reasons so demand” in the context of “armed conflicts not of an international character” as a war crime (art. 8, 2.e [viii]).
al-Nakba: Massacres and Depopulation of Villages

The dispossessed Palestinians.... Where do they come from?

50 years after al-Nakba: the towns and villages depopulated by the Zionists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District Towns &amp; Villages</th>
<th>Depopulated 1948</th>
<th>Dispossessed</th>
<th>Population 1998</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Acre</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>47,038</td>
<td>288,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ramleh</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>97,405</td>
<td>598,171</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baysan</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19,602</td>
<td>120,375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beersheba</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>90,507</td>
<td>555,811</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>79,947</td>
<td>490,960</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>121,196</td>
<td>744,269</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22,991</td>
<td>141,190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jaffa</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>123,227</td>
<td>756,743</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jerusalem</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>97,950</td>
<td>601,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jenin</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4,005</td>
<td>24,598</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8,746</td>
<td>53,712</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safad</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>52,248</td>
<td>320,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tiberias</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>28,872</td>
<td>177,307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tulkarm</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>11,333</td>
<td>67,746</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The dispossessed are 85% of the people of the land that became Israel.

Why did they leave?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>According to Israeli Historians:</th>
<th>Localities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Expulsion by Zionist/Jewish forces</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military assault by Zionist/Jewish forces</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fear of Zionist/Jewish attack, or of being caught in the</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>fighting Influence of fall of neighbouring town</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological warfare</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abandonment on Arab orders</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unknown</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>531</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That is, 90% were attacked by Zionist/Jewish forces...

...and terrorized by massacres at...

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Village/Town</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Al Abbasiyya</td>
<td>04-05-48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Abu Shusha</td>
<td>14-05-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ayn az Zaytun</td>
<td>02-05-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Balad ash Sheikh</td>
<td>25-04-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bayt Daras</td>
<td>11-05-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beer Sheba</td>
<td>21-10-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burayr</td>
<td>12-05-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Dawayima</td>
<td>29-10-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dayr Yassin</td>
<td>09-04-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eilaboun</td>
<td>29-10-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Haifa</td>
<td>21-04-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawsha</td>
<td>15-04-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Husayniyya</td>
<td>21-04-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ijzim</td>
<td>24-07-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isdud</td>
<td>28-10-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jish</td>
<td>29-10-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Kabri</td>
<td>21-05-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Khisas</td>
<td>18-12-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khubbayza</td>
<td>12-05-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lydda</td>
<td>10-07-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Majd al Kurum</td>
<td>29-10-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>mannsurat al Khayt</td>
<td>18-01-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Khirbet, Nasir ad Din</td>
<td>12-04-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qazaza</td>
<td>09-07-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Qisarya</td>
<td>15-02-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sa’re’a</td>
<td>30-10-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Safsaf</td>
<td>29-10-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saliha</td>
<td>30-10-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arab al Samniyya</td>
<td>30-10-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Tantoura</td>
<td>21-05-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al ‘Tira</td>
<td>16-07-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al Wa’ra al-Sawda</td>
<td>18-04-48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wadi ’Ara</td>
<td>27-02-48</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Where is their land?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Type</th>
<th>Area</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pre-1948, Jewish-controlled Land</td>
<td>1,682 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Remaining Palestinians’ Land¹⁴</td>
<td>1,465 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expelled Palestinians’ Land</td>
<td>17,178 km²</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Palestine (now Israel)</strong></td>
<td><strong>20,325 km²</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That is, 92% of the land that became Israel is Palestinian...

¹⁴ That is, the land of present absentees and uprooted Palestinians, now citizens in Israel.
When did they leave?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Time Period</th>
<th>No of Localities</th>
<th>No of Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>While under the protection of the British mandate (before Israel was created)</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>413,794 (52%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>During 1948 War</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>339,272 (42%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After signing the Armistice Agreements including unknown dates</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>52,001 (6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>531</strong></td>
<td><strong>805,067 (100%)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

More than half of the refugees were expelled by Zionist/Jewish forces before Israel was created on Palestinian Land.

**After 50 years of dispossession, where are the Palestinian refugees today?**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Place of Refuge in 1998</th>
<th>Total Palestinian Population</th>
<th>Refugees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Occupied Palestine/Israel</td>
<td>953,497</td>
<td>(200,000 internal)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gaza Strip</td>
<td>1,004,498</td>
<td>766,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>West Bank</td>
<td>1,596,554</td>
<td>652,855</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jordan</td>
<td>2,328,308</td>
<td>1,741,796</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lebanon</td>
<td>430,183</td>
<td>408,008</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Syria</td>
<td>465,662</td>
<td>444,921</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Egypt</td>
<td>48,784</td>
<td>40,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saudi Arabia</td>
<td>274,762</td>
<td>274,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kuwait</td>
<td>37,696</td>
<td>34,370</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Persian Gulf states</td>
<td>105,578</td>
<td>105,578</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraq, Libya</td>
<td>74,284</td>
<td>74,284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Arab countries</td>
<td>5,544</td>
<td>5,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Americas</td>
<td>203,588</td>
<td>173,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other countries</td>
<td>259,248</td>
<td>220,361</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,788,186</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,942,121</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two thirds of the Palestinians are refugees not allowed to return home under Israeli law, because they are not Jews. Meanwhile, Russian, Ethiopian and other Jewish (and non-Jewish) immigrants are pouring in.

**Is there room now for the Palestinians to return home?**

Yes. 78% of the Jews live in 15% of Palestine now called Israel. 22% of the Jews live in 85% of Palestine, now Israel, all of which is Palestinian land. The absolute majority of those live in a dozen towns or so. Only 2.7% of the Jews exploit all Palestinian land. Thus, only 154,000 rural Jews control 17,325 km², which is the home and heritage of 4,942,000 Palestinian refugees.
Institutionalised discrimination inside Israel: law and institutions.

Jamil Dakwar
New York University School of Law

All people need adequate land for a place to live. This fact is inextricably linked to demography and the issue of land use by the inhabitants. A people should have control over its land, as recognised in international public law. That requires the creation and implementation of a system.

Land acquisition has been integral to the colonization of Palestine. The whole structure of housing and land rights issues throughout historic Palestine (inside the 1948 borders of Israel) is affected by the political ideology of Zionism, from the question of land to that of demography and political sovereignty. Justifying land confiscation has been the subject of one of the State of Israel’s first legal enactments, and remains one of the highest priorities. In essence, all types of land confiscation by Jews are considered legal as of the creation of “the Jewish state.”

That is why the Israelis generally do not understand what is the problem concerning this issue. They accept uncritically the laws are enacted to support the Jewish majority, despite the consequent victimization of others.

On matters of institutionalising land theft, we actually do not speak only about Israeli laws, but also of laws in Palestine before 1948. Israel initially exploited the British Mandate-era Land Ordinance (Law of Acquisition of Land for Public Purposes, 1943), by which the Israeli government assumed to itself the right to confiscate private land for minimal compensation. In this first postindependence measure, the Knesset (parliament) adopted the complementary Law of the State’s Property (1951), providing for the transfer to Israel of all properties previously belonging to the British Mandatory Administration. As Israel took control of all the territories that were allocated to the Jewish state, in addition to nearly 50% of the territories allocated to the Arab State in Palestine under the 1947 UN partition plan, a total of 15,025,000 dunums were considered “state lands.” The state also implemented measures and passed various laws rationalizing the transfer of Palestinian land and property ownership to the Jewish agencies and settlements.

According to the British Mandate’s Acquisition of Land Law (1943), the state could take land for public purposes. This has been extensively used after 1948 to confiscate Palestinian land, since the main public purpose was to impose a Jewish majority on the land. The state founders needed for that to transform the reality of pre-1948 to a new one. This was done by various means.

Zionist Israelis and, particularly, their lawmakers sought to prevent the expelled Palestinians from returning to their lands and homes in Palestine. Hence, in 1953, the Knesset enacted the law on trusteeship of the land known as the

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15 For more details about the laws and other means of confiscation, see Annex 5.
Absentee Property Law, legalising the confiscation of all properties of those displaced, whether their owners were outside the country or not.

Another means was to provide the Zionist organisations a needed formal status. The World Zionist Organisation (WZO) and Jewish Agency [for the Land of Israel\(^{17}\)] (JA) were the main organizations acquiring and allocating land to create a Jewish state. The JA, first registered in Great Britain and now operating in many other countries, was built outside of Palestine in order to promote Jewish colonization by those in other countries. To reach the objective of creating a Jewish State, the founders devised the Law of Citizenship. However, the state also created a form of “supercitizenship,” known as “Jewish nationality,” which confers superior privileges to Jews over all others. The state manipulates citizenship and nationality status at the principal expense of the indigenous Palestinians, both refugees abroad and surviving Palestinians who remained to become Israeli citizens.

In the application of citizenship and nationality for Jews, one lawyer of the Israeli Supreme Court observed that the laws pertaining to civil status laws ensure that:

1. the Jews will have the exclusive right to come to Israel and acquire citizenship
2. Israel will maintain links with the Jewish diaspora
3. Israel has to maintain a Jewish majority in the State.

In addition to that, the Knesset adopted laws in the 1950s and 1960s to facilitate and expedite the state’s acquisition of Palestinian land, and an administration system was erected to facilitate the whole process. Currently, the state controls 93% of the land inside Israel (two million hectares). The different “national” organizations and laws formalised a close relationship with the Jews all over the world, offering them “Jewish nationality” status and the enjoyment of Palestinian land and property as a part of that privileged status. Those Jewish immigrants assume a superior status to the indigenous people not only with regard to land and property, but also most other human rights.

The state and Zionist institutions sought to build new Israeli towns. Since 1948, hundreds of settlements have been built for Jews, while Palestinian Arabs lost 76% of their land and more than 500 villages. Not only have no new Arab villages or towns been built since 1948, but many pre-existing Palestinian villages inside Israel remain legally “unrecognised” and subject to punitive demolition and transfer.

In addition, some 200,000 “present absentee” remain of those Palestinians displaced within Israeli boundaries and dispossessed in 1948. These are present physically and citizens of the state, but deemed legally “absent” under the 1953 Absentee Property Law.

Time permitting, we could talk further about many other state tools, such as those developed toward the continual dispossession of the Palestinian Bedouins. Suffice it to say that the Zionist project is determined, complex, pervasive and continuous.

\(^{17}\) As referred to in the Hebrew-language version of its title.
It is impossible to speak about land use in Israel without its legal conditionalities advancing the Jewish character of the state and the institutionalised discrimination that accompanies it. Moreover, it is similarly impossible to consider the rest of the territories of historic Palestine, namely the occupied territories of West Bank, Gaza Strip and Jerusalem, without also understanding this processes developed and refined inside the State of Israel. The same methods used during the Military Administration in Israel between 1948 and 1966 were transferred in the rest of Palestine acquired by force in 1967. These remain institutionalised in the Military Government of Israel that rules in those territories. Inside Israel, as in the OPT18, all these measures remain in contemporary use, forming an unbroken continuum of dispossession and deprivation of the indigenous Palestinian people—wherever they now live.

Discussion

Issa Samandar (Land Defence Committee, West Bank, Palestine), with reference to Mr. Warshawski’s presentation, pointed out that the Palestinians are at home in Palestine. The refugees of 1948 and 1967 cannot be considered “at home” unless they are in Palestine. Those remaining in historical Palestine are determined not to be refugees another time.

Françoise Clément (Egypt-based researcher and activist with International Solidarity Missions in Palestine) said that we cannot know if, and should not speculate that the Israeli society is actually threatened by the host society they have colonized. That could put us in the trap of attributing racism to Palestinian and Middle East society toward Jews as Jews. Such speculation invites analogies to the European (Nazi holocaust) example that finds no historic antecedent in the Arab world. In order to avoid such a cataclysmic scenario, however, the important problem to face now is, rather, that Israel continues to grow as a fascist, racist and outlaw state that conveys its predatory characteristics to the coming generation in school.

Participant question to Mr. Warshawski: Do you see a movement developing inside Israel with the analysis you shared with us that could give then a chance to compromise?

Participant question to speakers: How does the Israeli public opinion look at the situation?

M. Warshawski: I agree [with Issa]. Palestinians are already rooted in this world though, and the Jews are not, they are the problem.

I do not agree [with Françoise]. When I talk to Israelis, I have to show where Zionism is leading now. The disintegration of Israel may not happen, this is true. The imbalance of forces between Israel and Palestine is obvious. A second

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18 Consistent with a decision of the UN General Assembly in 1998, the term occupied Palestinian territory is referred to in the singular form. This is in order to reflect the principle of the 1991 Declaration of Principles in which the Oslo process considered the West Bank, Gaza Strip and occupied Jerusalem to be “a single territorial unit.” The remaining occupied territories in Lebanon and Syria are considered apart from this OPT designation, since they are part of self-determination units outside the borders of Palestine.
Nakba [ethnic cleansing] also may be successful! And as in the first, 10% will be the fault of the Arab world and 90% of Israel.

It is beyond any logic that six million people can dictate their will to all the Arabs. In that sense, Zionism is also a failure. It is almost impossible that Israel continues in this pattern. [Positive] changes certainly will happen, but, unfortunately, I will not see many of them and maybe the coming generation will not either.

The public opinion in Israel had managed a positive evolution during 20 years. However, in 1995, everything was not only stopped, but reversed. Rabin’s assassination was a symbol only. At that moment, there was a choice to make for the left, and almost all its members decided that the unity of the society was the supreme value, even if they had to put extremists at the head of the state to protect it.

I am very pessimistic today, not because Israel cannot change, not because of the collapse of the left after [former Prime Minister Ehud] Barak’s lie; not because the Israelis are stupid enough to think that they are safe behind their army, but because the people in Israel who were struggling have been ready to give up. We realized then that their positions were much more artificial than we thought. All openings were much less real than what we imagined. This is why the change has to come from inside the society, but I am very pessimistic today.

A participant (student from Free Palestine Action Network [USA], a university-based movement) pointed out how U.S. military support to Israel is crucial to the status quo. He asked that the panellists address this aspect.

A participant from Paraguay mentioned that the news and analysis generally come from the United States. That prevents the people to understand what happens. They would definitely support the Palestinian cause if they really knew. The situation is similar, for example, in Paraguay and Turkey. Because of ideological and U.S. geostrategic bias, the media do not make it possible to understand the similar way Kurds are treated in Turkey, but a lot is said about how they are treated in Iraq only.

A participant asked, “Why have the Jews not learnt from the [Nazi] holocaust to create their State?”

J. Schechla: The WZO/JA that Jamil referred to are locally registered in all participants’ countries as charitable organisations to transfer tax-exempt contribution to Israel. Their essential purpose is to conduct population transfer. For that reason too, Palestine is an American issue since a lot of money is raised there.

J. Dakwar: In Haifa, 25% of students are Arabs, but there is no university for them, nothing in Arabic, consistent with their culture. Almost every year, more than five students go before disciplinary courts because of activism in protest to this situation. Apart from the basic issue of land, violations of the indigenous Palestinians’ human rights affect most aspects of life.
About U.S. policy, briefly, the United States is naturally very supportive of Israel, since it is considered the first ally in the region. It is difficult to expect differently from the USA—itself a colonial-settler country—to oppose colonialism. However false, the United States considers Israel to be the only model of stability for them in the region. It is the first and only state in the region to have nuclear weapons.\footnote{About U.S. aid to Israel, see Annex 6.}

It is very possible to draw an analogy between Israel’s treatment of the Palestinians and the indigenous peoples in the Americas. The colonisers saw them as savages to be rehabilitated. Now, however, some institutions have created new spaces to valorise the indigenous cultures. The same happens with the Palestinians, who are portrayed as savages, terrorists.

I have a personal story demonstrating who the terrorists really are. My grandfather was killed by a bomb planted by an Israeli gang in a market in Haifa. One of those responsible was Yitzhak Shamir, eventual prime minister of Israel. Nobody ever questioned him for that, or other such crimes. The Israeli perpetrators of such acts have to be made accountable for their behaviour, and we have to raise the question.

The Kurdish question is indeed not very far from the Palestinian story. They have many things in common with us in their struggles, too. As a lawyer, I actually make the link with the Kurdish question for its value in legal argument. For example, the Turkish government has banned opposition political parties. This issue reached the European Court of Human Rights and has led to changes in the Turkish Constitution. I use these cases as a model and precedent to addressing similar bannings in Israel.

We should bear in mind that the Zionist Movement had rejected GA’s Partition of Palestine resolution 181, because it coveted the whole of Palestine, and because the 46% of land allotted to the Jewish state actually had a 40% Arab population. Therefore, it was seen as contradictory to the essence of Zionism.

Most of the Jews who immigrated to Palestine came for diverse circumstances, not only because of the holocaust. That is partly why many Israelis did not learn from it. The Zionists just built on it to create emotional appeal to justify their program. Thus, the Palestinians have become the victims of the victims. There should be no competition to privatise the suffering of peoples, but to build peace and justice.

Q.’Aina: The Palestinians are one people, wherever they are. We all want destruction and killings to stop as soon as possible and that we Palestinians have our completely independent state. The refugees should have the right to return to their homes inside Israel, where they should be able to live without discrimination. We look for peace and justice as a solution.

Participant question: Who funds the high costs of settling immigrants?
J. Dakwar: There are different means. The taxes, including mine, are one. A lot of money is also gathered around the world by the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency. The billions of dollars in yearly aid from the USA is another major source. The irony is that this colonization is supported by many people around the world, not only Jews.

J. Schechla: Money collected for Nazi holocaust reparations is often collected not for distribution to victims, but transferred to the State of Israel and Zionist institutions. For example, Germany also paid holocaust reparations compensations of some US$55 billion to Israel up until 1974. Other settlements extracted from German industries and Swiss banks have gone to Zionist institutions. Most Jewish victims of the Nazi holocaust have received only symbolic compensations, if at all.20

A participant asked, “Is there any possibility to do establish a unitary state for both peoples.”

J. Dakwar: Given the formal injustice of the Israeli system, the solution of two states is anyway not anymore applicable, particular if that means that apartheid were to prevail in one of those fragment states.

The two-state solution is not very practicable anyway, since almost all lands are occupied. Therefore, a Palestinian state would be completely divided and entirely dependent on Israel. That means that a Palestinian state as envisioned in the 1940s is no longer possible. Zionists always rejected the idea of one, secular Palestinian state, because it would have to share something with the Palestinians. In Israel, the principle of an independent Palestinian state alongside Israel becomes more and more publicly supported, but not as a secular state, because that would deny their material privileges. Moreover, a single state in historic Palestine invokes the Israeli fear of becoming a minority again.

J. Schechla: We do a lot of comparative analysis in our coalition. In South Africa, colonisation brought about the "removal" of 78% of the indigenous population to 14% of the land. The big difference with Palestine was that that removal was internal to the state, whereas the Israelis expelled the large majority of the indigenous population outside of its borders.

In South Africa, the lynch pin of the apartheid system was the Population Registry Act that defined hierarchical civil status based on skin colour. In Israel, the pivotal element of the Zionist system of institutionalised discrimination is “Jewish nationality,” as a supercitizenship status. If you do not have this unique nationality status, one might be recognized as a citizen (on the criteria of birth, residence, marriage or immigration), but never with full rights, especially economic, social and cultural rights.

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If there were to be an independent Palestinian state in Gaza Strip, West Bank and Jerusalem, that institutionalised racism would still prevail inside the Green Line, unless a democratic alternative were to emerge in Israel.
The Balfour Declaration
November 2, 1917

Foreign Office
November 2nd, 1917

Dear Lord Rothschild,
I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

"His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours sincerely,
Arthur James Balfour
In 1947–48, the Zionist strategic attacks and massacres against Palestinian villages galvanized the Palestinian national resistance throughout historic Palestine, including in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.

As already discussed, some one million Palestinians live inside Israel today as citizens, but without equal rights. However, the OPT became a settling ground for many refugees from the 1947–49 Nakba (catastrophe), characterised by Israel’s expulsion of Palestine’s indigenous land-based and urban populations alike. According to 2001 population figures, 2,102,360 Palestinians live in the West Bank and 1,196,591 in the Gaza Strip, making the latter one of the most densely populated regions of the world.

Israel had occupied over 76% of Palestine before its “pre-emptive” Six-day War in 1967, in which it occupied the rest (West Bank, Jerusalem and Gaza Strip), as well as the Syrian Golan Heights. The West Bank, covers 5,800 km²; Jerusalem, 75km²; and the Gaza Strip covers 365 km². The combined Palestinian population in the OPT today numbers nearly 3.5 million.

The Israeli military occupation has had three material objectives:

1. to make of the whole country a market for Israeli products,
2. to find cheap labour for work inside Israel and
3. to implant more and more Jewish settlers from abroad inside the OPT as a means to take possession of the territory.

To achieve these objectives, Israel has confiscated approximately 73% of all land in East Jerusalem and the West Bank, and around 40% of Gaza land. The Zionist programme has progressively confiscated land for building settlements and their infrastructure, but especially the land of the Palestinian farmers, where agriculture forms the economic base.

Like inside Israel, the confiscation, closure and bulldozing of productive agricultural land in the OPT accelerate in times of crisis or conflict. During the current intifada (September 2000–February 2002), for example, Israeli occupation forces (IOF) have destroyed 30,389 dunum of land in this way.

This land theft and destruction has transformed Palestinian labour from traditional, land-based activities to modes of work that are increasingly dependent upon the Israeli economy. Meanwhile, the OPT remain comparatively underdeveloped. In Gaza, currently 69% of all workers are engaged small industry (4–5-person workshops), and 36% work in agriculture, with 2.3% in the industrial sector.

For both the refugees from the Nakba and the original Palestinian residents in the OPT, many Palestinians were forced into the Israeli labour market to survive after Israel’s confiscation of their land. During its 35 years of occupation, Israel has exerted tremendous economic and administrative pressure on Palestinians.

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21 After 1967 war, the occupation authorities expanded “the Arab East Jerusalem municipal boundaries, comprising 6.5 km², to an additional 70 km² by annexing the lands of East Jerusalem territories and some 28 surrounding villages into the State of Israel’s territory (Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs—PASSIA, 2002).
to leave their country. For example, Israeli occupation authorities pose insurmountable obstacles to Palestinian families seeking reunification, especially in Jerusalem. We are not allowed to build on a room to our house without permission from the Military Government of Israel (MGol) or Jerusalem Municipality. Until now, Palestinians apply and wait for building permits, but very rarely obtain one. If the family needs oblige the building of an extra room without a permit, the IOF can automatically destroyed the house. Until August 2002, Israel has demolished 26,039 Palestinian houses in the OPT.

Israelis generally treat Palestinian workers like slaves. In Gaza, thousands of men have to wake up at 03:00 to reach their work places on time, because they have to go through humiliating and lengthy procedures at Erez Checkpoint to reach Israel. They stand in single lines, passing one-by-one through fencing that resembles cattle runs. These workers may even be considered as the lucky ones, since they have at least the permit and magnetic card required to pass.

Any occupation relies on a system of collaborators, and Palestinian workers are particularly subjected. Israel pressures and threatens hundreds of these workers to become spies and collaborators for the secret services. If they refuse, the authorities threaten to cancel their permits.

Ever since the Oslo process started, Israel closed its borders. They denied the Palestinians their right to go back to their work places. Between March 1993 and June 2002, Israel closed the borders and the access to villages more than 700 days.

Such occupation policies also punish entire urban populations. The West Bank city of Nablus has been under curfew for more than seven months, where the residents have been allowed to move about for a total of only 40 hours during that entire period.

Unemployment, which stood at 9% in September 2002, has now reached 50 per cent, 60 per cent, or 80 per cent in the various areas. Poverty, defined as living on less than US$ 2 per day per capita, is at 70%. A total of 1.8 million Palestinians now receive food aid or other forms of emergency humanitarian support from a variety of sources such as UNRWA, the World Food Programme and the International Committee of the Red Cross. In addition, Jewish settlers have notoriously stolen their olive crops in some areas.

The current reoccupation has negatively affected every feature of our life. There have been shortages of basic foodstuffs, interference with medical services by the denial of access to doctors and hospitals, interruption of family contacts and preventing education. Municipal services, including water, electricity, telephones and sewage removal, have been terminated or interrupted, and the Israeli forces (IDF) have denied permission to repair damaged municipal service supply units. There has also been a near complete cessation of productive activity in manufacturing, construction and commerce as well as private and public services, which has had serious consequences for the livelihood of most of the population.
The Israelis seek to exercise control over all Palestinian natural resources. Occupation authorities have deprived many villages of drinking water, which has become especially harmful to Palestinian communities in dry summer months.

More than 200,000 Palestinians who depend on supplies brought in by water tankers are left without adequate water supply for long periods because of curfews and closures. In addition to problem of access, the IOF have destroyed water systems (water pipes, pumps and wells) during “Operation Defensive Shield” and the ongoing reoccupation of the Palestinian self-rule areas.

The UN has reported that “a sizeable number of wells and reservoirs in rural areas have been damaged, destroyed or made inaccessible because of violence. A number of the West Bank villages adjacent to Israeli settlements have been, and are currently suffering from recurrent closures of main valves on their water networks.”

Some 22% of children under the age of five suffer from acute or chronic malnutrition, while 20% suffer from iron deficiency (anemia). Mental health problems have increased alarmingly among children. The health care system has fallen into a grave crisis as a result of the shortage of medication and the inability of Palestinians to access health centres.

The latest development in the military art of closure is the “apartheid wall,” currently being built to separate Israel from most of the West Bank. The aim is to prevent Palestinians to go inside Israel. However, between the wall and the Israeli border, 11,000 Palestinians will be trapped, and they fear being subject of the first new wave of ethnic cleansings with the wall as pretext.

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On 23 June 2002, the Israeli government authorized a plan to build a ‘security wall’ running the full length of the West Bank, expected to be completed by June 2003. The apartheid wall shall have three parts: a northern section, a section for Jerusalem and a southern section. Israel’s apartheid wall is projected to run the whole 360-km length of the West Bank, near Salem, a village west of Jenin to the Hebron area in the South. The wall shall include electric fences, trenches and security patrols.

The Sharon Government has initiated the construction of a barrier running through the West Bank. The initial phases of construction entail over 100 kilometers of high concrete walls, fences, buffer zones, trenches and security watchtowers. The long-term plans aspire to extend the wall the entire 340-kilometer length of the West Bank.

The Israeli government claims that the wall is being built for security reasons, and emphasizes that it is not intended to represent a political border or even a permanent situation. However, while the military orders confiscating land to build the wall seize the land only until 2005, it is expected that the orders will be renewed indefinitely. Palestinians dispute this reasoning, however, believing that the construction will cement the occupation and create more facts on the ground.

From a security perspective, one would expect that such a barrier would be built on a mountain, in order to look down over lower areas. However, the construction is taking place in the most fertile and dense agricultural valley areas of the western OPT. The pattern of construction appears rather more strategic for acquiring natural resources than for securing the safety of Israeli citizens, he says.

It will also sever farmers from their plots of land. In the Qalqilya governorate alone, the wall will stretch along the fields of 300 farmers, and 1,000 farmers will lose significant portions of land to the western side of the wall. The loss of wells will deprive land that remains accessible of water needed to farm it, while the close proximity of Israeli guards will pose a threat to farmers cultivating what fields remain.

Not only do the Israeli plans place the wall on highly desirable agricultural land, but they also gobble up the Western Aquifer, a renewable groundwater source that supplies over 50 percent of the West Bank’s needs. According to the Qalqilya department of agriculture, the wall will expropriate 14 artesian wells in the Qalqilya region alone, and it is expected that other wells will be consumed as plans develop.

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Palestinian self-determination

Izzat Abdulhadi
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Arab NGO Network for Development (Beirut, Lebanon)

The self-determination of the Palestinian people is an issue that has both a legal and a political dimension. We will focus on the political one.

Self-determination is an inalienable right of peoples by virtue of which all people should freely determine their economic, social and political condition and external relationships.

This right has been systematically denied to the Palestinians. The United Nations as well as the international community bear the responsibility for failing to implement this basic right. Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 each called for Israel’s withdrawal from the OPT. Resolution 236 recognised the right to self-determination of the Palestinian people. It has always been denied in practice, however, with the Palestinian people enjoying no effective national independence or sovereignty.

The Israeli occupation of Palestine, especially in its violent manifestations, is legally illegitimate, but the failure of the international community to apply the right to self-determination of the Palestinians actually gives it de facto legitimisation. The denial of the Palestinian right to self-determination is closely linked to the recognition of the State of Israel, whereas the very recognition of Israel contravenes the obligation of UN member states under the UN Charter to implement the self-determination of peoples.

A significant portion of the Israeli public started to appreciate the importance of this Palestinian right, thanks to the Palestinian struggle during the first Intifada (uprising), beginning in 1987. The Palestinians in the OPT and elsewhere had believed that the outcome of the Intifada would be the creation of a Palestinian state, moving from a historical option to a present concrete option. In 1993, Israel and the PLO signed the Oslo Accords, but Israel has failed to respect the Palestinian right to self-determination. Instead of that, a so-called “final” agreement under the Oslo process was postponed to 1999.

In the interim period, designed as a confidence-building phase, the Palestinian Authority was created. According to the Palestinian interpretation, by 1999, we

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25 In General Assembly Resolution 2625 (24 October 1970), the principal of equal rights and self-determination of peoples is defined as follows: “By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, all peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every state has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter.... Every state has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter.” Source: W. Thomas Mallison and Sally V. Mallison, The Palestine Problem in International Law And World Order (London: Longman, 1986), Appendix 14 (extracts).
should have entered in a negotiation with Israel to create our state and implement our right to self-determination.

The final negotiations were supposed to be the time to solve five central issues delayed until the final-status talks. One is the status of Jerusalem, crucial for all. From our perspective, Jerusalem is an important part of our territory and is our occupied capital. However, in 1980, Israel unilaterally declared Jerusalem as the “unified and eternal capital” of Israel. Most Palestinians consider Jerusalem to be the heart of Palestine.

Moreover, the 1993 agreement obliged both parties to refrain from any action that would affect the status of the territories subject to the process. However, Israel actually went on colonizing Palestine unchallenged. This brought more frustration and the Oslo process, formerly known as “the peace process” proved its futility.

The second central issue postponed to 1999 was the status of Palestinian refugees. They do not enjoy any right to self-determination, and even any right at all in Lebanon. Israel constantly has rejected their right to return. The Palestinians agreed at Oslo to negotiate, but not to surrender their rights. The Palestinian refugees continue to demand implementation of GA resolution 194.

The third issue is the Jewish settler colonies. Israeli settlers in the OPT are more than 400,000, not counting the 200,000 in Jerusalem. More significant than the population numbers are the vast lands that they control both under MGol planning allotments and by de facto land grabbing. Some 5,000 Jewish settlers control 33% of Gaza land, as well as the access to the principle aquifers. Meanwhile, 1.2 million Palestinians live on the rest. This situation resembles South African apartheid, and a peaceful settlement requires that the settler colonies be dismantled.

The fourth key self-determination issue is the borders. The final Israeli proposal at Camp David was for Palestinians to occupy only 65% of their own land. According to Israel’s right-wing Likud Party’s interpretation, the Palestinian parcel should be only 42%.

These five issues had been postponed until 1999, because they are the most difficult to resolve and always complicated the negotiations over other, more-immediate implementation issues. While solving them are the requisites for a peace resolution, they are actually five integral parts of the right to self-determination.

It is important to clarify the controversial issue concerning the last negotiations at Camp David (July 2002). Israel claims that it had made a generous offer at Camp David, that they were ready to transfer control of over 95% of the OPTs, but that the Palestinian delegation have not been given any document to that effect. They did not know if the settlements were included in the 95%. No minutes of this meeting have been publicised.

In general, the Palestinian negotiators were patient to a fault and respected their own part of the agreements, but the “final” position of Israel broke everything.
That is a failure of international community, too, including the United Nations to exercise guiding pressure on Israel to adhere to international obligations.

After this dismal experience, many Palestinians felt that there is not alternative to active resistance, that negotiating was a pathetic waste of time. They have felt very frustrated by the tepid reactions of the political international community to Israel’s crimes and impunity, and decided to struggle again and to cast its hopes with the international social movement. The Palestinians still believe in peace, but necessarily within the framework of respect of international law, an essential ingredient that the Oslo process deliberately lacked.
The Israeli colonization of the OPTs

Iyad Abu Rdeineh  
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The information in this presentation is based on the field research and monitoring of the Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem (ARIJ), an organization based in Bethlehem particularly concerned with environment and water issues, and the impact of Israel’s colonization of the occupied Palestinian land. We will proceed with a chronological review of the maps, which graphically tell the story of colonisation and occupation.

*What is left of historic Palestine: historical overview*

1. Partition plan 1947

The following map shows Palestine as envisioned in the GA resolution 181: “Partition of Palestine”:
2. In the 1967 Six-day War, the 22% of Historic Palestine left to the Palestinians and administered by Jordan and Egypt were occupied by Israel. Despite the numerous calls of the UN General Assembly to Israel for its withdrawal, it still military occupy these territories.

3. From then, colonies have flourished in the OPT and the State plans the expansion of most of them (Master Plans).
4. From 1993 on, the Palestinian Liberation Organisation and the Israeli government engaged in the so-called “peace process,” that began with the signature of the Oslo I Agreement and should have led to final talks in 1999. During and after this process, all negotiations and related attempts failed (mostly without being accompanied by true political will).  

A constant and unresolved issue during these negotiations was the real nature of the propositions done by each part, especially Israeli representatives. Below is a graph of what the Palestinians call the “political amnesia.” It details the percentage of land “given” by the Israelis along the various stages of negotiation.

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West Bank Land Classification According to Agreements

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Agreement</th>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Area A</th>
<th>Area B</th>
<th>Area C</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Oslo II</td>
<td>May 1994</td>
<td>3 %</td>
<td>24 %</td>
<td>73 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wye I</td>
<td>October 1998</td>
<td>10.1 %</td>
<td>18.9 %</td>
<td>71.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wye II &amp; III (not implemented)</td>
<td></td>
<td>18.2 %</td>
<td>21.8 %</td>
<td>60.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharm I</td>
<td>September 1999</td>
<td>10.1 %</td>
<td>25.9 %</td>
<td>64.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharm II (delayed implementation)</td>
<td>January 2000</td>
<td>12.1 %</td>
<td>26.9 %</td>
<td>61.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharm III (delayed implementation)</td>
<td>March 2000</td>
<td>18.2 %</td>
<td>21.8 %</td>
<td>60.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>What should have been</td>
<td>1997</td>
<td>&gt; 95 %</td>
<td>0 %</td>
<td>&lt; 5 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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Techniques and latest developments

As already understood from the session yesterday, Israel’s acquisition and colonization of Palestinian lands has several dimensions and inter-related measures, forming a matrix of dispossession. Master planning under the MGol’s “civil administration” represents an administrative tactic of expanding Israeli installations of all kinds in the OPT for future use. The consequences of this planning with military enforcement fragments Palestinian territory to such an extent that it prevents the consolidation of the Palestinian state with any integrity.

One specific Israeli planning tactic is to close lands to Palestinian use and to claim the lands as nature reserves, where Palestinians are not allowed to build. Typically, these putative public zones are transformed into settler colonies within a few years. Israeli developers then cut trees and build sprawling settlements that impede all normal life for the indigenous Palestinian communities and degrade the local environment.

The establishment of military closed areas forms another Israeli device for closing and possessing vast areas of Palestinian lands. Palestinian habitation is banned within military closed areas, and the Israeli occupation forces demolish Palestinian homes and villages there, and prevent all economic activity, including traditional pastoralism.

Ideology is also a potent force in Israeli colonisation of the OPT. Religious belief is a driving motivation for the most extreme Jewish settlers who harken back to a point in Palestinian history that the Hebrew bible attributes to Hebrew Israelites living in Palestine’s West Bank. Jewish settlers look at the West Bank differently from Palestinians. They don’t speak about Bethlehem, for example, but refer instead to Gush Etzion, a collection of Jewish settler colonies set up in the Bethlehem District.

The evolving pattern of settler colonies began as isolated points of Jewish habitation with a military character. These have spread into interconnected blocks, forming large contiguous areas among settler colonies linked by roads and infrastructure, effectively transforming Palestinian land into large satellites of Israeli cities.

In particular, the network of Israeli roads in the OPT has isolated indigenous Palestinian towns and villages. The settler by-pass roads are enforced Jewish-only arteries that integrate the illegal colonies with each other and Israel, sever Palestinian communities and properties, and windingly consume the maximum land area possible foreclosing it to Palestinian owners’ use.

The IOF zoning plans for both Israeli settler colonies and roads carry a planning ban against all construction within a wide swath. The IOF enforces this construction ban with violent effect against Palestinian homes and other structures, including those pre-existing the Israeli installations.
5. The Network of roads and by-pass roads, and the zoning plans.
6. Between 2000 and 2002, in its continuous process of colonization, the State of Israel allowed and/or organized the installation of 24 new colonies and 113 outposts, but also expanded 45 existing colonies.
7. One of the officially invoked reasons for further colonization and the expansion of current settlements is Israel’s demographic growth. However, as the graph hereunder clearly shows, Israeli settlement population growth is largely provoked and not natural. The World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency, Jewish National Fund and their affiliates around the world collaborate to mobilize more Jews to migrate to the colonies.

Moreover, the official Israeli budget for settler colonies in 2003 is two billion shekels (US$ 47 million); however, this is only a fraction of the investment in these illegal settlements. Much of the US$4 billion in annual grant aid from the United States ultimately goes to support these colonies, as do investments of the parastatal WZO/JA and nongovernmental contributions. These monies subsidize the war crime of population transfer and provide the colonies with a wide range of services, which makes them attractive to new settlers.

![The Myth of Natural Growth](chart.png)
9. This 2001 satellite image shows how IOF and settlers shave wide swaths of Palestinian land to build roads.

The same pattern of utter destruction can be seen on this satellite image of Jenin camp, this time under a military pretext (April 2003).
10. At the geographical heart of the conflict, Jerusalem is a microcosm of all the measures to expel and ban indigenous Palestinians, preventing needed housing and punishing Palestinian home builders with demolition.
11. The Jerusalem Municipality has unilaterally declared expanded borders to incorporate as much as possible of Palestinian lands with the least number of Palestinian inhabitants. The planning zone of Jerusalem now effectively covers most of the central West Bank as far east as the very outskirts of Jericho in the Jordan River Valley.
12. This map presents a full picture of the very latest tool used by Israel to confiscate more lands on the pretext of security: The separation wall, or "apartheid" wall, symbolizes the end to any possibility for peace in the future.
13. To conclude, ARIJ proposes the principal ingredients to achieve real peace, and sees these “peace commandments” as the following:

The Ten Peace Commandments

1. Both peoples are destined to live together in this land as good neighbours, but not as master and slave;
2. Occupation is evil and Israeli bulldozing of lands and other actions constitute state terrorism;
3. A sustainable peace should be based on justice and equality;
4. Palestinians will never raise the white flag [of surrender]; oppression only breeds extremism;
5. A just peace provides the best security for all;
6. The ultimate goal should be a comprehensive peace rather than merely a nonbelligerency treaty;
7. Peace making between leaders is challenging enough, but peace building between peoples is more challenging;
8. Economic development, an essential ingredient for peace building, needs an enabling environment; walls are falling worldwide and fences are detrimental for economic development;
9. The Palestinian state must have enough resources to be viable;
10. Palestinians’ right to self-determination is not negotiable.
**Discussion**

F. Clément (International Solidarity Mission): With the new right policy of transfer to uproot civilians of small villages, there will be a new war crime and will do everything more complicated. One of our missions is solidarity by intervening on the field by standing between soldiers to protect civilians.

Uruguay participant: We need more and better information and materials in Spanish, because the media are completely controlled by the right wing and the Zionists in Uruguay.

A participant queried, “What will be the role of [President Yasir] Arafat in the near future?”

Another asked about the phenomenon of propaganda on both sides, and asked the speakers about their position on extreme actions, such as political violence?

In a follow-up question concerning President Arafat, a participant asked if he represents a possible agreement or enjoys significant support among everybody on the Palestinian side.

J. Dakwar: In the Declaration of Principles (1993), Israel did not recognize the Palestinian right to self-determination, only the PLO as the “sole and legitimate representative of the Palestinians.” However, the Palestinian side recognized the State of Israel. That imbalance represents an error on the part of the Palestinian leadership that distorted the whole Oslo process.

A participant in the Seminar asked the speakers to characterise the role and position of the Arab countries.

I. ‘Abd ul-Hadi: President Yasir Arafat has been elected by the people. He has been criticised a lot, but when the people felt that he was in danger, they rallied round him.

Despite the attributes of any individual leader, Palestinian society is democratic, and the Palestinians are ready for change. The question remains how to replace our leadership through elections. There is an internal debate on details, but we are united in rejecting a permanent dictator without elections like in Egypt, Syria and all the other Arab countries. Palestine does not want to imitate them. Arafat is not God. We also have an internal debate about the extremist groups. There are various strategies engaged at any given time and, unfortunately, not all are completely compatible.

For us to understand the phenomenon, it is important to recognize the cause of the political violence; that is, occupation, humiliation and bantustanisation. Hamas, for example, is actually part of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, an essentially peaceful group that has run for elections in Egypt and Syria. Hamas also speaks of a Palestinian state on the West Bank and Gaza.
Solidarity in action: strategic planning

Introduction

Joseph Schechla
Housing and Land Rights Network (Cairo)
Habitat International Coalition

Our Seminar has arrived at the point at which we will exchange information about strategies to implement solidarity with Palestine together. That is the essential task of any network.

The purposes of our final session are to link new partners, identify new areas of potential work, proffer tools and strategies that will allow us to transform our understanding of the Palestine question into choices and actions that make a positive difference.

At our disposal are examples of social movements for change and reconciliation from other conflict areas that we can adapt and apply to Palestine. Many of us are participants in those movements locally. In the bonding spirit of WSF, we are looking forward to participants’ questions, ideas, expressed needs and strategic proposals to take forward from this Forum into our work programs at home.

Antiapartheid and solidarity

Randa Siniora
al-Haq: Law in the Service of Man (Ramallah, Palestine)

Exploring the issue of Palestine often raises the question of whether Israel’s practices constitute apartheid or not. The Palestinians always link their struggle with that of the South Africans. We talk not only about discrimination and apartheid, but also about apartheid inside an integrated conquering system, known as Zionism. We are talking about the means by which one colonizing group contains an indigenous people and expropriates their lands and property, isolates them and variously discriminates against them.

We have spoken of historic Palestine. The Zionist Movement sought a solution to the racism that Jews faced in Europe by taking all of historical Palestine as a land for them. It established a state in Palestine in 1948. Israeli forces drove hundreds of thousands of Palestinians from their homes, creating the enduring refugee problem. After 1967, the remaining part of Palestine was occupied, creating more refugees and protracting the dispossession of even more Palestinians.

I come from the West Bank, where I have lived almost all my life under occupation, under the Israeli policy that violates all aspects of human rights. Long before the beginning of the first or the second Intifada, the Palestinians have been subjected to war crimes.
The Jewish settler colonies loom on the hills overlooking Palestinian villages. The occupation has installed a system of highways and by-pass roads to prevent the Palestinians from entering their villages. Israel built many of these installations after 1993; that is, during the Oslo phase of occupation. Effectively, we see and experience a system and policy of apartheid. We live in isolated villages. Only the Jewish settlers are free to go to homes on our land.

Jewish colonists, perpetrating violations of international criminal law, move freely. We, the indigenous people, are very restricted, and normal life already has become more complicated because of the wall we spoke about, which we call the apartheid wall. It takes more land, separates families and communities, and destroys and confiscates vital water wells. At the level of individual victims, one could also talk about the targeted killings of Palestinian activists, the Israeli military causing permanently disabling injuries, the arbitrary arrest and torture of thousands of prisoners, including children.

Meanwhile, the Palestinian cause has been presented in all international forums. Many decisions and resolutions have been adopted in our favour. Our right to self-determination—politically and economically—has been incontrovertibly established. The problem lies, however, in the enforcement of international law, which was codified for all the important historical reasons we know. It is largely thanks to the solidarity of social movements around the world that we have achieved recognition and resolutions in our favour.

How can the lessons of South Africa be useful for us? The whole world was against the apartheid regime in South Africa. How did it collapse? Only thanks to social international support and isolation of the apartheid regime. But the USA is against us, because of its imperialist ideology applied in the region.

Among the lessons to take from South Africa is that Israel likely will democratise its apartheid nature only if it is isolated at all levels. For this to happen in our case, any kind of normal trade, diplomatic relations and communication with Israel as a state should be stopped.

We are activists from around the world at WSF. Many groups have come to Palestine to lend their support, especially during this Intifada. While we enjoy little protection from the international and intergovernmental organisations, ordinary people have come to defend us with their body. We do not ask people to risk their lives for our sake, but everybody can act on the level of his/her government.

Most of our countries are High Contracting Parties of the Fourth Geneva Convention. Even war has its laws. Your governments have treaty obligations to support and protect the Palestinian people. Not only are our governments duty bound to respect international law in their own behaviour, but also to engage in international relations toward other countries that violate these minimum rules, and to take effective measures and legal steps to deter their violations. You are well grounded in international law when you put pressure on your governments to act in solidarity with the Palestinian people.
Your countries also import products from Israel. See what you can boycott\textsuperscript{27} and put pressure on your governments and fellow consumers to create as much pressure as possible. This is in your interest, because you are tax payers and you have the right and duty to make your governments accountable for their foreign policy, to safeguard against colonization in its old and new forms.

The point of our discussion is not only to help the Palestinian people simply because they have rights, but to help each other carry out that task as a collective duty.

\textsuperscript{27} See “Consumer Guide” in Annex 5
"Apartheid in the Holy Land"

By Archbishop Desmond Tutu

In our struggle against apartheid, the great supporters were Jewish people. They almost instinctively had to be on the side of the disenfranchised, of the voiceless ones, fighting injustice, oppression and evil. I have continued to feel strongly with the Jews. I am patron of a Holocaust centre in South Africa. I believe Israel has a right to secure borders.

What is not so understandable, not justified, is what it did to another people to guarantee its existence. I've been very deeply distressed in my visit to the Holy Land; it reminded me so much of what happened to us black people in South Africa. I have seen the humiliation of the Palestinians at checkpoints and roadblocks, suffering like us when young white police officers prevented us from moving about.

On one of my visits to the Holy Land I drove to a church with the Anglican bishop in Jerusalem. I could hear tears in his voice as he pointed to Jewish settlements. I thought of the desire of Israelis for security. But what of the Palestinians who have lost their land and homes?

I have experienced Palestinians pointing to what were their homes, now occupied by Jewish Israelis. I was walking with Canon Naim Ateek (the head of the Sabeel Ecumenical Centre) in Jerusalem. He pointed and said: "Our home was over there. We were driven out of our home; it is now occupied by Israeli Jews."

My heart aches. I say, "why are our memories so short?" Have our Jewish sisters and brothers forgotten their humiliation? Have they forgotten the collective punishment, the home demolitions, in their own history so soon? Have they turned their backs on their profound and noble religious traditions? Have they forgotten that God cares deeply about the downtrodden?

Israel will never get true security and safety through oppressing another people. A true peace can ultimately be built only on justice. We condemn the violence of suicide bombers, and we condemn the corruption of young minds taught hatred; but we also condemn the violence of military incursions in the occupied lands, and the inhumanity that won't let ambulances reach the injured.

The military action of recent days, I predict with certainty, will not provide the security and peace Israelis want; it will only intensify the hatred.

Desmond Tutu is the former Archbishop of Cape Town and chairman of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This address was given at a conference, "Ending the Occupation," held in Boston, Massachusetts in April 2002. It was published also as an article in The Guardian, Monday 29 April 2002

Israel has three options: revert to the previous stalemated situation; exterminate all Palestinians; or—I hope—to strive for peace based on justice, based on withdrawal from all the occupied territories, and the establishment of a viable Palestinian state on those territories side by side with Israel, both with secure borders.

We in South Africa had a relatively peaceful transition. If our madness could end as it did, it must be possible to do the same everywhere else in the world. If peace could come to South Africa, surely it can come to the Holy Land?

My brother Naim Ateek has said what we used to say: "I am not pro- this people or that. I am pro-justice, pro-freedom. I am anti- injustice, anti-oppression."

But you know as well as I do that, somehow, the Israeli government is placed on a pedestal [in the US], and to criticise it is to be immediately dubbed anti-Semitic, as if the Palestinians were not Semitic. I am not even anti-white, despite the madness of that group. And how did it come about that Israel was collaborating with the apartheid government on security measures?

People are scared in this country [the US], to say wrong is wrong because the Jewish lobby is powerful—very powerful. Well, so what? For goodness sake, this is God's world! We live in a moral universe. The apartheid government was very powerful, but today it no longer exists. Hitler, Mussolini, Stalin, Pinochet, Milosevic, and Idi Amin were all powerful, but in the end they bit the dust.

Injustice and oppression will never prevail. Those who are powerful have to remember the litmus test that God gives to the powerful: what is your treatment of the poor, the hungry, the voiceless? And on the basis of that, God passes judgment.

We should put out a clarion call to the government of the people of Israel, to the Palestinian people and say: peace is possible; peace based on justice is possible. We will do all we can to assist you to achieve this peace, because it is God's dream, and you will be able to live amicably together as sisters and brothers."

Desmond Tutu is the former Archbishop of Cape Town and chairman of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission. This address was given at a conference, "Ending the Occupation," held in Boston, Massachusetts in April 2002. It was published also as an article in The Guardian, Monday 29 April 2002.
J. Schechla: Some of you have already been active in various campaigns, including actions in solidarity with Palestine. Some others of you may be new to the issue and have basic questions. We have good resource persons to address a variety of interests and solidarity objectives. Randa has presented different forms of solidarity: boycott, civilian missions to witness and stand between soldiers and Palestinian civilians, lobbying governments, enforcement of international treaty law.

The important question now is what you can do.

A Brazilian journalist asked about the participation of the United States; that is, if, beyond the economical interest, American people support the whole policy.

Three members of a delegation of the UNISON public-servants trade union in Great Britain spoke of their experience in practical solidarity with Palestinian organisations similar to their own. UNISON is a trade union movement that has been working in solidarity with Palestinians for 20 years. UNISON’s main counterpart in this is the Palestinian General Federation of Trade Unions (PGFTU). UNISON assists the PGFTU not only in labour-related issues, but also in education, and in establishing a health union.

UNISON also occasionally provides material support, and supports projects to assist Palestinian villagers. The union undertakes specific actions, for example, to help Palestinian women manage production when men are imprisoned. (Two-thirds of UNISON’s members are women). UNISON also organizes conferences and sends delegations regularly to the OPT and to progressive Israeli trade union counterparts, too, lobbying them at the same time.28

At home, UNISON advocates and lobbies inside the United Kingdom in favour of the Palestinians. This activity has extended also to the European Union, thanks to UNISON comrades who are currently serving as MEPs, or people related to them.

Lobbying is the most frustrating task, because it is a very long-term process to change the mind of people. They needed to fight ten years within the Trades Union Congress (TUC), which represents the majority of British trade unions, so that it invite the PGFTU director they work with to come and speak.

Another participant from Chile took the floor. He explained that he also represents a union and needs information about the products that come from Israel into their country in order to boycott them. He is also in the General Union of Palestine Students.

R. Siniora observed that it is interesting to join students and trade unionists together, as each group has its own interests that are often complementary.

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28 For more information concerning UNISON’s campaign and actions with Palestine, go to: [http://www.unison.org.uk/international/palestine.asp](http://www.unison.org.uk/international/palestine.asp)
A trade unionist working for justice in Brazil, affiliated with Central Únita dos Trabalhadores (CUT), explained that her union is also mainly comprised of women. She is also part of a coordination mechanism, gathering many other unions. They hold substantive meetings to discuss questions like the war on Iraq. They undertake actions with counterparts in Venezuela, Columbia and Chile that provide hope and empowerment. At present, they are looking for ways to form solidarity with Palestine.

F. Clément: The ISM works to support the social movement in Palestine. Together with Action pour une Taxe Tobin d'Aide aux Citoyens (ATTAC), a 57,000-member movement to which she is also affiliated, European participants have undertaken continuous work with Palestine over two years, particularly with the Democracy and Workers’ Rights Centre as counterpart. This year, a group conducted a mission there.

One Chilean participant presented herself as belonging to a very small group without any name, but which is ready to help. Moreover he is a student in a high school within a university and has a wide network of contacts. He offered to help at home with the media and to outreach efforts.

A delegate from Maine, USA, introduced himself as a member of a group that has organised many Palestine-solidarity activities, like film festivals and lectures about Palestine. His group wants to send people there next year for an international solidarity mission. He explained how very difficult it is to talk about Palestine in the USA, because people are generally scared to express themselves on the subject.

A student from the Catholic University in São Paulo, studying history, told of a great need for reliable information, especially in American languages other than English.

J. Dakwar suggested that, when we have the whole list of participants, we can summarize the ideas and connect the people in Latin America and out.

A man from England observed that there are fewer people at WSF III than last year at WSF II raising the Palestinian issue, and fewer participants at each related seminar.

J. Schechla explained that these Palestine Solidarity Seminars were designed in response to last year’s conspicuous swell of support for Palestine at WSF. The Arab participation in WSF 2002 was late and small. We also noticed that the solidarity with Palestine at WSF II was impulsive and very sympathetic, but not necessarily grounded in deep understanding or tools of analysis. Hence, the idea of this seminar was to go through the whole process of dispossession of the Palestinian land and to explore its relations with the Americas. The objective was then to transform this knowledge into practical action.

For this ultimate purpose, we are trying to take advantage of the opportunity to link people by field of interest to further build networks. There are namely many people representing trade unions at WSF who could share experiences. For
those who have additional needs, we want to see how we can help with the very capable resource persons gathered in these Seminars.

Ideally, we arrive at the elements of a plan of solidarity action. For those who need information in Spanish and Portuguese, some of us can take on the task of linking with students in the Latin American region to identify specific information gaps, procuring and producing information, and translating, as necessary.

The woman from the Catholic University requested more information about solidarity actions and available bibliographies.29

The journalist added that what information is available needs to be better disseminated. There is a need to understand the reasons of this problem too, and what can be done to remedy it.

A Seminar participant who works in Rio Grande do Sul as a judicial officer reported that he has some materials on the subject, but he would like to have maps like those shown in the Seminar. Particularly, he is interested to have more information about the settlements and on Israel’s control of water.30

R. Siniora suggested that the access to information is a problem as a starting point. We, Palestinians, have problems to communicate in Spanish. We are trying to establish links with Palestinians here who can translate directly from Arabic to Portuguese. Otherwise, sufficient information is already available in other languages, but the problem is just to communicate it. That is why we also should link groups together to facilitate productive relations. If we want to launch a campaign, for example, concerning decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court, it would be important to enlist the support of credible and well-known judges around the world. We should get out of here with ideas, disseminate them, and act.

F. Clément added that it is very possible to ask people like M. Warshawski, Jeff Halper (of the Israeli Committee against House Demolitions) and well-known Palestinians to come to communities and give testimonies.

R. Siniora said that having more people from Latin America going to Palestine would allow them to have a real understanding of the situation, and then allow them to give testimony back home.

F. Clément explained that all people cannot go there and confront the Israeli soldiers, but there is also a lot of office work to do, and it is also possible to visit Palestine and return with testimony, photos and films. It can be very useful to have a contact list of journalists before travelling. Some people also make contacts with centres, local people and now know their projects. They can go back home and raise funds, and help the local partners in Palestine develop their projects. There are a lot of possibilities.

29 See Bibliography below, Annex 10.
30 To find information about all these subjects, see references of websites listed in Annex 9.
For participants in the ISMs, it is important that everybody have training in order to anticipate problems and know what to do in an emergency situation.

J. Dakwar: Many people are pessimistic these days. For the next WSF, we should hope to organise a larger discussion, for which everything is concentrated and coordinated with all the organisations that participate. It should gather everybody in one concentrated event with one voice.

F, Clément agreed to cooperate in the preparations for WSF IV in India. A working group would serve that purpose, formed of those interested persons here at WSF III and others.

I. Abu Rdeina reported that he has met some activists from the ISM in Palestine. Their solidarity action is very important for the Palestinian people, because Israel tries to isolate Palestinians and make them feel alone. When they see people coming in solidarity, it is very helpful to the local morale.

**Resources for immediate follow-up**\(^{31}\)

Resource for documents and films in English and French:

indayse@maktoob.com

Spanish-language website on Arab issues, including Palestine:

Comité de Solidaridad con la Causa Árabe [http://www.nodo50.org/csca/palestina also http://www.nodo50.org/csca/palestina/abu-sitta_21-01-02.html](http://www.nodo50.org/csca/palestina)

International Solidarity Movement website:

www.palsolidarity.org

Contact for those wanting to participate in solidarity missions: abusalib@p-ol.com (Attn: Georges Rishmawi)

On workers rights, sources of relevant information include:

Democracy and Workers Rights Centre (DWRC): www.DWRC.org


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\(^{31}\) For more contacts, see Annex 9.
ANNEX 1
Program of the Sessions

26 January PM session, Prédio 11, Sala 406

13:30–14:00 Welcome and introduction: Joseph Schechla (HIC/HLRN)

14:00–14:40 “The Jewish question” and political Zionism: Michel Warshawski (Alternative Information Center, Jerusalem)


16:10–16:45 Institutionalised discrimination inside Israel: law and institutions: Jamil Dakwar (New York University)

16:45–17:30 Discussion: questions and answers

27 January AM session, Prédio 50, Sala 504

09:00–09:10 Welcome & introduction: Joseph Schechla (HIC/HLRN)

09:10–09:50 Continuing dispossession: Hassan Barghouthi (Democracy and Workers Rights Center, West Bank and Gaza Strip, Palestine)

09:50–10:30 Palestinian self-determination: Izzat Abdulhadi (Bisan Research Center, Ramallah, Palestine; & Arab NGO Network for Development, Beirut, Lebanon)

10:30–11:10 The Israeli colonization of the OPTs: Iyad Abu Rdeina, (Applied Research Institute of Jerusalem—ARIJ, Bethlehem, Palestine)

27 January PM session, Prédio 50, Sala 504

Solidarity in action: strategic planning

14:00–14:30 Welcome and introduction: Joseph Schechla (HIC/HLRN)

14:30–15:00 Anti-apartheid and solidarity: Randa Siniora (al-Haq: Law in the Service of Man, Ramallah, Palestine)

15:00–17:00 Practical solidarity proposals (brainstorming)
ANNEX 2
UN DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE

1. General Assembly resolution 181
2. General Assembly resolution 194
3. Security Council resolution 242
4. Security Council resolution 338

1. UN General Assembly Resolution 181
   (Partition Plan)
   November 29, 1947

B. STEPS PREPARATORY TO INDEPENDENCE
10 The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The Constitutions of the States shall embody Chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration provided for in section C below and include, inter alia, provisions for:

   a. Establishing in each State a legislative body elected by universal suffrage and by secret ballot on the basis of proportional representation, and an executive body responsible to the legislature;

   b. Settling all international disputes in which the State may be involved by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered;

   c. Accepting the obligation of the State to refrain in its international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any State, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the United Nations;

   d. Guaranteeing to all persons equal and non-discriminatory rights in civil, political, economic and religious matters and the enjoyment of human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of religion, language, speech and publication, education, assembly and association;

   e. Preserving freedom of transit and visit for all residents and citizens of the other State in Palestine and the City of Jerusalem, subject to considerations of national security, provided that each State shall control residence within its borders....

C. Declaration
A declaration shall be made to the United Nations by the Provisional Government of each proposed State before independence. It shall contain, inter alia, the following clauses:
General Provision
The stipulations contained in the Declaration are recognized as fundamental laws of the State and no law, regulation or official action shall conflict or interfere with these stipulations, nor shall any law, regulation or official action prevail over them.

Chapter 2: Religious and Minority Rights

1. Freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, shall be ensured to all.
2. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants on the ground of race, religion, language or sex.
3. All persons within the jurisdiction of the State shall be entitled to equal protection of the laws.
4. The family law and personal status of the various minorities and their religious interests, including endowments, shall be respected.
5. Except as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government, no measure shall be taken to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of religious or charitable bodies of all faiths or to discriminate against any representative or member of these bodies on the ground of his religion or nationality.
6. The State shall ensure adequate primary and secondary education for the Arab and Jewish minority, respectively, in its own language and its cultural traditions. The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the State may impose, shall not be denied or impaired. Foreign educational establishments shall continue their activity on the basis of their existing rights.
7. No restriction shall be imposed on the free use by any citizen of the State of any language in private intercourse, in commerce, in religion, in the Press or in publications of any kind, or at public meetings.(3)
8. No expropriation of land owned by an Arab in the Jewish State (by a Jew in the Arab State)(4) shall be allowed except for public purposes. In all cases of expropriation full compensation as fixed by the Supreme Court shall be said previous to dispossession.
2. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 194 (III)
11 December 1948

The General Assembly,

Having considered further the situation in Palestine,

1. Expresses its deep appreciation of the progress achieved through the good offices of the late United Nations Mediator in promoting a peaceful adjustment of the future situation of Palestine, for which cause he sacrificed his life; and

Extends its thanks to the Acting Mediator and his staff for their continued efforts and devotion to duty in Palestine;

2. Establishes a Conciliation Commission consisting of three States Members of the United Nations which shall have the following functions:

(a) To assume, in so far as it considers necessary in existing circumstances, the functions given to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine by resolution 182;(S-2) of the General Assembly of 14 May 1948;

(b) To carry out the specific functions and directives given to it by the present resolution and such additional functions and directives as may be given to it by the General Assembly or by the Security Council;

(c) To undertake, upon the request of the Security Council, any of the functions now assigned to the United Nations Mediator on Palestine or to the United Nations Truce Commission by resolutions of the Security Council; upon such request to the Conciliation Commission by the Security Council with respect to all the remaining functions of the United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council resolutions, the office of the Mediator shall be terminated;

3. Decides that a Committee of the Assembly, consisting of China, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom and the United States of America, shall present, before the end of the first part of the present session of the General Assembly, for the approval of the Assembly, a proposal concerning the names of the three States which will constitute the Conciliation Commission;

4. Requests the Commission to begin its functions at once, with a view to the establishment of contact between the parties themselves and the Commission at the earliest possible date;

5. Calls upon the Governments and authorities concerned to extend the scope of the negotiations provided for in the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948 and to seek agreement by negotiations conducted either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, with a view to the final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

6. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to take steps to assist the Governments and authorities concerned to achieve a final settlement of all questions outstanding between them;

7. Resolves that the Holy Places - including Nazareth - religious buildings and sites in Palestine should be protected and free access to them assured, in accordance with existing rights and historical practice; that arrangements to this end should be under effective United Nations supervision; that the United Nations Conciliation Commission, in
presenting to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly its detailed proposals for
a permanent international régime for the territory of Jerusalem, should include
recommendations concerning the Holy Places in that territory, that with regard to the Holy
Places in the rest of Palestine the Commission should call upon the political authorities of
the areas concerned to give appropriate formal guarantees as to the protection of the Holy
Places and access to them, and that these undertakings should be presented to the
General Assembly for approval;

8. Resolves that, in view of its association with three world religions, the Jerusalem area,
including the present municipality of Jerusalem plus the surrounding villages and towns,
the most eastern of which shall be Abu Dis; the most southern, Bethlehem, the most
western, Ein Karim (including also the built-up area of Motsa); and the most northern
Shu'fat, should be accorded special and separate treatment from the rest of Palestine and
should be placed under effective United Nations control;

Requests the Security Council to take further steps to ensure the demilitarization of
Jerusalem at the earliest possible date;

Instructs the Commission to present to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly
detailed proposals for a permanent international régime for the Jerusalem area which will
provide for the maximum local autonomy for distinctive groups consistent with the special
international status of the Jerusalem area;

The Conciliation Commission is authorized to appoint a United Nations representative, who
shall co-operate with the local authorities with respect to the interim administration of the
Jerusalem area;

9. Resolves that, pending agreement on more detailed arrangements among the
Governments and authorities concerned, the freest possible access to Jerusalem by road,
rail or air should be accorded to all inhabitants of Palestine;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to report immediately to the Security Council, for
appropriate action by that organ, any attempt by any party to impede such access;

10. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to seek arrangements among the Governments
and authorities concerned which will facilitate the economic development of the area,
including arrangements for access to ports and airfields and the use of transportation and
communication facilities;

11. Resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live at peace with their
neighbours should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that
compensation should be paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss
of or damage to property which, under principles of international law or in equity, should be
made good by the Governments or authorities responsible;

Instructs the Conciliation Commission to facilitate the repatriation, resettlement and
economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees and the payment of compensation, and
to maintain close relations with the Director of the United Nations Relief for Palestine
Refugees and, through him, with the appropriate organs and agencies of the United
Nations;

12. Authorizes the Conciliation Commission to appoint such subsidiary bodies and to
employ such technical experts, acting under its authority, as it may find necessary for the
effective discharge of its functions and responsibilities under the present resolution;
The Conciliation Commission will have its official headquarters at Jerusalem. The authorities responsible for maintaining order in Jerusalem will be responsible for taking all measures necessary to ensure the security of the Commission. The Secretary-General will provide a limited number of guards for the protection of the staff and premises of the Commission;

13. Instructs the Conciliation Commission to render progress reports periodically to the Secretary-General for transmission to the Security Council and to the Members of the United Nations;

14. Calls upon all Governments and authorities concerned to co-operate with the Conciliation Commission and to take all possible steps to assist in the implementation of the present resolution;

15. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the necessary staff and facilities and to make appropriate arrangements to provide the necessary funds required in carrying out the terms of the present resolution.

3. UN Security Council resolution 242
   22 November 1967

The Security Council,
Expressing its continuing concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every State in the area can live in security,
Emphasizing further that all Member States in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the application of both the following principles:
Withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict;
Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force;

Affirms further the necessity
For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area;
For achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem;
For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every State in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

Requests the Secretary General to designate a Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

Requests the Secretary-General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special Representative as soon as possible.
4. UN Security Council Resolution 338

The Security Council,

Calls upon all parties to present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions after the moment of the adoption of this decision, in the positions they now occupy;

Calls upon all parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) in all of its parts;

Decides that, immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
ANNEX 3
OTHER USEFUL DOCUMENTS ON PALESTINE

1. The Palestine Mandate
2. The Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel

The Palestine Mandate

The Council of the League of Nations:

24 July 1922

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2nd, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favor of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historical connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine; and

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions; and

Whereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 (paragraph 8), it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League Of Nations; confirming the said Mandate, defines its terms as follows:

ARTICLE 1. The Mandatory shall have full powers of legislation and of administration, save as they may be limited by the terms of this mandate.

ART. 2. The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

ART. 3. The Mandatory shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

ART. 4. An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration to assist and take part in the development of the country.
The Zionist organization, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

ART. 5. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no Palestine territory shall be ceded or leased to, or in any way placed under the control of the Government of any foreign Power.

ART. 6. The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

ART. 7. The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

ART. 8. The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, shall not be applicable in Palestine. Unless the Powers whose nationals enjoyed the afore-mentioned privileges and immunities on August 1st, 1914, shall have previously renounced the right to their re-establishment, or shall have agreed to their non-application for a specified period, these privileges and immunities shall, at the expiration of the mandate, be immediately reestablished in their entirety or with such modifications as may have been agreed upon between the Powers concerned.

ART. 9. The Mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that the judicial system established in Palestine shall assure to foreigners, as well as to natives, a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and communities and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the control and administration of Wakfs shall be exercised in accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

ART. 10. Pending the making of special extradition agreements relating to Palestine, the extradition treaties in force between the Mandatory and other foreign Powers shall apply to Palestine.

ART. 11. The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and, subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land.

The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

ART. 12. The Mandatory shall be entrusted with the control of the foreign relations of Palestine and the right to issue exequatur to consuls appointed by foreign Powers. He shall
also be entitled to afford diplomatic and consular protection to citizens of Palestine when outside its territorial limits.

ART. 13. All responsibility in connection with the Holy Places and religious buildings or sites in Palestine, including that of preserving existing rights and of securing free access to the Holy Places, religious buildings and sites and the free exercise of worship, while ensuring the requirements of public order and decorum, is assumed by the Mandatory, who shall be responsible solely to the League of Nations in all matters connected herewith, provided that nothing in this article shall prevent the Mandatory from entering into such arrangements as he may deem reasonable with the Administration for the purpose of carrying the provisions of this article into effect; and provided also that nothing in this mandate shall be construed as conferring upon the Mandatory authority to interfere with the fabric or the management of purely Moslem sacred shrines, the immunities of which are guaranteed.

ART. 14. A special commission shall be appointed by the Mandatory to study, define and determine the rights and claims in connection with the Holy Places and the rights and claims relating to the different religious communities in Palestine. The method of nomination, the composition and the functions of this Commission shall be submitted to the Council of the League for its approval, and the Commission shall not be appointed or enter upon its functions without the approval of the Council.

ART. 15. The Mandatory shall see that complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals, are ensured to all. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Palestine on the ground of race, religion or language. No person shall be excluded from Palestine on the sole ground of his religious belief.

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the education of its own members in its own language, while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose, shall not be denied or impaired.

ART. 16. The Mandatory shall be responsible for exercising such supervision over religious or eleemosynary bodies of all faiths in Palestine as may be required for the maintenance of public order and good government. Subject to such supervision, no measures shall be taken in Palestine to obstruct or interfere with the enterprise of such bodies or to discriminate against any representative or member of them on the ground of his religion or nationality.

ART. 17. The Administration of Palestine may organise on a voluntary basis the forces necessary for the preservation of peace and order, and also for the defence of the country, subject, however, to the supervision of the Mandatory, but shall not use them for purposes other than those above specified save with the consent of the Mandatory. Except for such purposes, no military, naval or air forces shall be raised or maintained by the Administration of Palestine.

Nothing in this article shall preclude the Administration of Palestine from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the Mandatory in Palestine.

The Mandatory shall be entitled at all times to use the roads, railways and ports of Palestine for the movement of armed forces and the carriage of fuel and supplies.

ART. 18. The Mandatory shall see that there is no discrimination in Palestine against the nationals of any State Member of the League of Nations (including companies incorporated under its laws) as compared with those of the Mandatory or of any foreign State in matters concerning taxation, commerce or navigation, the exercise of industries or professions, or in the treatment of merchant vessels or civil aircraft. Similarly, there shall be no discrimination in Palestine against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit under equitable conditions across the mandated area.

Subject as aforesaid and to the other provisions of this mandate, the Administration of Palestine may, on the advice of the Mandatory, impose such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary, and take such steps as it may think best to promote the
development of the natural resources of the country and to safeguard the interests of the population. It may also, on the advice of the Mandatory, conclude a special customs agreement with any State the territory of which in 1914 was wholly included in Asiatic Turkey or Arabia.

ART. 19. The Mandatory shall adhere on behalf of the Administration of Palestine to any general international conventions already existing, or which may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, respecting the slave traffic, the traffic in arms and ammunition, or the traffic in drugs, or relating to commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation and postal, telegraphic and wireless communication or literary, artistic or industrial property.

ART. 20. The Mandatory shall co-operate on behalf of the Administration of Palestine, so far as religious, social and other conditions may permit, in the execution of any common policy adopted by the League of Nations for preventing and combating disease, including diseases of plants and animals.

ART. 21. The Mandatory shall secure the enactment within twelve months from this date, and shall ensure the execution of a Law of Antiquities based on the following rules. This law shall ensure equality of treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to the nationals of all States Members of the League of Nations.

(1) "Antiquity" means any construction or any product of human activity earlier than the year 1700 A. D.

(2) The law for the protection of antiquities shall proceed by encouragement rather than by threat.

Any person who, having discovered an antiquity without being furnished with the authorization referred to in paragraph 5, reports the same to an official of the competent Department, shall be rewarded according to the value of the discovery.

(3) No antiquity may be disposed of except to the competent Department, unless this Department renounces the acquisition of any such antiquity.

No antiquity may leave the country without an export licence from the said Department.

(4) Any person who maliciously or negligently destroys or damages an antiquity shall be liable to a penalty to be fixed.

(5) No clearing of ground or digging with the object of finding antiquities shall be permitted, under penalty of fine, except to persons authorised by the competent Department.

(6) Equitable terms shall be fixed for expropriation, temporary or permanent, of lands which might be of historical or archaeological interest.

(7) Authorization to excavate shall only be granted to persons who show sufficient guarantees of archaeological experience. The Administration of Palestine shall not, in granting these authorizations, act in such a way as to exclude scholars of any nation without good grounds.

(8) The proceeds of excavations may be divided between the excavator and the competent Department in a proportion fixed by that Department. If division seems impossible for scientific reasons, the excavator shall receive a fair indemnity in lieu of a part of the find.

ART. 22. English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

ART. 23. The Administration of Palestine shall recognise the holy days of the respective communities in Palestine as legal days of rest for the members of such communities.

ART. 24. The Mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report to the satisfaction of the Council as to the measures taken during the year to carry out
the provisions of the mandate. Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated or issued during the year shall be communicated with the report.

ART. 25. In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.

ART. 26. The Mandatory agrees that, if any dispute whatever should arise between the Mandatory and another member of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of the mandate, such dispute, if it cannot be settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by Article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

ART. 27. The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of this mandate.

ART. 28. In the event of the termination of the mandate hereby conferred upon the Mandatory, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary for safeguarding in perpetuity, under guarantee of the League, the rights secured by Articles 13 and 14, and shall use its influence for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate, including the rights of public servants to pensions or gratuities.

The present instrument shall be deposited in original in the archives of the League of Nations and certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all members of the League.

Done at London the twenty-fourth day of July, one thousand nine hundred and twenty-two.
ERETZ-ISRAEL [(Hebrew) - the Land of Israel, Palestine] was the birthplace of the Jewish people. Here their spiritual, religious and political identity was shaped. Here they first attained to statehood, created cultural values of national and universal significance and gave to the world the eternal Book of Books.

After being forcibly exiled from their land, the people kept faith with it throughout their Dispersion and never ceased to pray and hope for their return to it and for the restoration in it of their political freedom.

Impelled by this historic and traditional attachment, Jews strove in every successive generation to re-establish themselves in their ancient homeland. In recent decades they returned in their masses. Pioneers, ma'pilim [(Hebrew) - immigrants coming to Eretz-Israel in defiance of restrictive legislation] and defenders, they made deserts bloom, revived the Hebrew language, built villages and towns, and created a thriving community controlling its own economy and culture, loving peace but knowing how to defend itself, bringing the blessings of progress to all the country's inhabitants, and aspiring towards independent nationhood.

In the year 5657 (1897), at the summons of the spiritual father of the Jewish State, Theodore Herzl, the First Zionist Congress convened and proclaimed the right of the Jewish people to national rebirth in its own country.

This right was recognized in the Balfour Declaration of the 2nd November, 1917, and re-affirmed in the Mandate of the League of Nations which, in particular, gave international sanction to the historic connection between the Jewish people and Eretz-Israel and to the right of the Jewish people to rebuild its National Home.

The catastrophe which recently befell the Jewish people - the massacre of millions of Jews in Europe - was another clear demonstration of the urgency of solving the problem of its homelessness by re-establishing in Eretz-Israel the Jewish State, which would open the gates of the homeland wide to every Jew and confer upon the Jewish people the status of a fully privileged member of the comity of nations.

Survivors of the Nazi holocaust in Europe, as well as Jews from other parts of the world, continued to migrate to Eretz-Israel, undaunted by difficulties, restrictions and dangers, and never ceased to assert their right to a life of dignity, freedom and honest toil in their national homeland.

In the Second World War, the Jewish community of this country contributed its full share to the struggle of the freedom- and peace-loving nations against the forces of Nazi wickedness and, by the blood of its soldiers and its war effort, gained the right to be reckoned among the peoples who founded the United Nations.

On the 29th November, 1947, the United Nations General Assembly passed a resolution calling for the establishment of a Jewish State in Eretz-Israel; the General Assembly required the inhabitants of Eretz-Israel to take such steps as were necessary on their part for the implementation of that resolution. This recognition by the United Nations of the right of the Jewish people to establish their State is irrevocable.

This right is the natural right of the Jewish people to be masters of their own fate, like all other nations, in their own sovereign State.
Accordingly we, members of the people's council, representatives of the Jewish community of Eretz-Israel and of the Zionist movement, are here assembled on the day of the termination of the British mandate over Eretz-Israel and, by virtue of our natural and historic right and on the strength of the resolution of the United Nations General Assembly, hereby declare the establishment of a Jewish state in Eretz-Israel, to be known as the State of Israel.

We declare that, with effect from the moment of the termination of the Mandate being tonight, the eve of Sabbath, the 6th Iyar, 5708 (15th May, 1948), until the establishment of the elected regular authorities of the State in accordance with the Constitution which shall be adopted by the Elected Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October 1948, the People's Council shall act as a Provisional Council of State, and its executive organ, the People's Administration, shall be the Provisional Government of the Jewish State, to be called "Israel".

The State of Israel will be open for Jewish immigration and for the Ingathering of the Exiles; it will foster the development of the country for the benefit of all its inhabitants; it will be based on freedom, justice and peace as envisaged by the prophets of Israel; it will ensure complete equality of social and political rights to all its inhabitants irrespective of religion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedom of religion, conscience, language, education and culture; it will safeguard the Holy Places of all religions; and it will be faithful to the principles of the Charter of the United Nations.

The State of Israel is prepared to cooperate with the agencies and representatives of the United Nations in implementing the resolution of the General Assembly of the 29th November, 1947, and will take steps to bring about the economic union of the whole of Eretz-Israel.

We appeal to the United Nations to assist the Jewish people in the building-up of its State and to receive the State of Israel into the comity of nations.

We appeal - in the very midst of the onslaught launched against us now for months - to the Arab inhabitants of the State of Israel to preserve peace and participate in the upbuilding of the State on the basis of full and equal citizenship and due representation in all its provisional and permanent institutions.

We extend our hand to all neighbouring states and their peoples in an offer of peace and good neighbourliness, and appeal to them to establish bonds of cooperation and mutual help with the sovereign Jewish people settled in its own land. The State of Israel is prepared to do its share in a common effort for the advancement of the entire Middle East.

We appeal to the Jewish people throughout the Diaspora to rally round the Jews of Eretz-Israel in the tasks of immigration and upbuilding and to stand by them in the great struggle for the realization of the age-old dream - the redemption of Israel.

Placing our trust in the almighty, we affix our signatures to this proclamation at this session of the provisional council of state, on the soil of the homeland, in the city of Tel-Aviv, on this Sabbath eve, the 5th day of Iyar, 5708 (14th May, 1948).
Displaced and refugee Palestinians, including victims of arbitrary house demolitions, are categorised as follows:

1. 1948 refugees: initially displaced population of 770–780,000 has now grown to roughly five million persons
2. 1967 refugees: initially displaced: approximately 350,000 population has now grown to over one million persons (although this may include some “double-counting,” since at least 30% of the 1967 refugees are "second time refugees" (i.e., initially displaced from their homes of origin in 1948)
3. Refugees (relatively fewer in number) from the interwar years and wartime refugees from the October 1973 war;
4. “Internally displaced” Palestinian citizens of Israel dispossessed under the Absentee Property Law: initially displaced: 75–80,000; which population has now grown to some 200,000;
5. The “uprooted”: internally displaced persons evicted from villages inside Israel's 1948 and armistice borders whose villages were demolished and/or dispossessed without applying the Absentee Property Law."

International Protection for Palestinian Refugees?

A critical analysis of the September 2002 Revised UNHCR Interpretation of the Status of Palestinian Refugees under International Refugee Law:

Since 1948, Palestinian refugees have called for international protection to enable them to exercise their right of return to homes and lands illegally expropriated by Israel, and to avoid persecution in their places of refuge. From [their] exile in the Middle East, Europe and elsewhere they have called for protection of their right to freedom of movement, family unity, access to education, work and adequate housing. Too often, Palestinian refugees have raised desperate calls to the international community for protection from renewed forced displacement, collective punishment, arbitrary destruction of their properties, and [other] war crimes.

The 1982 massacre at Sabra and Shatila (Beirut); Israeli human rights violations during the first Palestinian Intifada in the occupied West Bank, eastern Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip (1987–91); and mass expulsion from Kuwait and Libya in the early 1990s, all gave raise to new UN resolutions and initiatives aimed at upgrading international protection for Palestinian refugees. These efforts, however, have not brought about substantial improvements. Confronted with massive Israeli military assaults against the civilian camp population in the current (second) intifada, Palestinian refugees from all areas of exile continue to call for international protection.

Five Decades of Exclusion from the International Protection Regime

For more than five decades, the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (‘Refugee Convention’) has provided a universal legal framework for international protection of refugees. Since 1950, the Office of the UN High Commissioner for

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Refugees (UNHCR) has served as the primary international agency mandated to provide protection for refugees.

To date, the majority of Palestinian refugees have derived few benefits from this international protection regime. UNHCR does not have a specific mandate to provide protection for Palestinian refugees. The UNHCR Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status, a major reference for policy makers and practitioners in the field of refugee law, has viewed Palestinian refugees primarily in terms of their exclusion from UNHCR mandate and concomitant protection (See Chapter IV: “Exclusion Clauses”).

UNHCR's longstanding interpretation of the 1951 Refugee Convention as excluding Palestinian refugees—especially refugees residing in UNRWA areas of operation—has been based on the understanding that protection or assistance for Palestinian refugees was provided by the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). According to the 1951 Refugee Convention (Article 1D), persons receiving protection or assistance from an existing UN agency are excluded from the Convention until such time as protection or assistance has ceased for any reason. This interpretation did not distinguish between the protection mandate accorded to UN Conciliation Commission for Palestine (UNCCP), which ceased to provide protection in the early 1950s, and the assistance mandate of UNRWA.

In 2002, UNHCR launched a first initiative to address the obvious gaps (“protection gaps”) in the special protection regime for Palestinian refugees. Serious gaps exist in the protection of the day-to-day rights of Palestinian refugees in exile. The most severe problems are in Lebanon and the 1967 occupied Palestinian territories. Equally serious gaps exist in the search for durable solutions (i.e., return, restitution, and compensation) consistent with international law and UN resolutions. No agency is currently recognized as having an explicit mandate to provide international protection for Palestinian refugees.

The New UNHCR Interpretation of the Status of Palestinian Refugees under the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Palestinian Refugees

UNHCR's revised interpretation of the status of Palestinian refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention was completed and published in September 2002. (For a complete copy of the revised interpretation, see the reference at the end of this analysis)

Positive Aspects

1. The revised interpretation addresses all categories of Palestinian refugees and one category of internally displaced Palestinians. The interpretation explicitly lists three categories of Palestinian refugees falling within the scope of the 1951 Convention:

(a) "Palestine refugees" within the sense of UN General Assembly resolution 194 (1948), who were displaced from that part of Palestine that became Israel and who have been unable to return there. This category implicitly includes 1948 internally displaced Palestinians in Israel. The implications of this interpretation will require additional clarification. Many of the norms relating to the status of refugees in international refugee law guarantee equal treatment only with aliens in the country of refuge. Therefore, they might not be applicable to internally displaced Palestinians, citizens of Israel.

(b) "Displaced Persons" within the sense of UN General Assembly resolution 2252 (ES–V) of 4 July 1967 who have been unable to return to the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967.

(c) "Palestinian refugees" who are neither 1948 refugees nor 1967 displaced persons and are outside the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel since 1967 and unable, or unwilling to return there owing to a well-founded fear of persecution.
2. UNHCR's revised interpretation recognizes that article 1D (second sentence) also functions as an "inclusion clause." Previous reference to Article 1D in the UNHCR Handbook (Chapter IV: "Exclusion Clauses") treated it only as an exclusion clause. According to the new interpretation, 1948 refugees (category "a") and 1967 refugees (category "b") are "Convention refugees" simply due to the fact that they belong to one of these groups (group refugee definition). UNHCR recognizes that members of this group do not need to prove individual persecution in order to be protected under the 1951 Refugee Convention. Proof of well-founded fear of persecution (Article 1A of the Convention; individual refugee definition) is required, however, for Palestinians from the 1967 occupied territories claiming refugee status (category "c"). The revised UNHCR interpretation should facilitate the harmonization and handling of protection requests submitted by Palestinian refugees/displaced persons to domestic state authorities.

3. The revised interpretation states that 1948 refugees (category "a") and 1967 refugees (category "b") are protected by the 1951 Convention as long as they reside outside the area of UNRWA operations. Based on Article 1D (paragraph 2), such persons do not need to prove that they are outside that area involuntarily. This interpretation should contribute to ending the controversy over the "returnability" in domestic immigration services and courts of Palestinians otherwise eligible for protection under the 1951 Convention.

4. The revised interpretation explicitly recognizes that descendants of 1948 refugees (category "a") and 1967 refugees (category "b") are entitled to protection under the 1951 Convention, even if such descendents have never lived in an area of UNRWA operations. UNHCR thus affirms the refugee status and protection rights of Palestinian refugees and displaced persons as applied in previous UN resolutions and practice of UN agencies (e.g., UNRWA).

Negative aspects

1. The major shortcoming of UNCHR's revised interpretation, from the perspective of Palestinian refugees in need of protection, is the absence of a clear interpretation of the language "protection or assistance" in reference to the special UN regime for Palestinian refugees. The revised interpretation continues to use the phrase "protection or assistance" solely in relation to UNRWA, without explicit reference to the protection mandate of the UNCCP, even though both UN agencies existed at the time of the drafting of the 1951 Refugee Convention. UNRWA only has an assistance mandate with limited protection options. While the interpretation states that neither the UN General Assembly nor any subsequent UN resolution has specifically limited the scope of UNRWA's mandate, it is equally true, with self-evident results, that neither the General Assembly nor any subsequent UN resolution specifically expanded the scope of UNRWA's mandate to provide comprehensive protection to Palestinian refugees. The fact that the United Nations set up a specific protection agency for Palestinian refugees (UNCCP), which ceased to provide effective protection in the early 1950s, is addressed only in a footnote. As a result, the revised interpretation does not contribute to resolving the important question: "Which agency is responsible for the provision of international protection to Palestinian refugees?"

1. The application of cessation clauses 1C, 1E, 1F under the 1951 Refugee Convention to 1948 REFUGEES (category "a") and 1967 REFUGEES (category "b") is especially problematic. Cessation clause 1E provides that protection under the 1951 Convention does not apply to persons who have obtained nationality/citizenship rights in another country. This interpretation disregards the fact that Palestinian refugees and displaced persons are Convention refugees under Article 1D, which provides that protection by the Convention will cease only if "the position of such persons is definitely settled in accordance with the relevant resolutions adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations," i.e. implementation of a definite solution in accordance with UN General Assembly resolution 194. The revised interpretation is, therefore, inconsistent with the language and intent of the 1951 Convention itself. This interpretation could have dangerous political implications for Palestinian refugees who have obtained permanent
residency/citizenship elsewhere, while still wishing to exercise their rights (return, restitution, compensation) in the context of a durable solution of the Palestinian refugee question.

2. The revised interpretation does not provide clear legal analysis on the status of Palestinian refugees as "stateless persons." The lack of clarity on this matter has negative implications concerning additional provisions for international protection under 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness.

3. The revised interpretation, which includes detailed information about UNRWA criteria and standards of refugee registration, does not critically reflect or comment on UNRWA's policy of refugee registration according to descendants of the male line. Registration according to male lineage violates principles on nondiscrimination and gender equality otherwise promoted by the United Nations.

BADIL calls upon the UNHCR, UNRWA and other UN agencies, as well as Palestinian civil society and its refugee community organizations, to continue with a sense of urgency the constructive debate about principles and mechanisms, which could enhance the scope and quality of international protection for Palestinian refugees. Such debate must establish exactly the scope and magnitude of the "protection gap" that Palestinian refugees face, and tackle the question of how and by whom the protection gap should be closed. It must also take into consideration UNHCR's revised 2002 interpretation of the status of Palestinian refugees under the 1951 Refugee Convention and lead to the clarification of issues raised in the above analysis.

Note: The original text of the new, September 2002 UNHCR interpretation ("Note on the Applicability of Article 1D of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Palestinian Refugees to Palestinian refugees"), as well as the previous UNCHR interpretation of Article 1D, 1951 Refugee Convention can be found at:
www.badil.org/Protection/Documents/Protect_Docs.htm

Relevant background information can be found in BADIL Briefs No. 5 (UNCCP), No. 6 (UNRWA), and No. 7 (UNHCR) at: www.badil.org/Publications/Briefs/I&D_Briefs.htm

Additional recommended background information:
Lex Takkenberg. The Status of Palestinians in International Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998);
Susan Akram and Guy Goodwin-Gill: Brief Amicus Curiae, at:
www.badil.org/Publications/Other/Refugees/amicus.pdf

Source: BADIL Resource Center For immediate release, 24 November 2002 (E/63/02)

BADIL Resource Center aims to provide a resource pool of alternative, critical and progressive information on the question of Palestinian refugees in our quest to achieve a just and lasting solution for exiled Palestinians, including implementation of their right of return.

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Means of acquisition of the Palestinian land: technical overview

Here is a chronologically consistent overview of the tools that have been used by the Israeli state and the parastatal Zionist organizations to colonize the Palestinian land.

Prestate public institutions

The first dimension of Zionist colonisation of the land of Palestine emerged with the Jewish National Fund (Kayren Kayemeth), officially registered in Britain as a public international organization, succeeded in buying the first land in 1905 and 1907, and developed into the central Zionist institution for land acquisition in Palestine (Jiryis, 1973). The development and settlement of these acquired lands was also carried out by the World Zionist Organization/Jewish Agency, also operating internationally to transfer funds and settlers for the colonizing enterprise.

After 42 years of organized well-funded efforts on the part of the Zionist organizations, the total Jewish ownership of land in Palestine in 1947 was 1,734,000 dunums, or 1,734 km², which is 6.6% of the total land. The Jewish National Fund owned 933,000 dunums out of the total Jewish-owned land of Palestine (Jiryis, 1973). Some of these lands were sold to the Zionist agency by absentee landlords, individuals who were not the rightful owners of the land, but used their positions in previous governments to register large portions of lands to their names.

Zionist “national” institutions are public bodies that form part of the State of Israel as determined by Israeli legislation in its Basic Laws and other statutes. Officers of the WZO/JA and JNF also assume other parallel appointments within the state apparatus, and Israeli law guarantees World Zionist Organization (WZO), Jewish Agency (JA) and Jewish National Fund (JNF) exemptions and waivers on a range of fees and taxes on transactions conducted on behalf of “Jewish nationals” that are imposed on all others (Lehn & Davis, 96–99).

Long before the establishment of Israel, the WZO and its sister institution, the JA, claimed status as a public body under international law. The First Zionist Congress of 1897 at Basle set out explicitly to achieve that public status.

The principal juridical consequence of status as a public body, of course, is subjection to the law. Both the public status and accompanying legal limitations on the WZO/JA are manifest from the start of its activities in Palestine (e.g., in the various versions of the Balfour Declaration of 1917, subsequent recognition by the community of states, and the Mandate of Palestine Administration). The WZO/JA has been the principal public body promoting the concept of “Jewish nationality” and the status that this concept confers under the laws and policies of Israel. The close working relationship of the WZO/JA to the Palestine (Mandate) Administration emerged in the form of a shadow government in Palestine, leading up to the establishment of the State of Israel (Report of the Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry, in Mallison [1986], 100). Claiming “the Jewish people” as its exclusive constituency, the WZO/JA, however, violated its public

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body obligations commensurate with the increasing political and military power of the Jewish colony in Palestine. (The Anglo-American Report stated that "The Jewish shadow Government has ceased to cooperate with the [Palestine] Administration in the maintenance of law and order, and in the suppression of terrorism") The WZO/JA also financed much of the war effort against the Arab States fifty years ago.

The 1954 Covenant between the Government of Israel (GoI) and the Zionist Executive clarifies further the relationship of the WZO/JA and the GoI. The Covenant includes recognition of the JNF and United Israel Appeal as "institutions of the Zionist Organization," authorizes activities in Israel to be carried out "by means of public funds," and indicates in its first paragraph that the Zionist Executive "and its institutions" are to be treated as part of the GoI.

The parastatal WZO and JA have had overlapping functions over the decades. Moreover, a "Coordinating Body," formed in 1951, joins the executives of the WZO and JA to the GOI. However, what emerges through their continuing functions under the GOI and MGOI spheres amounts to an apparent division of labor. In their common roles of recruiting, organizing and carrying out physical projects for Jewish settlement, WZO operations focus on the 1967-occupied territories, and the JA concentrates inside the "green line" (1948-49 border of Israel). The two operations overlap, however, in certain settlement projects. One example is the "Seven Stars" chain of settlements, carried out during Gen. Ariel Sharon's tenure as Housing Minister. Promotion and planning were carried out jointly by the two symbiotic parastatals whereas those seven colonies straddle-and, effectively, erase-the "green line."

The WZO/JA also assume to themselves the task of representing "the Jewish people" extraterritorially; however, there is no method consistent with international law that makes the State of Israel, WZO/JA or JNF the representative of Jewish persons who are not also citizens of Israel.

Looting refugees and displaced persons' properties

As a result of the 1948 war and the armistice agreements Israel reached with Egypt and Jordan, Israel controlled 20.5 million dunums of Palestine, representing 78% of the land. The vast majority of these lands were owned by Palestinian residents who were evacuated from their villages or who fled their homes during the war.

In September 1948, the state appointed a Trustee on Absentee Properties and took measures to organize the seizure and the allocation of these properties. On 15 March 1950 the Israeli Knesset passed the Law of the Absentee Properties.

To ensure a dimension of legality to this booty in a world already categorizing such practice as a war crime, the new Israeli Knesset enacted the Basic Law: Law of Absentee Property (1950), which retroactively and prospectively provided for the State of Israel to confiscate properties from those identified as "absentees." That classification covered anyone who:

At any time during the period between 16 Kislev 5708 (29 November 1947) and the declaration published under Section 9(d) of the Law and Administrative Ordinance, 5708 (19 May 1948), has ceased to exist as a legal owner of any property situated in the area of Israel or enjoyed or held by it, whether by himself or and another and who, at any time during the said period,

(i) was a national or citizen of the Lebanon, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Transjordan, Iraq or the Yemen; or
(ii) was in one of these countries or in any part of Palestine outside the area of Israel; or
(iii) was a Palestinian citizen and left his ordinary place of residence in Palestine
   (a) for a place outside Palestine before 27 Av 5708 (1 September 1948); or
By this “legal” criterion, those persons who were away from their property in the general area of any form of war action—whether engaged in fighting or not—during the said period would have their properties confiscated by Israel, which then would be administered by the Jewish National Fund for the benefit of Jewish immigrants. Likewise, any joint owner with another person falling under that category similarly would lose his/her property to Israel. While that applied in absentia to those refugees outside Jewish-occupied Palestine (whom the law termed “absentees”), it also provided for the legal dispossession of those who never left the borders of the newly created state, or those who were reabsorbed into Israel as a result of the armistice agreements and hence omitted from the counting of “international” refugees. These last categories came to be ironically known as “present absentees.” Though most of the internally displaced persons (IDPs) are also “present absentees” by virtue of the fact that they had properties confiscated, not all of them were, and a very few have recovered any property. For the purposes of this discussion, we will refer both to generic total of all IDPs, who are estimated at one-quarter of the 953,500 population of Palestinian citizens of Israel, and to the “present absentees” who now count at about 200,000.

From the standpoint of the law, anyone absent from his/her home or village but still in the areas of Palestine overtaken by Israel would be considered “absentee.” Perhaps the most famous case of the internally displaced is the inhabitants of the three villages near the Lebanese border—Iqrit, Mansura, and Kafr Bir'im—who were “temporarily” evicted by the IDF in October 1948, trucked to other locations, and never allowed to return. By a supreme irony, the state expropriated their homes and lands under the Absentee Property Law even as they continued to press their case in the courts.36

In September 1953 the Trustee of Absentee Properties executed a contract with the Israeli Department of Construction and Development whereby he transferred the ownership of all the lands under his control to the department. The price for these properties was to be retained by the Israeli Department of Construction and Development as a loan. At the same time, the Trustee on the Absentee Properties transferred the ownership of the houses and commercial buildings in the cities to Amidar, an Israeli company set up to settle Jewish immigrants (Jiryis, 1973).

Three months before this transfer of ownership to the Department of Construction and Development, the Jewish National Fund had executed a contract with the Israeli Department of Construction and Development whereby the department would sell a total of 2,373,677 dunums of state lands and lands of the department to the Jewish National Fund. The deal was completed after the department completed its transaction with the Trustee. Following this transaction, the Jewish National Fund "ownership" totalled over 90% of the total territories that fell under the control of the state of Israel. These properties are referred to as the "nation's land" limited to the use of Jews (Jiryis, 1973).

Ethnic Cleansing and Land Confiscation

The third dimension of Israeli land acquisition in Palestine was the confiscation of the lands of the remaining Palestinian villages in what is now Israel. The Israelis used military, administrative and legal means to confiscate these lands and dispossess their owners.

In addition to the ethnic-cleansing campaign that was executed by the Jewish militias in the 1948 war, during the period between October 1948 to November 1949, the Israeli army

36 http://www.birem.org/
evacuated the villages of al-Safsaf, Iqrit, Kufir Bir`am, Kufr Anan, Khasas, Jau`neh, Qaytityeh, al-Ghabasiyaa, al-Majdal, and al-Battat. In 1951 the Israeli army evacuated 13 villages in the triangle area. In October 1956 the Israeli army forced the Palestinian Bedouin tribe al-Bakara to cross the border into Syria. In October 1959 some Bedouin tribes in the Negev desert were forced to cross the borders into Egypt and Jordan. The lands for all these villages and tribes were confiscated after their cleansing (Jiryis, 1973).

Exploiting British Mandate law

With the establishment of the state of Israel on 15 May 1948, these lands were regarded as Israeli "state lands." Israel initially exploited the British Mandate-era Land Ordinance (The Acquisition of Land for Public Purposes) (1943), by which the Israeli government assumed to itself the right to confiscate private land for minimal compensation. In this post-independence dimension, the Knesset (parliament) adopted the complementary Law of the State's Property (1951), providing for the transfer to Israel of all properties previously belonging to the British Mandatory Administration. As Israel took control of all the territories that were allocated to the Jewish state in addition to nearly 50% of the territories allocated to the Arab State in Palestine under the 1947 UN partition plan, a total of 15,025,000 dunum were considered "state lands" (Jiryis, 1973). The state also implemented measures and passed various laws that were employed to transfer the land ownership to the Jewish agencies and settlements.

Among the legal devices evict Arab citizens from their villages and land Israel has applied Regulation 125 of the British Mandatory Defence (Emergency) Regulations, which the British Mandate actually revoked before leaving Palestine in 1948, but which the Israeli military administration preserved until 1966. That regulation allowed military commanders absolute discretion to declare land “closed” for military purposes. Once land was so declared, no one was allowed to enter or leave the area without special permission. Many Arab citizens were forced from their villages and have not been permitted to return since the 1950s; these affected villages are known as “uprooted villages.” The residents of such villages also are “present absentees.” Regulation 125 has never been used to close Jewish settlements in Israel, even where these communities are located in dangerous areas. In fact, the Jewish settlements adjacent to these uprooted villages have used the indigenous people’s lands for their own purposes.

Security pretexts

The Emergency Laws form part of the fourth dimension of dispossession by using military pretexts to acquire land. Law 125 gives Israeli military officers the discretion to declare certain areas closed military areas where people can only enter such an area by permit from the Israeli Army Chief of Staff. The Israeli Army considered the 12 villages in the Galilee as closed military zones and prevented their residents from returning to them after orders of evacuation for security purposes (Jiryis, 1973).

The Use of Security Zones Law 5709 granted the Defence Minister the authority to declare any area within a 35 km-wide stretch along the Lebanese border and near Gaza as a closed security zone and granted him the ability to order residents of such areas to evacuate for security reasons. On this pretext, the villages of Iqrit and Kufir Biram were declared security zones and evacuated on 5 November 1948. On 25 December 1951 the village of Iqrit was destroyed and its lands totalling 15,650 dunum were confiscated. The village of Kufir Biram was destroyed on 16 September 1953 and the village lands totalling 11,700 dunum were also confiscated. Also the village of Khasas, near the Syrian border, was evicted en masse under the same law in 1949 (Jiryis, 1973).

The introduction of Utilization of Vacant Lands Laws granted the Ministry of Agriculture the ability to acquire and utilize lands that are "neglected" or "abandoned" by its owners to
ensure proper and efficient use. Using Article 24 of Law 5709 of these regulations, the Ministry of Agriculture legalized seizure of neighbouring Palestinian villages' lands by some kibbutz (Jewish collective farms) (Jiryis, 1973).

Israel has used these laws in conjunction with the security laws to confiscate lands. The army would declare an area as a closed military zone, barring farmers from reaching their fields. At a later point, the Ministry of Agriculture would issue confiscation orders predicated on the owners' alleged “neglect” of the fields (also in cases where lands were deliberately left fallow as traditionally practiced in the agricultural system). Then the army officers would issue permits for the incoming Jewish settlers to whom the Department of Agriculture would assign the lands.

The introduction of Measures to Confiscate Properties in the Palestinian Cities Law 5710, Article 3, granted the government the right to appoint a Special Authority that has the right to issue orders to confiscate real estate that "may be necessary for the protection of the country and general security or for the absorption of returnees or for the relief of discharged soldiers. This law at first limited the use of such properties to a period of three years. Then before the end of the term, the period was extended for six more years. And then, before the end of the sixth year, it was adjusted to give the right to the Special Authority to extend the term indefinitely if the Authority considers it necessary for the general security of Israel, (Jiryis, 1973).

The fifth dimension of seizing the properties of Palestinians living in what is now Israel was the transfer of “ownership” of these properties to Jewish hands. In 1953, Law 5713 granted the Minister of Finance the ability to transfer ownership of properties confiscated by the previous laws over the last five years to the Israeli Department of Construction and Development. Article 2 of this law states that if the Minister of Finance issues a certificate on a property, that it must meet the following three conditions:

1. It was not as of 1 April 1952 under the control of its owner;
2. It was designated for the period between 14 July 1948 and 1 April 1952 for development, settlement, or security; and
3. The property is still needed for any of the purposes in item 2.

If a property meets these conditions, then the property will be transferred to the ownership of the Israeli Department of Construction and Development (Jiryis, 1973).

The Palestinian Bedouin community in the Naqab/Negev Desert suffered a similar loss in land in the same period. However, since the Bedouin community owned vast pieces of land as fields and grazing grounds, Israel is still on a continuous campaign to seize more of their lands by limiting their movement and forcing their urbanization through orders of security concerns. The process of land confiscation of the Palestinian residents of what is now Israel continues to this day, but at a smaller scale in the Galilee and continues to be at a large scale in the south region.

The sixth (and current) dimension of Israeli land acquisition was the occupation of the remaining Palestinian territories, the West Bank and Gaza, in June 1967. Israel used the same methods for confiscation of the lands in the West Bank and Gaza. The lands that were classified as forest under the British rule were confiscated as state lands. The use of the Absentee Law was used in the West Bank and Gaza in the same manner. Other lands were confiscated for military use or security purposes. The final phase of transferring the lands Israel confiscated in the West Bank and Gaza is being carried out today through the Oslo Peace Process, which is discussed in a later section."
ANNEX 6
United States Aid to Israel

1. U.S. to give Israel $9B in loan guarantees, $1B in military aid
2. The Strategic Functions of U.S. Aid to Israel
3. U.S. Aid: Interpreting the 'Strategic Relationship'
5. The Cost of Israel to U.S. Taxpayers: True Lies About U.S. Aid to Israel
The Strategic Functions of U.S. Aid to Israel,

By Stephen Zunes37

Since 1992, the United States has offered Israel an additional $2 billion annually in loan guarantees. Congressional researchers have disclosed that, between 1974 and 1989, $16.4 billion in U.S. military loans were converted to grants and that this was the understanding from the beginning. Indeed, all past U.S. loans to Israel have eventually been forgiven by Congress, which has undoubtedly helped Israel's often-touted claim that they have never defaulted on a U.S. government loan.

37 Dr. Zunes is assistant professor in the Department of Politics at the University of San Francisco.
U.S. policy since 1984 has been that economic assistance to Israel must equal or exceed Israel’s annual debt repayment to the United States. Unlike other countries, which receive aid in quarterly instalments, aid to Israel since 1982 has been given in a lump sum at the beginning of the fiscal year, leaving the U.S. government to borrow from future revenues. Israel even lends some of this money back through U.S. treasury bills and collects the additional interest. In addition, there is the more than $1.5 billion in private U.S. funds that go to Israel annually in the form of $1 billion in private tax-deductible donations and $500 million in Israeli bonds. The ability of Americans to make what amounts to tax-deductible contributions to a foreign government, made possible through a number of Jewish charities, does not exist with any other country. Nor do these figures include short- and long-term commercial loans from U.S. banks, which have been as high as $1 billion annually in recent years.

Total U.S. aid to Israel is approximately one-third of the American [U.S.] foreign-aid budget, even though Israel comprises just .001 percent of the world’s population and already has one of the world’s higher per capita incomes. Indeed, Israel’s GNP is higher than the combined GNP of Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, the West Bank and Gaza. With a per capita income of about $14,000, Israel ranks as the sixteenth wealthiest country in the world; Israelis enjoy a higher per capita income than oil-rich Saudi Arabia and are only slightly less well-off than most Western European countries. AID does not term economic aid to Israel as development assistance, but instead uses the term "economic support funding." Given Israel’s relative prosperity, U.S. aid to Israel is becoming increasingly controversial. In 1994, Yossi Beilin, deputy foreign minister of Israel and a Knesset member, told the Women’s International Zionist organization, "If our economic situation is better than in many of your countries, how can we go on asking for your charity?"

U.S. Aid to Israel: Interpreting the ’Strategic Relationship

By Stephen Zunes

"The U.S. aid relationship with Israel is unlike any other in the world," said Stephen Zunes during a January 26 CPAP presentation. "In sheer volume, the amount is the most generous foreign aid program ever between any two countries," added Zunes, associate professor of Politics and chair of the Peace and Justice Studies Program at the University of San Francisco. He explored the strategic reasoning behind the aid, asserting that it parallels the "needs of American arms exporters" and the role "Israel could play in advancing U.S. strategic interests in the region." Although Israel is an "advanced, industrialized, technologically sophisticated country," it "receives more U.S. aid per capita annually than the total annual [Gross Domestic Product] per capita of several Arab states." Approximately a third of the entire U.S. foreign aid budget goes to Israel, "even though Israel comprises just...one-thousandth of the world's total population, and already has one of the world's higher per capita incomes."

U.S. government officials argue that this money is necessary for "moral" reasons-some even say that Israel is a "democracy battling for its very survival." If that were the real reason, however, aid should have been highest during Israel's early years, and would have declined as Israel grew stronger. Yet "the pattern . . . has been just the opposite." According to Zunes, "99 percent of all U.S. aid to Israel took place after the June 1967 war, when Israel found itself more powerful than any combination of Arab armies . . ."

The U.S. supports Israel's dominance so it can serve as "a surrogate for American interests in this vital strategic region." "Israel has helped defeat radical nationalist movements" and has been a "testing ground for U.S. made weaponry." Moreover, the intelligence agencies of
both countries have "collaborated," and "Israel has funneled U.S. arms to third countries that the U.S. [could] not send arms to directly...like South Africa, like the Contras, Guatemala under the military junta, [and] Iran." Zunes cited an Israeli analyst who said: "It's like Israel has just become another federal agency when it's convenient to use and you want something done quietly." Although the strategic relationship between the United States and the Gulf Arab states in the region has been strengthening in recent years, these states "do not have the political stability, the technological sophistication, [or] the number of higher-trained armed forces personnel" as does Israel.

Matti Peled, former Israeli major general and Knesset member, told Zunes that he and most Israeli generals believe this aid is "little more than an American subsidy to U.S. arms manufacturers," considering that the majority of military aid to Israel is used to buy weapons from the U.S. Moreover, arms to Israel create more demand for weaponry in Arab states. According to Zunes, "the Israelis announced back in 1991 that they supported the idea of a freeze in Middle East arms transfers, yet it was the United States that rejected it."

In the fall of 1993, when many had high hopes for peace, 78 senators wrote to former President Bill Clinton insisting that aid to Israel remain "at current levels." Their "only reason" was the "massive procurement of sophisticated arms by Arab states." The letter neglected to mention that 80 percent of those arms to Arab countries came from the U.S. "I'm not denying for a moment the power of AIPAC [the American Israel Public Affairs Committee], the pro-Israel lobby," and other similar groups, Zunes said. Yet the "Aerospace Industry Association which promotes these massive arms shipments...is even more influential." This association has given two times more money to campaigns than all of the pro-Israel groups combined. Its "force on Capitol Hill, in terms of lobbying, surpasses that of even AIPAC." Zunes asserted that the "general thrust of U.S. policy would be pretty much the same even if AIPAC didn't exist. We didn't need a pro-Indonesia lobby to support Indonesia in its savage repression of East Timor all these years." This is a complex issue, and Zunes said that he did not want to be "conspiratorial," but he asked the audience to imagine what "Palestinian industriousness, Israeli technology, and Arabian oil money...would do to transform the Middle East...[W]hat would that mean to American arms manufacturers? Oil companies? Pentagon planners?" "An increasing number of Israelis are pointing out" that these funds are not in Israel's best interest. Quoting Peled, Zunes said, "this aid pushes Israel 'toward a posture of callous intransigence' in terms of the peace process." Moreover, for every dollar the U.S. sends in arms aid, Israel must spend two to three dollars to train people to use the weaponry, to buy parts, and in other ways make use of the aid. Even "main-stream Israeli economists are saying [it] is very harmful to the country's future."

The Israeli paper Yediot Aharonot described Israel as "the godfather's messenger" since [Israel] undertake[s] the 'dirty work' of a godfather who 'always tries to appear to be the owner of some large, respectable business.'" Israeli satirist B. Michael refers to U.S. aid this way: "My master gives me food to eat and I bite those whom he tells me to bite. It's called strategic cooperation." "To challenge this strategic relationship, one cannot focus solely on the Israeli lobby but must also examine these "broader forces as well." "Until we tackle this issue head-on," it will be "very difficult to win" in other areas relating to Palestine.
"The results" of the short-term thinking behind U.S. policy "are tragic," not just for the "immediate victims" but "eventually [for] Israel itself" and "American interests in the region." The U.S. is sending enormous amounts of aid to the Middle East, and yet "we are less secure than ever"—both in terms of U.S. interests abroad and for individual Americans. Zunes referred to a "growing and increasing hostility [of] the average Arab toward the United States." In the long term, said Zunes, "peace and stability and cooperation with the vast Arab world is far more important for U.S. interests than this alliance with Israel."

This is not only an issue for those who are working for Palestinian rights, but it also "jeopardizes the entire agenda of those of us concerned about human rights, concerned about arms control, concerned about international law." Zunes sees significant potential in "building a broad-based movement around it."

The above text is based on remarks, delivered on 26 January, 2001 by Stephen Zunes, associate professor of politics and chair of the Peace and Justice Studies Program, San Francisco University.

U.S. Aid to Israel: What U.S. Taxpayer Should Know

By Tom Malthaner

This morning, as I was walking down Shuhada Street in Hebron, I saw graffiti marking the newly painted storefronts and awnings. Although three months past schedule and 100 percent over budget, the renovation of Shuhada Street was finally completed this week. The project manager said the reason for the delay and cost overruns was the sabotage of the project by the Israeli settlers of the Beit Hadassah settlement complex in Hebron. They broke the street lights, stoned project workers, shot out the windows of bulldozers and other heavy equipment with pellet guns, broke paving stones before they were laid and now have defaced again the homes and shops of Palestinians with graffiti. The settlers did not want Shuhada St. opened to Palestinian traffic as was agreed to under Oslo 2. This renovation project is paid for by USAID funds and it makes me angry that my tax dollars have paid for improvements that have been destroyed by the settlers.

Most Americans are not aware how much of their tax revenue our government sends to Israel. For the fiscal year ending in September 30, 1997, the U.S. has given Israel $6.72 billion: $6.194 billion falls under Israel's foreign aid allotment and $526 million comes from agencies such as the Department of Commerce, the U.S. Information Agency and the Pentagon. The $6.72 billion figure does not include loan guarantees and annual compound interest totalling $3.122 billion the U.S. pays on money borrowed to give to Israel. It does not include the cost to U.S. taxpayers of IRS tax exemptions that donors can claim when they donate money to Israeli charities. (Donors claim approximately $1 billion in Federal tax deductions annually. This ultimately costs other U.S. taxpayers $280 million to $390 million.) When grant, loans, interest and tax deductions are added together for the fiscal year ending in September 30, 1997, our special relationship with Israel cost U.S. taxpayers over $10 billion. Since 1949 the U.S. has given Israel a total of $83.205 billion. The interest costs borne by U.S. taxpayers on behalf of Israel are $49.937 billion, thus making the total amount of aid given to Israel since 1949 $133.132 billion. This may mean that U.S. government has given more federal aid to the average Israeli citizen in a given year than it has given to the average American citizen.

I am angry when I see Israeli settlers from Hebron destroy improvements made to Shuhada Street with my tax money. Also, it angers me that my government is giving over $10 billion to a country that is more prosperous than most of the other countries in the world and uses much of its money for strengthening its military and the oppression of the Palestinian people.
The Cost of Israel to U.S. Taxpayers True Lies About U.S. Aid to Israel

By Richard H. Curtiss

For many years the American [U.S.] media said that "Israel receives $1.8 billion in military aid," or that "Israel receives $1.2 billion in economic aid." Both statements were true, but since they were never combined to give us the complete total of annual U.S. aid to Israel, they also were lies—true lies.

Recently, Americans [of the United States] have begun to read and hear that "Israel receives $3 billion in annual U.S. foreign aid." That's true. But it's still a lie. The problem is that in fiscal 1997 alone, Israel received from a variety of other U.S. federal budgets at least $525.8 million above and beyond its $3 billion from the foreign aid budget, and yet another $2 billion in federal loan guarantees. So the complete total of U.S. grants and loan guarantees to Israel for fiscal 1997 was $5,525,800,000. One can truthfully blame the mainstream media for never digging out these figures for themselves, because none ever have. They were compiled by the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs. But the mainstream media certainly are not alone. Although Congress authorizes America's foreign aid total, the fact that more than a third of it goes to a country smaller in both area and population than Hong Kong probably never has been mentioned on the floor of the Senate or House. Yet it's been going on for more than a generation. Probably the only members of Congress who even suspect the full total of U.S. funds received by Israel each year are the privileged few committee members who actually mark it up. And almost all members of the concerned committees are Jewish, have taken huge campaign donations orchestrated by Israel's Washington, DC lobby, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), or both. These congressional committee members are paid to act, not talk. So they do and they don't.

The same applies to the president, the secretary of state, and the foreign aid administrator. They all submit a budget that includes aid for Israel, which Congress approves, or increases, but never cuts. But no one in the executive branch mentions that of the few remaining U.S. aid recipients worldwide, all of the others are developing nations which either make their military bases available to the U.S., are key members of international alliances in which the U.S. participates, or have suffered some crippling blow of nature to their abilities to feed their people such as earthquakes, floods or droughts.

Israel, whose troubles arise solely from its unwillingness to give back land it seized in the 1967 war in return for peace with its neighbours, does not fit those criteria. In fact, Israel's 1995 per capita gross domestic product was $15,800. That put it below Britain at $19,500 and Italy at $18,700 and just above Ireland at $15,400 and Spain at $14,300.

All four of those European countries have contributed a very large share of immigrants to the U.S., yet none has organized an ethnic group to lobby for U.S. foreign aid. Instead, all four send funds and volunteers to do economic development and emergency relief work in other less fortunate parts of the world.

The lobby that Israel and its supporters have built in the United States to make all this aid happen, and to ban discussion of it from the national dialogue, goes far beyond AIPAC, with its $15 million budget, its 150 employees, and its five or six registered lobbyists who manage to visit every member of Congress individually once or twice a year. AIPAC, in turn, can draw upon the resources of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish

38 Richard H. Curtiss is a former officer of the U.S. Information Agency and current executive editor of the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs (Washington).
Organizations, a roof group set up solely to coordinate the efforts of some 52 national Jewish organizations on behalf of Israel.

Among them are Hadassah, the Zionist women's organization, which organizes a steady stream of American-Jewish visitors to Israel; the American Jewish Congress, which mobilizes support for Israel among members of the traditionally left-of-center Jewish mainstream; and the American Jewish Committee, which plays the same role within the growing middle-of-the-road and right-of-center Jewish community. The American Jewish Committee also publishes Commentary, one of the Israel lobby's principal national publications.

Perhaps the most controversial of these groups is B'nai B'rith's Anti-Defamation League (ADL). Its original highly commendable purpose was to protect the civil rights of American Jews. Over the past generation, however, the ADL has regressed into a conspiratorial and, with a $45 million budget, extremely well-funded hate group.

In the 1980s, during the tenure of Chairman Seymour Reich, who went on to become chairman of the Conference of Presidents, ADL was found to have circulated two annual fund-raising letters warning Jewish parents against allegedly negative influences on their children arising from the increasing Arab presence on American university campuses.

More recently, FBI raids on ADL's Los Angeles and San Francisco offices revealed that an ADL operative had purchased files stolen from the San Francisco police department that a court had ordered destroyed because they violated the civil rights of the individuals on whom they had been compiled. ADL, it was shown, had added the illegally prepared and illegally obtained material to its own secret files, compiled by planting informants among Arab-American, African-American, anti-Apartheid and peace and justice groups.

The ADL infiltrators took notes of the names and remarks of speakers and members of audiences at programs organized by such groups. ADL agents even recorded the license plates of persons attending such programs and then suborned corrupt motor vehicles department employees or renegade police officers to identify the owners.

Although one of the principal offenders fled the United States to escape prosecution, no significant penalties were assessed. ADL's Northern California office was ordered to comply with requests by persons upon whom dossiers had been prepared to see their own files, but no one went to jail and as yet no one has paid fines.

Not surprisingly, a defecting employee revealed in an article he published in the Washington Report on Middle East Affairs that AIPAC, too, has such "enemies" files. They are compiled for use by pro-Israel journalists like Steven Emerson and other so-called "terrorism experts," and also by professional, academic or journalistic rivals of the persons described for use in black-listing, defaming, or denouncing them. What is never revealed is that AIPAC's "opposition research" department, under the supervision of Michael Lewis, son of famed Princeton University orientalist Bernard Lewis, is the source of this defamatory material.

But this is not AIPAC's most controversial activity. In the 1970s, when Congress put a cap on the amount its members could earn from speakers' fees and book royalties over and above their salaries, it halted AIPAC's most effective ways of paying off members for voting according to AIPAC recommendations. Members of AIPAC's national board of directors solved the problem by returning to their home states and creating political action committees (PACs).

Most special interests have PACs, as do many major corporations, labor unions, trade associations and public-interest groups. But the pro-Israel groups went wild. To date some
126 pro-Israel PACs have been registered, and no fewer than 50 have been active in every national election over the past generation.

An individual voter can give up to $2,000 to a candidate in an election cycle, and a PAC can give a candidate up to $10,000. However, a single special interest with 50 PACs can give a candidate who is facing a tough opponent, and who has voted according to its recommendations, up to half a million dollars. That's enough to buy all the television time needed to get elected in most parts of the country.

Even candidates who don't need this kind of money certainly don't want it to become available to a rival from their own party in a primary election, or to an opponent from the opposing party in a general election. As a result, all but a handful of the 535 members of the Senate and House vote as AIPAC instructs when it comes to aid to Israel, or other aspects of U.S. Middle East policy.

There is something else very special about AIPAC's network of political action committees. Nearly all have deceptive names. Who could possibly know that the Delaware Valley Good Government Association in Philadelphia, San Franciscans for Good Government in California, Cactus PAC in Arizona, Beaver PAC in Wisconsin, and even Icepac in New York are really pro-Israel PACs under deep cover?

**Hiding AIPAC's Tracks**

In fact, the Congress members know it when they list the contributions they receive on the campaign statements they have to prepare for the Federal Election Commission. But their constituents don't know this when they read these statements. So just as no other special interest can put so much "hard money" into any candidate's election campaign as can the Israel lobby, no other special interest has gone to such elaborate lengths to hide its tracks. Although AIPAC, Washington's most feared special-interest lobby, can hide how it uses both carrots and sticks to bribe or intimidate members of Congress, it can't hide all of the results. Anyone can ask one of their representatives in Congress for a chart prepared by the Congressional Research Service, a branch of the Library of Congress, that shows Israel received $62.5 billion in foreign aid from fiscal year 1949 through fiscal year 1996. People in the national capital area also can visit the library of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) in Rosslyn, Virginia, and obtain the same information, plus charts showing how much foreign aid the U.S. has given other countries as well. Visitors will learn that in precisely the same 1949-1996 time frame, the total of U.S. foreign aid to all of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean combined was $62,497,800,000—almost exactly the amount given to tiny Israel.

According to the Population Reference Bureau of Washington, DC, in mid-1995 the sub-Saharan countries had a combined population of 568 million. The $24,415,700,000 in foreign aid they had received by then amounted to $42.99 per sub-Saharan African. Similarly, with a combined population of 486 million, all of the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean together had received $38,254,400,000. This amounted to $79 per person. The per capita U.S. foreign aid to Israel's 5.8 million people during the same period was $10,775.48. This meant that for every dollar the U.S. spent on an African, it spent $250.65 on an Israeli, and for every dollar it spent on someone from the Western Hemisphere outside the United States, it spent $214 on an Israeli.

**Shocking Comparisons**

These comparisons already seem shocking, but they are far from the whole truth. Using reports compiled by Clyde Mark of the Congressional Research Service and other sources, freelance writer Frank Collins tallied for the *Washington Report* all of the extra items for Israel buried in the budgets of the Pentagon and other federal agencies in fiscal year 1993.

They uncovered $1.271 billion in extras in FY 1993, $355.3 million in FY 1996 and $525.8 million in FY 1997. These represent an average increase of 12.2 percent over the officially recorded foreign aid totals for the same fiscal years, and they probably are not complete. It's reasonable to assume, therefore, that a similar 12.2 percent hidden increase has prevailed over all of the years Israel has received aid.

As of 31 October 1997, Israel will have received $3.05 billion in U.S. foreign aid for fiscal year 1997 and $3.08 billion in foreign aid for fiscal year 1998. Adding the 1997 and 1998 totals to those of previous years since 1949 yields a total of $74,157,600,000 in foreign aid grants and loans. Assuming that the actual totals from other budgets average 12.2 percent of that amount, that brings the grand total to $83,204,827,200.

But that's not quite all. Receiving its annual foreign aid appropriation during the first month of the fiscal year, instead of in quarterly instalments as do other recipients, is just another special privilege Congress has voted for Israel. It enables Israel to invest the money in U.S. Treasury notes. That means that the U.S., which has to borrow the money it gives to Israel, pays interest on the money it has granted to Israel in advance, while at the same time Israel is collecting interest on the money. That interest to Israel from advance payments adds another $1.650 billion to the total, making it $84,854,827,200. That's the number you should write down for total aid to Israel. And that's $14,346 each for each man, woman and child in Israel.

It's worth noting that that figure does not include U.S. government loan guarantees to Israel, of which Israel has drawn $9.8 billion to date. They greatly reduce the interest rate the Israeli government pays on commercial loans, and they place additional burdens on U.S. taxpayers, especially if the Israeli government should default on any of them. But since neither the savings to Israel nor the costs to U.S. taxpayers can be accurately quantified, they are excluded from consideration here. Further, friends of Israel never tire of saying that Israel has never defaulted on repayment of a U.S. government loan. It would be equally accurate to say Israel has never been required to repay a U.S. government loan. The truth of the matter is complex, and designed to be so by those who seek to conceal it from the U.S. taxpayer.

Most U.S. loans to Israel are forgiven, and many were made with the explicit understanding that they would be forgiven before Israel was required to repay them. By disguising as loans what in fact were grants, cooperating members of Congress exempted Israel from the U.S. oversight that would have accompanied grants. On other loans, Israel was expected to pay the interest and eventually to begin repaying the principal. But the so-called Cranston Amendment, which has been attached by Congress to every foreign aid appropriation since 1983, provides that economic aid to Israel will never dip below the amount Israel is required to pay on its outstanding loans. In short, whether U.S. aid is extended as grants or loans to Israel, it never returns to the Treasury.

Israel enjoys other privileges. While most countries receiving U.S. military aid funds are expected to use them for U.S. arms, ammunition and training, Israel can spend part of these funds on weapons made by Israeli manufacturers. Also, when it spends its U.S. military aid money on U.S. products, Israel frequently requires the U.S. vendor to buy components or materials from Israeli manufacturers. Thus, though Israeli politicians say that their own manufacturers and exporters are making them progressively less dependent upon U.S. aid, in fact those Israeli manufacturers and exporters are heavily subsidized by U.S. aid.
Although it's beyond the parameters of this study, it's worth mentioning that Israel also receives foreign aid from some other countries. After the United States, the principal donor of both economic and military aid to Israel is Germany.

By far the largest component of German aid has been in the form of restitution payments to victims of Nazi atrocities. But there also has been extensive German military assistance to Israel during and since the Gulf war, and a variety of German educational and research grants go to Israeli institutions. The total of German assistance in all of these categories to the Israeli government, Israeli individuals and Israeli private institutions has been some $31 billion or $5,345 per capita, bringing the per capita total of U.S. and German assistance combined to almost $20,000 per Israeli. Since very little public money is spent on the more than 20 percent of Israeli citizens who are Muslim or Christian, the actual per capita benefits received by Israel's Jewish citizens would be considerably higher.

**True Cost to U.S. Taxpayers**

Generous as it is, what Israelis actually got in U.S. aid is considerably less than what it has cost U.S. taxpayers to provide it. The principal difference is that so long as the U.S. runs an annual budget deficit, every dollar of aid the U.S. gives Israel has to be raised through U.S. government borrowing.

In an article in the Washington Report for December 1991/January 1992, Frank Collins estimated the costs of this interest, based upon prevailing interest rates for every year since 1949. I have updated this by applying a very conservative 5 percent interest rate for subsequent years, and confined the amount upon which the interest is calculated to grants, not loans or loan guarantees.

On this basis the $84.8 billion in grants, loans and commodities Israel has received from the U.S. since 1949 cost the U.S. an additional $49,936,880,000 in interest. There are many other costs of Israel to U.S. taxpayers, such as most or all of the $45.6 billion in U.S. foreign aid to Egypt since Egypt made peace with Israel in 1979 (compared to $4.2 billion in U.S. aid to Egypt for the preceding 26 years). U.S. foreign aid to Egypt, which is pegged at two-thirds of U.S. foreign aid to Israel, averages $2.2 billion per year. There also have been immense political and military costs to the U.S. for its consistent support of Israel during Israel's half-century of disputes with the Palestinians and all of its Arab neighbours. In addition, there have been the approximately $10 billion in U.S. loan guarantees and perhaps $20 billion in tax-exempt contributions made to Israel by American Jews in the nearly half-century since Israel was created.

Even excluding all of these extra costs, America's $84.8 billion in aid to Israel from fiscal years 1949 through 1998, and the interest the U.S. paid to borrow this money, has cost U.S. taxpayers $134.8 billion, not adjusted for inflation. Or, put another way, the nearly $14,630 every one of 5.8 million Israelis received from the U.S. government by Oct. 31, 1997 has cost American taxpayers $23,240 per Israeli.

It would be interesting to know how many of those American taxpayers believe they and their families have received as much from the U.S. Treasury as has everyone who has chosen to become a citizen of Israel. But it's a question that will never occur to the American public because, so long as America's mainstream media, Congress and president maintain their pact of silence, few Americans will ever know the true cost of Israel to U.S. taxpayers.
### Benefits to Israel of U.S. Aid Since 1949 (as of 1 November 1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Foreign aid grants and loans</td>
<td>$74,157,600,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other U.S. aid (12.2% of foreign aid)</td>
<td>$9,047,227,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest to Israel from advanced payments</td>
<td>$1,650,000,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grand total</td>
<td>$84,854,827,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total benefits per Israeli</td>
<td>$14,630</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Cost to U.S. Taxpayers of U.S. Aid to Israel

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Grand total (from above)</td>
<td>$84,854,827,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interest costs borne by U.S.</td>
<td>$49,936,680,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total cost to U.S. taxpayers</td>
<td>$134,791,507,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total U.S. cost per Israeli</td>
<td>$23,240</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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**Economist tallies swelling cost of Israel to US**

By David R. Francis

Since 1973, Israel has cost the United States about $1.6 trillion. If divided by today’s population, that is more than $5,700 per person.

This is an estimate by Thomas Stauffer, a consulting economist in Washington. For decades, his analyses of the Middle East scene have made him a frequent thorn in the side of the Israel lobby.

For the first time in many years, Mr. Stauffer has tallied the total cost to the US of its backing of Israel in its drawn-out, violent dispute with the Palestinians. So far, he figures, the bill adds up to more than twice the cost of the Vietnam War.

Israel is the largest recipient of US foreign aid. It is already due to get $2.04 billion in military assistance and $720 million in economic aid in fiscal 2003. It has been getting $3 billion a year for years.

Adjusting the official aid to 2001 dollars in purchasing power, Israel has been given $240 billion since 1973, Stauffer reckons. In addition, the US has given Egypt $117 billion and Jordan $22 billion in foreign aid in return for signing peace treaties with Israel.

"Consequently, politically, if not administratively, those outlays are part of the total package of support for Israel," argues Stauffer in a lecture on the total costs of US Middle East policy, commissioned by the US Army War College, for a recent conference at the University of Maine.

These foreign-aid costs are well known. Many Americans would probably say it is money well spent to support a beleaguered democracy of some strategic interest. But Stauffer wonders if Americans are aware of the full bill for supporting Israel since some costs, if not hidden, are little known.

Stauffer's list will be controversial. He's been assisted in this research by a number of mostly retired military or diplomatic officials who do not go public for fear of being labeled anti-Semitic if they criticize America's policies toward Israel.
ANNEX 7
Consumer Guide

Some solidarity campaigns involve the boycott of Israeli products as a practical measure by which to oppose violations against the Palestinian people, particularly by companies that support the occupation or operate in the occupied Palestinian territory. The following excerpts are compiled from boycott campaign information and websites promoting the economic boycott of Israeli goods and companies.

Israeli products carry the unique code starting with # 729

Most of the products have a bar code to identify them. Each bar code contains a lot of information such as the factory and also the country where it is produced. Some examples that has nothing to do with Israel:

383 EAN Slovenija
471 EAN Taiwan

A bar code starting with "729" indicates that this product is produced in Israel. 729 Israeli Bar Code Association - EAN Israel.

Products that carry the code # 729

Companies and manufacturers that produce goods and provide services from occupied territories are in violation of international law. You can do your part to enforce these prohibitions by ensuring that you not patronise those enterprises and protest their operations. A partial list of such companies is below:

Food & beverages:
A & M Greenberg Food agency Atarot industrial zone (I.Z)
Ahva Halva and candy Barkan I.Z.
Bar Haim Food products Edomim I.Z.
Barkan Cellars Wine makers Barkan IZ
Barkan Sweets Candy and sweets Barkan IZ
BarKat Food products Barkan I.Z.
Beigel & Beigel Pretzel bakery Barkan I.Z.
Better and Different Pretzel bakery Edomim I.Z.
Cohen Brothers Butchers Atarot I.Z.
Eden Springs Ltd. Mineral water Katzrin I.Z. (Golan Heights)
Elyon Spices Alpehi Menashe
Glatt Of Chicken slaughterhouse Atarot I.Z.
Golan Cheese Various cheeses Katzrin I.Z.(Golan Heights)
Golan Dairies Milk products Katzrin I.Z. (Golan Heights)
Golan Wines Wine makers Katzrin I.Z (Golan Heights)
Gold Pie Pie factory Edomim I.Z.
Hacormim Wines Winery Edomim I.Z.
Hamizrah Wines Winery Edomim I.Z
Hebron Wines Winery Qiryat Arba I.Z.
Jerusalem Granola Granola bars Atarot I.Z.
Klufim Potato processing Edomim I.Z.
Malosh Borekas Kobi Frozen foods Edomim I.Z.
Migdanot Cookies and biscuits Edomim I.Z.
Negev Yam Chemicals Cleaning products Gush Katif
Of Habira Chicken Edomim I.Z.
Openheimer Chocolate and sweets Atarot I.Z.
Ramat Hagolan Dairy Dairy products Katzrin I.Z. (Golan Heights)
Shamir Salads Ready-made salads Barkan I.Z.
Shomron Meat Meat products Karnei Shomron
Soda Club Home sodawater devices Edomim I.Z.
Sofrei Ltd. Food production and marketing Edomim I.Z.
Tel Arza Wines Winery Edomim I.Z.
Tohikon Arts & Crafts Ma'ale Ephraim
Yerek Adom Food products Edomim I.Z.

Household products:
Amgazit Gas equipment Gush Etzion
Arieh Plast Nylon bags Ma'ale Ephraim IZ
Barkan Metal & wood furniture Barkan I.Z
Benitex Camping equipment Edomim I.Z.
Daniel Furniture Edomim I.Z.
Dead Sea Health Products Cosmetics Mitzpe Shalem
Edomim Chemicals Household cleaning products Edomim I.Z.
Pereg Air conditioning Atarot I.Z.
Flanero Kitchen utensils Gush Etzion
Flick Plastic bags and file folders Mevoh Hama
Halabin Industries Cosmetics Barkan I.Z.
Hod Tiles Kiryat Arba I.Z.
Hogla Jerusalem Paper stuffs Atarot I.Z.
I.S. Illumination Edomim I.Z.
IAT Carpets Edomim I.Z.
InterCosma Cosmetics Atarot I.Z.
Jerusalem Knitworks Uniforms plant Edomim I.Z.
Jerusalem Pencils Pencils Atarot I.Z.
Lipski Plastics Barkan I.Z.
Lital Furniture Edomim I.Z.
Mavrik Shoe polish Edomim I.Z.
Mul-t-lock Locksmiths and security doors Barkan I.Z.
Ofertex Cleaning rags Barkan I.Z.
RabinTex Ltd Textiles and camping equip. Edomim I.Z.
Sol Camping Camping equipment Barkan I.Z.
Streicher Uniforms Edomim I.Z.
Super Isra-chom Solar systems Edomim I.Z.
Yardeni Locksmiths Barkan I.Z.
Yerushalmi Industries Ropes Barkan I.Z.
Zivanit Shoes & sandals Ein Zivan

General industries:
AGS Toys and games Beit Horon
Alum-Tal Glass products Edomim I.Z.
Aviv Builders Atarot
Aviah Safety equipment Ma'ale Ephraim I.Z.
Benda Plast Food packing Katzrin I.Z.
Ben-Or Vacuum packing Barkan I.Z.
Ben-Tal Motors Electric motors Merom Golan
Bloko Ltd Printing dyes Edomim I.Z.
"Builders of the Fathers Town" Building blocks Kiryat Arba
Carmigal Ceramics Alphie Menashe I.Z.
Dar-El Printed circuits Ariel
Dotan Leather goods Mevoh Dotan
Edomim Wood mills Edomim I.Z.
Eshkol Publishers Edomim I.Z.
Export Books Factory Publishers Atarot I.Z.
FiberTech Fiberglass pipes Karnei Shomron
Gachelet Aluminum factory Atarot I.Z.
Gelman Science and technology Atarot I.Z.
Golan Industries Metal works Bnei Yehuda
Granit 2000 Marble and granite Edomim I.Z.
H. Wegshel Publishers Edomim I.Z.
Haalonim (Oaks) Building blocks Edomim I.Z.
Hagim Electronic systems Neveh Dekalim
Har-Shefi Packing Beit-El
Hasholsha Products (Jerusalem) packing Atarot I.Z.
Herto Textile industries Edomim I.Z.
Irit Silkscreen printing Edomim I.Z.
Isra-Beton Cement industries Atarot I.Z.
Israel United Laundries Cement industries Atarot I.Z.
IsraVit Plastic and metal works Edomim I.Z.
Kanfei Yona Tannery Edomim I.Z.
Klima Israel Ltd Tannery Atarot I.Z.
Lasri Ltd Metal works Edomim I.Z.
Levi Metal and wood works Edomim I.Z.
Mei Zurim Water purification Gush Etzion
Nesarim Woodwork production & marketing Atarot I.Z.
Niron Textile threads Emanuel
Optima Textile threads Edomim I.Z.
Or-Lil Electronics Katzrin I.Z.
Oval Computers Barkan I.Z.
Oval Hospital equipment Barkan I.Z.
Plastfiber Plastic products Karnei Shomron
R. N. Ltd Judaica Edomim I.Z.
Ramat Magshimim Systems Automation Ramat Magshimim
Readymix Industries Cement Edomim I.Z.
Remet Trom Aluminum products Edomim I.Z.
Ronopol Plastic products Barkan I.Z.
Shahaf (Seagull) Metal works Edomim I.Z.
Sherut Packaging products Barkan I.Z.
Shiloh Technologies Packaging products Edomim I.Z.
Spideshe Ready-grown lawn Gilgal
Sprinco Industrial springs Barkan I.Z.
Star Auto parts Edomim I.Z.
TAPI Plastics Edomim I.Z.
Tzarfati Metal works Edomim I.Z.
Victory Oil seals Edomim I.Z.

**Ahava Agents Worldwide:**

Ahava is an Israeli cosmetic company that manufacturers and markets products from the occupied West Bank made with minerals extracted from the Dead Sea. The following is a listing of its international agents:
Australia Skin Factors 64 DALMENY Ave Rosebery, N.S.W. 2018 Australia. Tel: + 61 2 9663 1283 Fax: + 61 2 9663 1328 Att: Matoyla Kollaras

Austria R.R. Stiassny Richard Neutragasse 12 1210 Wien Austria. Tel: +43 1 250490 Fax: +43 1 2504938 Att: Karin Degen stiassny@Eunet.at

Belgium S.I.M. b.vba - Ahava Haachtsesteenweg 378 B-1910 Kampenhout Belgium Tel: +32 16659082/3 Fax: +2 16659085 Att. Mark Verstockt

Brazil Sonia Mayumi Nacano Ivory Comercial LTDA Rua Luis Goes, San Paulo Ahava@zaz.com.br Tel: +55-11-5096 6911 Fax: +55-11-50521278 Tel: +55-11-276 7077 Fax: +55-11-5581 1871

Cyprus Dead Sea Products 8130 Paphos 6 Athonen Ave. Att:Christos Christoforou Tel:+357 6 237 007/5 Fax: 6 237 777

Czech Republic AHAVA Czech spol.s r.o Plotni 15, 60200 Brno Tel: +420543235952-3 Fax: +420543235952-3 Att: Mr. Roman

Denmark Ahava Danmark Shalom Cosmetics Skovbrynet 185 Denmark Tel: +45 9718 0988 Fax: +45 9718 0939 Att. Anny Ellgaard E-mail: shalom-ahava@get2net.dk

Finland Mika Vuorio KY Mekkanikonkata 3A, Helsinki 00 810 Finland. Tel: + 35 8 9 7554644 Fax : + 35 8 9 7554412 Att. Tuja Lindstrom E-mail: Mika.vuorio@mikacos.fi

France Laboratoire Yaxa 8 Rue Bertrand Russel 42100 St. Etienne. Cedex 02, France Tel: +33 4 77 957871 Fax: +33 4 77 953029 Att: Mr. Michel Marin

Germany Ahava Beauty Vertrieb GmbH, Borsigstrasse 12 D-65205 Wiesbaden Germany Tel: +49 61221222 Fax: +49 612212267 Att: Ms. Sonja Niklas http://www.ahava.de

Greece Elpida Papagrigoraki & Co. Ltd. 4, Oublianis, 161 21 Athens, Greece Tel: +301 7246046 Fax: +301 7240939 Att: Elpida Papagrigoraki

Hungary BIODEM LTD h-1125 Budapest Szarvas Gabor u. 8/d Mr. Ulrich Volmer Tel/Fax 36-1-200 4097 biodem@pronet.hu

Indonesia Ria Tur Kompleks Harmoni Plaza Blok A Kav 10 JI Suryopranoto 2, Jakarta Mr. Jongky F. Januar Tel: +62-21 6386 6708 Fax: +62-21 6386 6711 Email: ria-tur@centrin.net.id

Italy P.M. Chemicals s.r.l Via Monteverdi 11 20131 Milano Italy. Tel:+39 02 204871 Fax: +39 02 2049449 Att.Luigia Pozzoli

Japan Hiyoki Co. L.t.d 3rd fl.Sendai Bldg.1-8-11, Minato, Chuo-Ku, Tokyo 104, Japan. Tel: + 81 3 32060551 Fax: + 81 3 32065484 Att: Mrs. /Mr Kusakabe

Mauritius Sharda Bunjun-Teeloku Edstltld@bow.intnet.mu Tel: + 230 464 2316 Mobile:+ 230 729 1465

Netherlands Dorenco/AHAVA Koppelweg 108 3813 SE Amersfoort Netherlands Tel: +31 33 4799438 Fax: +31 33 4799521 Bergen/Cees van Dormael Att. Evelyn Geuts-van

Norway Dead Sea Health Products Sveene 33, 3731 Skien, Norway Tel: +47 35594979 Fax : + 47 35594977 Att. Arvid Fosse Manager

Russia Bio Maris Ltd 58, Novoslobodskaya St. 103055 Moscow Russia. Tel: + 7 0959612949/50 Fax: 013 7 095 9612951 Att. Igor Krivitsky igorkrivitski@netscape.net

Slovenia/(Bosnia) Astoria L. d.o.o. Trubarjeva 77 1000 Ljubljana Slovenia Tel: +38 6 61 149 1880/5 Fax: +38 6 61 149 1884 Att: Lucija Mrhar

South Africa SDV Pharmaceuticals Suite 219 Postnet, Private Bag X7 Tygervalley 7536 Capetown, SA Tel: + 27 21 511 5075 Fax: + 27 21 510 6492 Att: Sandra Rath E-mail: sdv@yebo.co.za
Spain Belmine Calle Camino de Valderribas 93-Portal C-68, 'Oficentro Valderribas' 28038 Madrid, Spain. Tel: +34 91 3280144 Fax: +34 91 3282970 Att: Cristina Diez

Sweden Dermobasic Haradsvagen 11, S-903 62 Umea Tel/Fax:+ 46 90 144033 Att:Ann-Kristin Sandstrom E-mail: ahava@dermobasic.com

Switzerland Ahava Cosmetics AG Untermull 9 CH6300 Zug Maitre. Tel: +41 56 6342001 Fax: +41 56 6342008 Att: Margarit & Gaston Maitre

Taiwan Kingcess Trading Co.Ltd 2f-4, no.73, Ho Ping E Rd., Sec. 1 Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C. Tel: + 886 2 23971891 Fax: + 886 2 23971895 Att: Mr. C.J. Tsai

Turkey PINKAR Istanbul, Turkey Tel: +90 212 219 0128 Fax: +90 212 231 1610 Attn: Mr. Izzet Pinto E-mail:info@pinkar.com

U.S.A. Ahava (USA) Inc. 124 McQueen Blvd. Industrial Park Summerville South Carolina 29483 Free Toll Phone: Tel: + 1 843 875 7347 Fax: + 1 843 832 6011 Att: Brett Goldberg karen@ahava.com 1800 25 AHAVA

United Kingdom Ahava (U.K.) Ltd. P.O.B. 275 Cheltenham, Gl51 5YT Gloucesters U.K. Tel: +44 1 45 2864574 Fax: +44 1 45 2862580 Att: Pat Strutt. E-mail: pat@ahava.co.uk

Estée Lauder companies

The chairman of Estée Lauder International, Ronald Lauder, is active in right -wing Jewish and Zionist causes. He is the president of the Jewish National Fund (JNF) which is a quasi-Israeli state agency, whose main function is to legitimise and promote Israeli theft and confiscation of Palestinian land. Until recently, he was also the chairman of the Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations.

In January 2001, Lauder was the key speaker from the United States at a rally in Jerusalem, organized by right-wing Israeli politician Natan Sharansky. The rally's goal was to oppose the consideration of Jerusalem as a negotiating point. Lauder addressed 300,000 Israeli extremists at the gates of Haram Al-Sharif saying he was "representing millions of Jews throughout the world who oppose Israeli compromise over control of Jerusalem."

On the Palestinian Right of Return, Lauder said "For Israel to allow these people to return would be national suicide." After the election of Sharon, Lauder went to Israel to endorse the War Criminal and his policies stating his confidence that Sharon would maintain Jewish control over Jerusalem.

Estee Lauder International owns the following cosmetic and perfume lines:

Bobbie Brown                Stila
La Mer                      Jo Malone
Jane                        Bumble and Bumble.
Estee Lauder                Prescriptives
Aramis                      M.A.C.
Clinique                    Origins
Aveda

The company is also the global licensee for fragrances and cosmetics sold under these brands:

* Tommy Hilfiger
* Donna Karan
* Kate Spade

In fiscal 2000, the Europe / Middle East / Africa region represented 26% of net sales and
33% of operating income for Estee Lauder.

**Intel**

Intel-Israel's unveiled its latest accomplishment—the 3-gigahertz Centrino chip series—on 9 March 2003 with an unprecedented worldwide advertising and marketing campaign. Website: [http://www.israel21c.org/](http://www.israel21c.org/)

The Centrino processor will enable the development of thinner, faster and lighter mobile computers. As the latest series of the Intel's new series of mobile Centrino computer chips and products is unveiled in New York this week with great fanfare and an unprecedented $300 million advertising campaign, the team at the company's R&D facility in Haifa will be looking on with a particular sense of pride.

The Centrino, officially unveiled March 12, is completely the brainchild of those who work at the company's Haifa facility. "Everything was done in Israel, from top to bottom," said Intel Israel spokesman Koby Bahar. "All of the Centrino mobile technology and all the products, not just the chip, were developed in Israel." Bahar praised the Intel Israel team for its dedication to the project. "Several hundred engineers worked for three years to develop this," he said.

During the chips' development, utter secrecy was maintained. The code name for the project was "Banias" the name of a tributary to the Jordan River.

The new Centrino processors are being aggressively marketed around the world, including the U.S., UK, France, Germany, Australia and South Korea, and the global cost of advertising could surpass the budget Intel lavished on promoting its Pentium processors. Intel, the world's largest chip maker, has been operating in Israel since 1974, and has 5,200 employees at its four main development centres in Jerusalem, Haifa, Kiryat Gat and Petah Tikva. David Perlmutter, Vice President and General Manager of Intel's Mobile Platform Group, told the financial daily Globes that one of the most important advantages of the Centrino processor, compared with the performance of its competitors in the mobile computer sector, was its low electricity consumption. Perlmutter added that the Centrino processor would enable the development of thinner, faster and lighter mobile computers.

The 3-gigahertz Centrino chips are expected to far outstrip rivals in speed with performance close to the latest Pentium 4, while using power sparingly. The new processor is Intel's response to criticism of the Pentium 4, installed in laptops and notebooks, which suffered high energy consumption rates and were considered battery-wasters. Recently, Intel also officially revealed its PXA800F processor, code named "Manitoba," which was partly developed in Israel, which is designed to grab a substantial share of the market for advanced cellular telephone processors.

The Manitoba processor is intended for cellular telephones with multimedia capabilities similar to that of a PDA. Communications companies believe the customers' ultimate ambition is to own a cellular telephone with voice, data communications, multimedia and agenda capabilities; in short, a cellular telephone which is also a PDA device. Intel has already shown Manitoba-based examples to potential customers, and the company expects the first products with the processor will be launched in mid-2003. The processor is designed for mid and high-end products; i.e., multimedia-capable cellular telephones. Six Intel developments centres across the world participated in Manitoba's development. Two of them have an Israeli connection: Petah Tikva, and Calgary, Alberta, in Canada, both of which were facilities of the Israeli DSPC company, acquired by Intel in 1999 for $1.6 billion.
According to Globes, Intel's Israeli development centers will also be setting the tone for future processors' dual band capability. The Petah Tikva development center is developing processors for cellular networks, while the Haifa R&D center is developing processors for wireless networks. Collaboration by the two centres will lead in future, possibly even by next year, to a processor combining both cellular and wireless capability. Already, the Haifa facility is developing the processor which will succeed the Centrino, codenamed "Dothan."

Useful websites:
http://luberon100gauche.lautre.net/article.php3?id_article=108
http://village.infoweb.ne.jp/~voices/campaign.htm
http://www.BoycottIsraelGoods.org
http://www.boycottisraeligoods.org/modules.php?op=modload&name=Boycott&file=index
www.bigcampaign.org/
www.boikottisrael.no/eindex.html
www.boycottisrael.co.uk/
www.boycottisrael.org/about_us.htm
www.boycottisraeligoods.org/
www.erinoconnor.org/criticalmass/archives/000327.html
www.geocities.com/saynotousa/choic.htm
www.inminds.co.uk/boycott-israel.html
www.islam-shia.org/boycott_israel/
www.labournet.net/world/0205/kasrils1.html
www.labournet.org.uk/so/48israel.htm
www.matzpun.com/
www.muhajabah.com/boycott.htm
www.palestinecampaign.org/
www.petitiononline.com/mod_perl/signed.cgi?bin&251
www.redress.btinternet.co.uk/boycott.htm
www.redress.btinternet.co.uk/boycott2.htm
www.sevde.de/boycott_israel_campaign.htm
www.solidarite-palestine.org/cbi003.html
www.suraualadang.net/modules.php?name=Boycott_Israel
By QUIT! Sunday August 18, 2002 at 11:01 PM
quitpalestine@yahoo.com 510-434-1304

About 25 queer settlers descended on a downtown Berkeley Starbucks on Saturday, August 17, claiming Berkeley as “a city without people for people without a city.” The group, organized by Queers Undermining Israeli Terrorism (QUIT!), posted a banner proclaiming the reclaimed café “Queerkeley – A Prophecy Fulfilled.” They also erected homes (transformed “Palestinian civilian homes reclaimed from another street theatre action), lawn furniture, and signs reading, “It Works In Palestine, Why Not Here?” and “It’s Ours Because We Say So.” They erected plastic palm trees to “make the concrete bloom,” and gave patrons a tract explaining their religious claim to the land as follows:

“Land of fruits and nuts …

“And the Lord saw that the queer people were harried in this land. And the Lord spake onto the prophet Harvey, “You will lead your people across the wide waters unto a new land.” Harvey was fearful, and he cried to the Lord, “How will we cross the wide waters? For they are cold, and they are filled with all manner of hazardous substances and raw sewage and other pollutants.” And the Lord responded, “fear not, Harvey, for a great bridge will be built, and the people will cross into this land. And this land will be called Berkeley. I say, Lo, I have promised the land of Berkeley to the lesbians and to the gays, and to the bisexuals, and to the transgenders and to the intersexed, and to all of the gender variant peoples. And this land shall be blessed with fruits and nuts, unto 50 generations.” — Book of Reclamations and Realty, 4.0

The group selected Starbucks for the location of their first settlement in Berkeley because Starbucks founder and CEO, Howard Shultz, is a major supporter of the Israeli state and the corporation has become the prime target of an international boycott of corporations with ties to Israel (www.inminds.co.uk/boycott-israel.html). “Since Mr. Shultz clearly believes it is okay for one group of people to grab land belonging to another and say they have a right to it, we figure he won’t mind if we take some of his,” a QUIT leaflet explains.

Workers in the café were surprisingly unruffled as the Queer Defense Forces entered the café and announced over a loudspeaker that the land had been confiscated by the Queer National Fund and curfew for straights would begin in five minutes. Several “patrons” were forcibly ejected from the café by means of SuperSoakers (which were especially popular with a three-year-old settler).

Many coffee drinkers quickly cleared out, but one group of chess players steadfastly ignored the group, who vow to set up more settlements in the coming months.

Download "QueerNation Berkeley -- God’s Prophecy Fulfilled"
pdf  text-only version
More photos from the action available at
Annex 8

“Chosenness” & the Legal Device of “Jewish Nationality”

Efforts to explain the discrimination experienced by the indigenous Arab citizens as spontaneous and inconsistent with the “democratic character” of the State of Israel serve to divert attention from the institutionalised nature of the phenomenon. Israel’s Declaration of Establishment includes the contradictory assertion of the State’s Jewish with the statement that all its citizens are to have equal “social and political rights.” However, this anti-discrimination clause, like the Declaration itself, has no legal force or effect in Israel. What primary legal instruments do confer status and rights to citizens are a series of “Basic Laws” that function in place of a constitution or bill of rights.

Biblical references to divine provision of a “promised land” to the children of Israel form the cornerstone of the State of Israel’s claim to the land of historic Palestine on behalf of the “Jewish people” exclusively. Consequently, a concept of Jewish superiority and “chosenness” lies at the base of Israel’s relations with the indigenous Palestinians. This has been formalized in Israeli civil law, which confers full rights only upon a class of citizens deemed to be “Jewish nationals.” Thus, the Israeli legal concept of “Jewish nationality” provides the essential criterion that determines relations between groups of Israeli citizens. Applied in practice, “nationality” serves as the basis upon which some citizens (“Jewish nationals”) obtain rights to use land and benefit from “national” institutions providing many types of government services covering land-use, development planning and housing. Israeli citizens without “Jewish nationality” formally are denied some basic rights and privileges, including the right to develop their communities on an equal basis with other citizens.

“Jewish nationality” status also serves as the principal criterion for immigration designed to dilute and supplant the Palestinian people’s presence in the land of historic Palestine. The Palestinians are thereby denied their own national dimension, at the core of which rests the right to one’s place to live. Israeli law and ideology cancel the indigenous people’s “nationality,” and complementary policies separate them from their pertinenza in their own country; while they are to be replaced with settlers whom the state endows with a superior civil status.

Under Israeli Law, anyone considered eligible for Jewish nationality can obtain this preferential status and full rights on the basis of (1) a claim to Jewish religion and (2) arrival in the country. By contrast, a citizen of the State of Israel who does not hold this exclusive “nationality” status can never hold this first-class status of full rights and benefits, even if s/he is born there. This legal fact became most clear in the High Court of Israel case of George Tamarin v. the State of Israel (1971), wherein a Jewish Israeli had petitioned to have the official registration of his nationality changed from “Jewish” to “Israeli.” The High Court denied his request as “there is no Israeli nation separate from the Jewish nation...composed not only of those residing in Israel but also of Diaspora Jewry.” Therefore, nationality status in Israel is not linked to origin from, or residence in a territory, as is the norm in international law. Instead, the basic theocratic character of the Israeli legal system establishes ethnic criteria as the grounds for enjoyment of economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights.

Source: Compilation of extracts from documents about the Israeli “national” institutions, by Joseph Schechla.

Then President of the Israeli High Court Justice Shimon Agranat explained his ruling that, if Tamarin’s plea were upheld, it “would negate the very foundation upon which the State of Israel was formed.” The New York Times, 21 January 1972, 14, as cited in Oscar Kraines, The Impossible Dilemma: Who is a Jew in the State of Israel (New York: Bloch Publishing, 1976).
Case in point: the “unrecognised villages”

Israel’s interministerial Markowitz Commission drew up a pragmatic blueprint eviction and demolition plan in August 1986. It has been called a *coup de grace* against the right to a place to live for the Arab sector, especially the “unrecognised villages.” Culminating the work of foregoing and perhaps less-coordinated “development-planning” efforts, Markowitz identified unlicensed Arab dwellings all over Israel, now especially in the remote areas, as the primary targets of demolition, confiscation, and population transfer. The plan’s implementation forces those rural Arab citizens to face incremental and, in sum, collective demolition and removal on the premise that their structures were illegal. The legal premise sued is the 1965 Construction and Building Law, which creates the tautological technicality rendering entire communities “unrecognised” by virtue of their omission from any official Master Plans since 1948.

Devising the needed tools to complete past attempts at demographic manipulation, Markowitz emphasized Article 157A of the aforementioned Planning and Construction Law, prohibiting a municipality from connecting water, electricity or telephone networks to unlicensed buildings. That, of course, gave statutory ground to deny services to Arab citizens living in existing homes in the “unrecognised villages” and “unrecognised” neighbourhoods of recognized Arab villages and towns, all of which Markowitz referred to as “grey areas.” The complement to this malign neglect has been an iron-fist campaign of demolishing any construction after 1985, prohibiting any repairs, empowering any Planning Committee clerk with authority to order destruction of Arab citizens’ homes and other buildings, and imposing punitive fines, including costs of the demolition service itself.

None of those villages has any status as a local authority; none has a plan; no building permits have ever been issued; all the buildings are considered “illegal” and are under threat of demolition by administrative order. Very little development has taken place, and numerous demolitions already have occurred. The worst housing conditions in Israel are to be found in these “unrecognised” villages. Nonetheless, Ministry of Interior officials had ordered all reference to existing unrecognised villages removed from the District Plan for the Northern Region survey reports, which had described the actual situation.

Because of their obscure status, the unrecognised villages remain deliberately uncounted. There are at least 249 “unrecognised villages” in Israel; most (ca. ¾) are in the Negev, but at least 72 are in central and northern Israel (Arab Triangle and Galilee, respectively). Estimates hold that the total population exceeds 70,000, with 10,000 affected persons living in the northern villages and the rest living in the Naqab.

Each of the unrecognised villages and the unrecognised neighbourhoods of Arab towns represents a small population. A recent survey of 104 unrecognised Naqab villages shows that these range in size from 50 to 800 houses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>“Unrecognised” villages in the Naqab</th>
<th>No. of Localities</th>
<th>No. of Houses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>64</td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>51–100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>101–350</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>351–800</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: [www.assoc40.org](http://www.assoc40.org)

The 1986 Markowitz report called for the immediate demolition of 5,419 houses belonging to indigenous Arab citizens, and another 5,761 officially were added to that list in the subsequent two years. Now that figure has multiplied many times over (e.g., 30,000 in the Naqab alone). The northern

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43 Interview with Prof. Hubert Law-Yone, Technion University, Haifa (February 1993).

"unrecognised" village homes are mostly (83.6%) built of concrete or stone. The Naqab village homes are generally less substantial structures, including tents (25%), shanties (50%) and some concrete or stone (25%), of which 60% have zinc or asbestos ceilings. Adding insult to injury, the policy applied since 1986 reduces the entire impoverished population of these villages to a category of collective "violators."45

In Israel, there are no objective criteria for recognizing a village or other built-up area within statutory plans, except by approval of the Regional and District Planning Councils. In actual planning practice, however, it emerges by way of the "unrecognised villages" example, that any criteria are subjective and discriminatory. The typically Jewish-only Local Planning Councils (with ubiquitous Jewish Agency membership) have excluded these villages from all official development schemes, thus rendering them outside of statutory plans. Communities' size, longevity and legal tenure normally would count as planning criteria for the inclusion of a human settlement in a legal plan. However, all Jewish built-up areas in Israel postdate the existence of the "unrecognised villages," and some are considerably smaller in population. For example, the Jewish settlement Lavon, established in the jurisdiction of Misgav Regional Council, houses only two families, who are supplied with all possible public services and amenities. The Arab Galilee village of Umm Tunan has over 2,000 residents, but enjoys neither recognition nor corresponding services. According to findings of the Association of Forty, there are presently 155 Jewish villages built without recognition in the statutory plans; however, these small and theoretically illegal settlements enjoy all the necessary services that come with their residents' privileged civil status as Jews. Whatever the putative criteria of size and longevity of the communities, the "recognized" rural village or other built-up area retains the right to stay, distinguished solely by the Jewishness of its recent-settler population.

Inside the "green line" (Israel's internationally recognized border formed by the 1948–49 Armistice agreements), Israeli planning provides the official basis for demolishing some 176 historic Palestinian villages and small clusters of habitation in the present phase of population transfer.46

A parliamentary committee reported in 1996 that the actual number of "unrecognised villages" in the Naqab alone totalled 1,440 and a composite population of 64,000, constituting 50% of the Palestinian Arab citizens of Bedouin origin (ca. 120,000). The actual tenure of their lands, estimated at 800,000 to one million dunums, is varied and subject to diverse interpretations. However, it is safe to conclude that, today, it is a combination of privately owned land, lands to which Israel forcibly removed the population over time, and officially claimed as "state lands."47 Against the various forms of private tenure and legal disputes over acclaimed confiscations, Israeli planners seek to consolidate the totality of these Palestinian lands as a Jewish "national" possession.

Some of these communities have been demolished already, while others are underway or still scheduled. Their Palestinian inhabitants are slated for transfer to planned townships (seven in the north and 16 in the south) that, in Israeli planning parlance, are termed "concentration points."48 They lack adequate infrastructure, security of tenure or economic base.

45 wwwassoc40.org
46 As issued by the Markowitz Commission (1986), various plans by the Jewish Agency/World Zionist Organization and Seven-Star Plan currently implemented under Housing Minister Ariel Sharon. See also "Demolition of Palestinian Homes and Other Structures by Israeli Authorities," (Washington: EAFORD—USA, 1990).
47 According to MK David Mena’s Committee report, the area of land disputed between the Arab citizens of the Negev and the State reaches 800,000 dunums. In the same report, a Ministry of Justice source claimed that the area covers one million dunums, while researcher Dr. Yosef Ben-David estimated that 50% of unrecognized Naqab village inhabitants live on lands that are registered as owned by them, 45% live on lands to which the authorities forcibly moved them, and only 10% live on “state lands.” See wwwassoc40.org.48 “Report of the Interministerial Commission concerning Illegal Construction in the Arab Sector” (Markowitz Commission) (Jerusalem: 1986).
Functionally, these townships are to serve effectively as surplus labour camps under a pretence of modern development planning. The implementation of the Markowitz blueprint is to establish seven concentrations for the 120,000 Arab inhabitants in the Negev. This compares to the already 180 Israeli settlements with full services that the “national” institutions have planned, built and serviced in the same area to accommodate 280,000 Jews there.

The current wave: Sharon’s $1.75 billion land and unrecognised villages elimination plan—until 2007

Sharon’s Government will make the final approval next week for the new US$1.75 billion Five-year Plan. This plan is a comprehensive strategy to remove the Bedouin of the “unrecognised villages” from their land and concentrate them into seven townships.

While this plan has been present for a long time - it has now been given a budget and a specific timeframe: the coming year 2003. The strategy includes a legal framework, with the hiring of lawyers to defend state claims of illegal land use or building, the expansion in strength of the armed police force that patrols the Negev and carries out house demolitions, and the allocation of funds for any compensation, which may be necessary. The plan's main points run as follows:

1. Establishing a special police station and paramilitary forces to implement the plan.
2. Empowering the Green Patrol (or Black Patrol) by allocating more funding and personnel for land confiscation. This paramilitary police unit is responsible for patrolling the Negev and carrying out house demolitions.
3. Final and complete registration of the land of the unrecognised villages as Governmental Land.
4. The Justice Ministry, Israel Land Authority, and the Bedouin Authority (the Civil Administration of the government for the community) will work together in identifying land ownership by making claims that it is governmental property in all cases. The landowner then has to prove in court that the land is his or her land.
5. The plan provides for the government hiring legal experts and lawyers to defend itself against claims to the newly governmental land from its Bedouin inhabitants.
6. Any money or land compensation given will be subject to the Israeli Law, Governmental decisions, and the Israel Land Authority.
7. The Jewish Regional Councils of Ramat Hovav and Bani Shimoun will give individuals of their choosing farms, on lands not within their municipal authorizations, which now belong to the unrecognised villages.
8. The Israeli Government will implement this plan retrospectively from 4/8/2002 which includes the Planning and Building Law passed at the end of last year. This law did not cover any unrecognised villages, therefore rendering every one of them illegal, even though these historical villages were established before the State of Israel, and before this Planning Law).
9. Local Municipalities will be established for the seven townships, and Bedouin addresses will be registered according to these new concentrations. There is a plan which suggests uprooting some recently recognised Bedouin villages and concentrating them into Meriet Township.

The importance of this plan cannot be overstated. Implementing the decisions that have been taken will mean mass house destruction and uprooting the 70,000 inhabitants without any housing alternatives. The government has decided to create the military police capacity

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to carry out these destructions, and backed up this capability with laws already passed in the Knesset and a legal team to defend the plan.

We see this Plan as a declaration of war on the Bedouin community of the unrecognised villages, even though the Regional Council of Unrecognized Villages of the Negev (RCUV) welcomes any village recognition. The Government has for the first time developed a comprehensive plan for settling the Unrecognised Villages "threat" with implementations and timetables, budget allocation, and job distribution to each ministry and governmental offices. This plan was never discussed with any of the population or their representatives, or the RCUV. The Bedouin people and their representatives do not support this plan.

The RCUV and the Arab Human Rights Association (HRA) urge the international community, all political parties, the High Follow Up Committee for Palestinians in Israel (the all-inclusive body for Palestinians citizens of Israel), and NGOs to work together and fight against the implementation of this Plan.

The RCUV and the HRA also urge parties to stand against the building of 14 Jewish settlements which is scheduled to begin on March 2003. The first settlement scheduled to be built is Givat Bar Settlement on Araqeeb Village, from where the citizens were initially uprooted for a "6-month period" in 1953. This settlement building is the complement to the plan to eliminate the Bedouin unrecognised villages: it will replace the indigenous inhabitants of the land with Jewish Israeli settlers.
## Annex 9
### Contacts for More Information

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ORGANIZATION</th>
<th>DESCRIPTION</th>
<th>CONTACT</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adalah Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel</strong></td>
<td>Legal service organization founded in 1996 to defend the indigenous Palestinian citizens of Israel from discrimination. Adalah has rich experience in litigation to advocate housing rights and defend against evictions, demolition. Member of HIC.</td>
<td><strong>Main Office:</strong> PO Box 510 Shifa `Amr 20 200 Israel Tel: +972 (0)4 950-1610 Fax: +972 (0)4 950-3140 <strong>Negev Office:</strong> 28 Reger Ave, Room 35 Beer Sheva Israel Tel: +972 (0)8 665–0740 Fax: +972 (0)8 665–0853 E-mail: <a href="mailto:adalahorg@hotmail.com">adalahorg@hotmail.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC)</strong></td>
<td>American Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee was founded in 1981 to mobilize against social discrimination and racism against Arab citizens of the United States, and to provide a critical voice in foreign policy debate. ADC operates a network of members throughout the US and Canada.</td>
<td>Ziad Asali, president <a href="mailto:zasali@adc.org">zasali@adc.org</a> Khalil E Jahshan executive vice president &amp; director of Government Affairs 4201 Connecticut Ave. NW Washington DC 20008 Phone: (202) 244-2990 Fax: (202) 244-3196 E-mail: <a href="mailto:adc@adc.org">adc@adc.org</a> Web: <a href="http://www.adc.org">http://www.adc.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adameer</strong></td>
<td>Prisoners Support and Human Rights Association. Also realizes social activities and provides public information on a range of human rights issues. The name “al-Damir” is Arabic for “conscience.”</td>
<td><strong>Ramallah Office:</strong> Khalida Jarrar, director al-Isra' Bldg., 7th floor al-Isra’ St., Ramallah P.O.Box 17338, Jerusalem Tel: 972(0)2 296-0446 / Fax: 972(0)2 296-0447 e-mail: <a href="mailto:addameer@planet.edu">addameer@planet.edu</a> <strong>Gaza Office:</strong> Khalil Abu Shammaleh, director Omar al-Mukhtar Street P.O. Box 5045, Gaza City Tel/FAX: 972 (0)8 282 6660 / 284 0661 E-mail: <a href="mailto:aldameer@pis.com">aldameer@pis.com</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alternative Information Center (AIC )</strong></td>
<td>The Alternative Information Center involves Palestinian and Israeli staff producing critical analysis + public information on Israeli policies and Zionist ideology. Publishes monthly News from Within.</td>
<td>P.O. Box 31417 Jerusalem 91313 E-mail: <a href="mailto:aic@alt-info.org">aic@alt-info.org</a> Michal Warshawski, director: Farid Jaber <a href="mailto:farid@alt-info.org">farid@alt-info.org</a> Sergio Yahni <a href="mailto:sergio@alt-info.org">sergio@alt-info.org</a> <strong>Bethlehem office:</strong> Maraq Bldg. Bab el-Zuqaq (on the Hebron Road) Tel/Fax: 972(0)2 277-7558/9 <strong>Jerusalem office:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Amanjordan</strong></td>
<td>The Arab regional resource center on violence against women. The award-winning Amanjordan website provides standard and rare human rights resources in Arabic for downloading.</td>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Amnesty International—OPTs</strong></td>
<td>Regional division of the International Secretariat of the largest international human rights movement dedicated to defending civil and political rights.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arab Association for Human Rights—HRA</strong></td>
<td>The Arab Association for Human Rights. Deals with matters of discrimination against and the human rights of Palestinian citizens of Israel; produces studies aimed at mobilizing public opinion. Provides free legal services and has a lawyers committee that studies issues and petitions the Israeli High Court.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arab Lawyers Union</strong></td>
<td>The ALU is a well-established institution linking lawyers and bar associations throughout the Arab world. The Union is a consistent participant in international advocacy and solidarity activities in support of Palestine.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Arab World Geographer</strong></td>
<td>Network of academics specialized in geography, physical planning, architecture and related expertise. They publish their articles in the journal Arab World Geographer and could be a source of support and technical assistance.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Applied Research Institute—Jerusalem -- ARIJ</strong></td>
<td>Researches environmental problems, agriculture, water, technology, land confiscation and settlements. Member of HIC.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Association for the Defence of the Rights of the</strong></td>
<td>Conduct social mobilisation and advocacy in support of those Palestinian citizens of Israel who were displaced in the 1948 and after to regain their</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Internally Displaced** | rights and properties that the State of Israel has confiscated. | Muhammad Kayal  
P.O. Box 330  
Shafa’ Amr 20200 Israel  
Tel: +972 (0)5 321–6514 |
|--------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------|
| **Association for Support and Defence of Bedouin Rights in Israel** | A center for information, advocacy, legal support, training and social development for the Bedouin Palestinian community in Israel. The Association has suffered a decline in the past several years and most of its programs have been curtailed. | P.O. Box 5212,  
Beersheva, Israel  
Tel: +972 (0)7 623–0289 |
| **Association of Forty** | Created by inhabitants of unrecognised villages and their supporters in 1988, the 40th anniversary of Israel + the Universal Declaration for Human Rights. Active in UN forums and international networks. Member of HIC. The Association of Forty provides technical assistance and advocacy for the development and recognition of the “unrecognised” communities, and participates in international human rights forums. Member of HIC. | Muhammad Abu al-Haija, director  
Ein Hod, near Nir Etzion, 30808, Israel  
Tel : +972 (0)4 836-2381  
+972 (0) 2 836-2382  
Fax : +972 (0)4 836–2379  
E-mail: assoc40@assoc40.org |
| **al-Awda** | A networking service that provides information on, and advocates for Palestinian refugees right of return. Al-Awda is the abbreviated name of the Palestine Right to Return Coalition—PRRC also organizes public events and social mobilisation to support the refugees’ right of return. | P.O. Box 1172  
Orange CT 06477 USA  
Fax: +1 717 832–1123  
E-mail: prrc@mail.com  
Web: http://al-awda.org |
| **Badil Resource Center for Palestinian Residency & Refugee Rights** | “Badil aims to provide a resource pool of alternative, critical and progressive information and analysis on the question of Palestinian refugees to achieve a just and lasting solution for Palestinian refugees based on the right of return.” It participates on international advocacy, including cooperation with UN human rights body and publishes reports and a quarterly newsletter al majdal. Member of HIC. | Ingrid Gassnar Jaradat, director  
P.O. Box 726  
Bethlehem, Palestine  
Tel: +972 (0)2 274–7346  
+972 (0)2 277–7086  
Fax: +972 (0)2 274–7346  
E-mail: badil@palnet.com  
info@badil.org  
Web page: http://www.badil.org |
| **al-Beit Association for the Defence of Human Rights in Israel** | Its aim is to promote the right to equal housing and freedom of residence for Palestinian citizens of Israel and to educate against Israeli apartheid in Palestine. Member of HIC. | Dr. Uri Davis  
P.O Box 99, Sakhnin 20173, Israel  
Fax : 972(0)6 674-7028  
Mobile : 972(0)5 352-3822  
E-mail: uridavis@actcom.co.il |
| **Between the Lines** | Project of radical and progressive Palestinians and Israelis. “This perspective stems from a comprehensive stance which opposes the exclusive Jewish-Zionist nature of the state of Israel and the authoritarian regime that has emerged in the areas beneath the control of the Palestinian Authority. Both gain sustenance from the institutions of world globalisation and the ‘New World Order’ which are enemies of the Palestinians (both in ‘48 & ‘67 Palestine) and Arab peoples, as well as the oppressed within Israeli society including Mizrahim and women.” | Dr. Tikva Honig-Pamass & Toufic Haddad , coeditors  
P.O. Box 681, Jerusalem  
Tel: +972 (0)2 563N0060  
+972 (0)2 296–6311  
Email: btl@palnet.com  
Web: http://www.between-lines.org |
| **Bir`em Committee** | Kfar Bir`im is an Arab and Christian village located 4-km south of the Lebanese-Israel border. In 1948 | P.O. Box 44603  
Haifa, Israel |
| **B’Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories** | The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. Founded in 1989, B’Tselem is an independent information center and watchdog agency on human rights in the occupied territories that seeks to provide information to the Israeli public and foster public debate within Israel; to educate the Israeli public about international human rights standards; and to recommend and press for policy changes. | Tel : +972 (0)4 866–5276  
Fax : +972(0)4 869-9628  
E-mail : committee@birem.org  
Jessica Martel, director  
8 HaTa’asiya St, 4th Floor  
Telalp, Jerusalem 93420 via Israel  
Fax: +972(0)2 674-9111  
E-mail: mail@btselem.org  
Web: [http://www.btselem.org](http://www.btselem.org) |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Cairo Institute for Human Rights Studies (CIHRS)** | CIHRS plays an influential role in the region as a think tank and advocate for human rights in general. | Bahieddin Hasan, executive director  
9 Rustom St, 7th Floor, Flat 35,  
Garden City, Cairo, Egypt  
Mailing address: P.O. Box 117,  
Maglis al-Sha’b  
11516 Cairo -Egypt  
Tel: +20(0)2 795–1112  
Fax: +20(0)2 795–4200  
E-mail: cihrs@soficom.com.eg  
Web: [http://www.cihrs.org](http://www.cihrs.org) |
| **Center for Bedouin Studies and Development** | Its purpose is: to promote and conduct research into Bedouin history and heritage; to encourage, develop and promote new educational, medical and social programs designed to facilitate the process of cultural and social transition; to provide support services to all faculties and departments of the university for the purpose of maximizing the effectiveness of existing and new programs related to the Bedouin community. Note: it has published a common study with the Negev Center for Regional Development in August 2000 called An Urban Development Strategy for the Beduin Community. | Alean al-Krenawi, director  
Ben Gurion University  
P.O. Box 853  
Beer-Sheva 84105, Israel  
Tel: +972 (0)7 647–2859  
FAX: +972 (0)7 646–1876  
E-mail: beduin@bgumail.bgu.ac.il  
ncred@river.bgu.ac.il  
Web: [www.bgu.ac.il/bedouin](http://www.bgu.ac.il/bedouin) |
| **Center for Economic & Social Rights, ESR-Net** | International Network for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights | 162 Montague St., 2nd Floor,  
Brooklyn NY 11201  
Tel: +1 718 237–9145  
Fax: +1 718 237-9147  
E-mail: rights@cesr.org  
escr-net@cesr.org  
[http://www.nodo50.org/casca/palestina](http://www.nodo50.org/casca/palestina)  
| **Comité de Solidaridad con la Causa Árabe** | Spanish-language website on Arab issues, including Palestine. |  
[http://www.nodo50.org/casca/palestina](http://www.nodo50.org/casca/palestina)  
| **DCI–Palestine Section** | Defense for Children International / Palestine section has been established in 1992. It monitors and reports on the human rights and living conditions of children in the OPT. | P.O. Box 55201, Jerusalem  
al-Bireh/Ramallah Office:  
al-Khoulafa' Street  
al-Sartawi Building, 2nd Floor  
Tel: +972 (0)2 240–7530  
Fax: 972(0)2 240-7018  
Email: dcipal@palnet.com |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Department of Geography, Ben Gurion University</strong></th>
<th>Academic center with specialisation in planning and the living conditions of the Bedouin and other Palestinians in Israel. Member of HIC.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Oren Yiftachel, chairman** | Tel/Fax: +972 (0)8 647-200  
Fax: +972 (0)8 247-2821  
E-mail: yiftach@bgumail.bgu.ac.il  
Web: http://www.bgu.ac.il/geog/index.html |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>DWRC, Democracy and Workers Rights Center</strong></th>
<th>Established in 1993, its main goal is to organize marginalized groups, democratizing their representative bodies, enhancing their organizational skills and activating their participation in the political, social and cultural life. It has 3 major units: a Legal Aid and Human Rights Unit, an Elimination of Poverty and Unemployment Unit and a Training and Education Unit, plus a Networking Program.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Hassan Barghouthi, general director** | Tel: +972 (0)2 295–2608 / 2718  
Fax: +972 (0)2 295-N2985  
E-mail: dwrc@natvision.net.il  
Web: http://www.dwrc.org |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Electronic Intifada</strong></th>
<th>Electronic source on the Intifada presented as a counter resource to the Israeli media. Founder Ali Abu Nimah serves as media watchdog.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong><a href="http://www.electronicintifada.org">http://www.electronicintifada.org</a></strong></td>
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|--------------------------------------------------|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|
| **Sandrine Grenier, coordinator** | Tel/Fax: +32 (0)2 513–3797  
E-mail: sgrenier@euromedrights.net |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Foundation For Middle East Peace</strong></th>
<th>Issues reports on Israeli Settlement activity in the OPTs. Publishes (monthly) Israeli Settlement Newsletter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Shafa ` Amr, Galilee</strong></td>
<td>Web: <a href="http://www.gal-soc.org/">http://www.gal-soc.org/</a></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Galilee Society</strong></th>
<th>National Arab society for health and research services.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong><a href="http://www.gal-soc.org/">http://www.gal-soc.org/</a></strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Gesellshaft für Bedrohte Völker</strong></th>
<th>Active in public information, lobbying and advocacy in international forums dealing with indigenous peoples and all peoples facing threat for their existence.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| **Postfach 2024** | Tel: +49 (0)551 499-060  
Fax: +49 (0)551 58-028  
E-mail: info@gbv.de  
Web: http://www.gbv.de |

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th><strong>Gush Shalom</strong></th>
<th>Peace Bloc - Gush Shalom is a liberal Zionist</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Adam Keller, Uri Avnery,</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>movement bloc. Regards the Oslo Agreement as a first step, but demands an independent Palestinian state as a condition for real peace.</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>HaMoked : Center for Defence of the Individual</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The areas of action are human and residency rights, legal advocacy, detainees’ rights &amp; prison conditions, family reunification and freedom of movement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>al-Haq: Law in the Service of Man</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Al-Haq is a human rights organization established in 1979; publishes reports (including an annual summary) on the human rights situation in the occupied territories; carries out legal research; has a database on human rights and legal issues; provides legal services to the Palestinian community and has an excellent library. Al-Haq was one of the founding members of the Palestinian Housing Rights Movement.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Human Rights Watch/Middle East</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Specialised regional programme of Human Rights Watch, the international human rights organisation based in New York.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Humanity on Hold</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanity on Hold is a nonprofit organization committed to ending and preventing human rights violations in the Middle East. Goal: to remind the international community of its obligation to act against brutality, injustice, and inhumanity. Links to UN documents; photo galleries; articles, etc.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ibda’a Cultural Center</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provides cultural preservation and programs from its base in the refugee communities in the Bethlehem district.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Israeli Committee against House Demolitions—ICAHD</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Israeli Committee against House Demolitions Group of Israeli citizens committed to housing demolition and land confiscation in the OPT. Maintains a liberal-left Zionist consensus. Collaborated with Palestinian communities and NGOs, namely LDC. Member of HIC.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Innovative Minds</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boycott Israeli products and other innovative actions. Maintains updated information on corporations trading with and /or supporting Israel and the Israeli occupation.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Institut Arabe des</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Created in 1989 on the initiative of the Arab</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Activities and Contact Information</td>
</tr>
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<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Droits de l'Homme – IADH / Arab Institute for Human Rights – AIRH</strong></td>
<td>Organisation for Human Rights, the Arab Lawyers Union and the Tunisian League for Human Rights, it has a consultative status in ECOSOC, in the African Commission of Human Rights and is an observer member to the Permanent Committee of Human Rights of the League of Arab States. Its fundamental aim is to promote the principles and culture of Human Rights. In that purpose, most of its activities consist in Human Rights education for NGOs but also for the whole civil society through various publications.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ittijah: The Union of Arab Community-based Associations</strong></td>
<td>The national coordinating network that coordinates among 44 local advocacy and service organizations inside the Green Line.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jerusalem Center for Human Rights and Justice</strong></td>
<td>New organisation dedicated to economic, social and cultural right defense in the occupied Holy City and East Jerusalem region. Member of HIC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Jerusalem Center for Social and Economic Rights (JCSER)</strong></td>
<td>Jerusalem Center for Social and Economic Rights. It was established in 1997 by lawyers and members of the Palestinian community of Jerusalem to provide legal assistance and representation to Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem subjected to discriminatory policies by the Israeli authorities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land and Housing Research Center</strong></td>
<td>Monitors and reports on confiscation, demolition and other colonisation activities. Member of HIC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Land Defense (General) Committee</strong></td>
<td>Links and assists rural residents in defence against land theft, and surveys and plans land use and development. Member of HIC.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>LAW: Palestinian Society for Human Rights and the Environment</strong></td>
<td>LAW is a Palestinian Human Rights organization, founded in 1990 by a group of Palestinian lawyers to promote human rights and further the principles of the rule of law, and to defend Palestinian rights in accordance with international human rights law and United Nations declarations. Does research and gives legal advice on land issues, environment, etc.; monitors human rights; publishes reports; press releases, and People’s Rights.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization</strong></td>
<td><strong>Activities</strong></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| **Mashraqiyyat** | Women’s rights organization in the Gaza Strip specializing in HR education and law reform, including ESCR in Islamic Sharia. | Marwa Qassem, director  
P.O. Box 5138  
Gaza City, Palestine  
Tel: +970 (0)8 284–8557  
Fax: +972 (0)8 284–8337  
mashr@palnet.net |
| **al-Mezan** | Center for Human Rights based in Jabalia Refugee Camp. Specialized in ESC rights, with links to international activities and networking. Member of HIC. | **Main Office:**  
PO.Box: 2714, Main St, Jabalia Camp, Gaza Strip, Palestine  
Tel.: 972 (0)8 245-3555, Fax: 972 (0)8 245-3554  
**Gaza Office:**  
Omar Ibn Abd al-Aziz St.  
Gaza City, Palestine  
Tel/Fax: +972 (0)8 282–0447  
+972 (0)8 282-0442  
E-mail: mezan@palnet.com, mezan@hally.net, info@mezan.org  
Web: [www.mezan.org](http://www.mezan.org) |
| **Middle East Children’s Alliance (MECA)** | The Middle East Children’s Alliance is a non-governmental organization, working for peace and justice in the Middle East; focusing on Palestine, Israel, Lebanon and Iraq. | Barbara Lubin, director  
Web: [http://www.mecaforpeace.org/](http://www.mecaforpeace.org/) |
| **Mossawa Center** | Advocacy center for the Arab Palestinian citizens of Israel. Member of HIC. | Jafar Farah, director  
16 Ben Yehuda Street  
P.O. Box 4471, Haifa, 31043  
Tel: +972 (0)4 852–8063  
Email: mosawa@rannet.com |
| **Muwatin** | The Palestinian Institute for the Study of Democracy is a project of the Arab Thought Forum, one of the oldest NGOs in the West bank and Jerusalem. | al-Irsal St., Said Haifa Bldg.  
1st Floor  
P. O. Box 1845  
Ramallah, Palestine  
Tel: +972 (0)2 295–1108  
Fax: +972 (0)2 296–0285  
Email: muwatin@muwatin.org |
| **Minority Rights Group International** | Minority Rights Group International. It has four main activities: researching and publishing Reports and other information about minorities around the world; advocating (or lobbying for) the rights of minorities at the United Nations (UN), in Europe, with governments and elsewhere; educating children and teachers on minority issues in order to counter racism and prejudice; working with organizations and activists who share our aims to build alliances, discuss ideas, develop skills and further minority rights worldwide. MRG was founded over 25 years ago and has consultative status with the UN (ECOSOC). | 379 Brixton Road  
London SW9 7DE, UK  
Tel: +44 (0)207 978-9498  
Fax: +44 (0)207 738-6265  
E-mail: minority.rights@mrgmail.org  
| **Mandela Institute for Political Prisoners** | Offers medical, material and legal assistance to Palestinian political prisoners, ex-prisoners and their families; is particularly concerned with direct improvement of detention/prison conditions and protection of legal and human rights of detainees. | Ahmad Al-Sayad, director  
Room 1, Hotel Odeh St., Ramallah  
PO Box 38002, Kufr Aqab, Jerusalem |
<table>
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<tr>
<th><strong>Organization</strong></th>
<th><strong>Description</strong></th>
<th><strong>Contact Information</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Nidal Center for Community Development</strong></td>
<td>Publishes a newsletter on prisoners' affairs, Samid (English, issued regularly).</td>
<td>Tel: +972 (0)2 295–5756 Fax: +972 (0)2 295–6468 E-mail: <a href="mailto:mandela@baraka.org">mandela@baraka.org</a> Web: <a href="http://www.mandela.org">http://www.mandela.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Organization for Democratic Action</strong></td>
<td>The Nidal Center is dedicated to social development and defending the right of Palestinians in Jerusalem. Member of HIC.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Palestine Children's Welfare Fund (PCWS)</strong></td>
<td>A charitable, relief organization.</td>
<td>Riad Hamad E-mail: <a href="mailto:info@pcwf.org">info@pcwf.org</a> Web: <a href="http://www.pcwf.org/">http://www.pcwf.org/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Palestine Facts</strong></td>
<td>Website service dedicated to providing comprehensive and accurate information regarding the historical, military, and political background to the ongoing struggle between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. The situation is complex with deep and diverse roots. By using the resources of this large and growing site, you can become much more knowledgeable about what is going on and why. The information on this site is organized into sections, by historical period.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Palestinian Agricultural Relief Committees (PARC)</strong></td>
<td>Assists Palestinian workers under occupation through development and technical assistance in land reclamation, irrigation and other practical services. It has among others programs for training and research but also to empower rural women. During the Intifada, PARC has dedicated much of its efforts to emergency relief in the remote and vulnerable communities of the West Bank. Member of HIC.</td>
<td>Judeh Abdallah Jamal, deputy general director P.O. Box 25128, Jerusalem, Palestine Tel: +972 (0)52 869–560 FAX: +972 (0)2 583–1898 E-mail: <a href="mailto:judeh@pal-arc.org">judeh@pal-arc.org</a> Web: <a href="http://www.pal-arc.org">http://www.pal-arc.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Palestinian Centre for Human Rights</strong></td>
<td>The Centre was established in 1995 by a group of Palestinian lawyers and human rights activists with the following mandate: to protect human rights and promote the rule of law in accordance with international standards; to create and develop democratic institutions and an active civil society, while promoting democratic culture within Palestinian society; to support all efforts aimed at enabling the Palestinian people to exercise its inalienable rights in regard to self-determination and independence in accordance with international law and UN resolutions. The work of the Centre is conducted through documentation and investigation of human rights violations, provision of legal aid and counselling to both individuals and groups, and research articles. The Centre also provides comments on Palestinian Draft Laws and urges the adoption of legislation that incorporates international human rights standards and basic democratic principles. Due to the illegal restrictions on movement imposed by Israeli</td>
<td>Raji Sourani, director 29 Omar al-Mukhtar St. P.O. Box 1328 Gaza City, Palestine Tel/Fax: +972 (0)8 282–4776 +972 (0)8 282–5893 +972 (0)8 282–3725 E-mail: <a href="mailto:pchr@pchrgaza.org">pchr@pchrgaza.org</a> Web: <a href="http://www.pchrgaza.org">http://www.pchrgaza.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Website</td>
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<tr>
<td>Palestine-net</td>
<td>Website service made up of pages from related links so as to cover all general questions on Palestine, Palestinian news, geography, history, politics, culture, education, business, etc.</td>
<td><a href="http://www.palestine-net.com/">http://www.palestine-net.com/</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Refugee Researchnet</td>
<td>A non-partisan project devoted to the dissemination of ideas and scholarly information, in an effort to foster scholarly collaboration, policy research, and innovative thinking on the Palestinian refugee issue. PRRN is maintained by the Inter-University Consortium for Arab Studies (Montreal), with the support of the Arts Computing Network, McGill University, the International Development Research Centre and the Canadian International Development Agency</td>
<td><a href="http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/mepp/PRRN/prfront.html">http://www.arts.mcgill.ca/mepp/PRRN/prfront.html</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Academic Society for the Study of International Affairs—PASSIA</td>
<td>Independent academic society researching and publishing various studies on the Palestinian question and its national, regional and international dimensions. PASSIA also encourages and organizes intra-Palestinian and Palestinian-foreign dialogue. Its annual diary includes a history of Palestine and its people, contacts of many Palestinian organizations and institutions.</td>
<td>Dr. Mahdi F. Abdul Hadi, head Deniz Atayli, program director 18 Hatim al-Ta’l St. Wadi Al-Joz, East Jerusalem P.O. Box 19545, Jerusalem Tel: +972 (0)2 626–4426 Fax: +972 (0)2 628–2819 E-mail: <a href="mailto:passia@palnet.com">passia@palnet.com</a> Web: <a href="http://www.passia.org">http://www.passia.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group—PHRMRG</td>
<td>Palestinian Human Rights Monitoring Group was established to monitor the performance of the Palestinian National Authority. During the Intifada, PHRMRG has turned its focus to Jewish settler activities in the West Bank, particularly physical assaults on Palestinians, seeking police intervention and prosecution of perpetrators.</td>
<td>Bassem Eid, general director P.O. Box 19918 East Jerusalem 91198 Tel: +972 (0)2 582–3372/3 Fax: +972 (0)2 582–3385 Mobile: +972(0)5 025-8594 E-mail: <a href="mailto:Bassem@phrmg.org">Bassem@phrmg.org</a> Web: <a href="http://www.phrmg.org">http://www.phrmg.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PNGO</td>
<td>The Palestinian NGO Network is a voluntary cluster of Palestinian NGOs that work in various fields. They share a unified vision seeking to develop and strengthen Palestinian civil society. PNGO strives to support, consolidate and strengthen Palestinian civil society on the principles of democracy, social justice and sustainable development. The Network performs its services without discrimination on the basis of ethnicity, religion or gender. The Palestine Monitor: PNGO operates the PM website as part of the newly created information clearinghouse of the same name. It conveys unified responses about local developments from the perspective of civil society, particularly given the present crisis in the Palestinian territories. The website also provides tools for the public to take action on specific issues and features fact sheets</td>
<td>c/o PARC P.O. Box 2232 Ramallah, Palestine Tel: +972 (0)2 296–3847 Fax: +972 (0)2 296–3848 E-mail: <a href="mailto:pngo@p-ol.com">pngo@p-ol.com</a> Web: <a href="http://www.pngo.net">http://www.pngo.net</a> The Palestine Monitor P.O. Box 1351 Ramallah, Palestine Tel: +972 (0)2 298–5372 Fax: +972 (0)2 298–5917 E-mail: <a href="mailto:hdip@hdip.org">hdip@hdip.org</a> Web:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organisation</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Contact Information</td>
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<tr>
<td>Regional Council for Palestinian Beduin Unrecognised Villages Negev</td>
<td>Acts for political mobilization, true alternative planning, advocacy, using the court system, raising public awareness to put unrecognised villages in political agenda and promoting democracy.</td>
<td>Karen Hayasoud 29/29 P.O.Box 10002 Beer Sheva, Israel Tel: +972 (0)8 628–3043 Fax: +972 (0)8 628–3315 E-mail: <a href="mailto:mqupty@hotmail.com">mqupty@hotmail.com</a> Web: <a href="http://www.arabhra.org">http://www.arabhra.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Riwaq Centre for Architectural Conservation</td>
<td>Established in 1992, Riwaq specialises in the built environment and preserving the urban civilisation and structures of occupied Palestine. Member of HIC.</td>
<td>Dr. Nazmi al-Ju`beh, director Nablus Road, al-Sharafa, P.O.Box 212 Ramallah, Palestine Tel: +972 (0)2 240–6887 +972 (0)2 246–9256 Fax: +972 (0)2 240–6986 E-mail: <a href="mailto:riwaq@palnet.com">riwaq@palnet.com</a> Web: <a href="http://www.riwaq.org">http://www.riwaq.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shaml Palestinian Diaspora and Refugee Centre</td>
<td>Established in 1995. It conducts research and seminars linking the Palestinian communities inside and outside of Palestine.</td>
<td>Sari Hanafi, director <a href="mailto:hanafi@p-pl.com">hanafi@p-pl.com</a> Jaffa St., P.O.Box 2456, Ramallah, Palestine Tel: +972 (0)2 298–8442 Fax: +972 (0)2 298N6598 Web: <a href="http://www.shaml.org">http://www.shaml.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technion University Faculty of Architecture and Town Planning</td>
<td>An academic center within the Technion (technical university) in Haifa, Israel, the Faculty of Architecture and Town Planning director, Hubert Law-Yone, is specialized in “Ideology and Planning,” public participation in planning, planning for the Beduin, spatial consequences of Public Policy (housing inequalities), history of Planning and advanced computer applications in planning. The faculty and students have provided important technical assistance to Palestinian Arab communities and NGOs inside Israel.</td>
<td>Hubert Law-Yone, associate professor Haifa 32000 Israel Tel : +972 (0)4 829–4047 Fax : +972 (0)4 829–4617 E-mail : <a href="mailto:hubert@tx.technion.ac.il">hubert@tx.technion.ac.il</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unrepresented Nations and Peoples Organisation—UNPO</td>
<td>Founded in 1991, UNPO today consists of over 50 members who represent over 100 million persons. UNPO offers an international forum for occupied nations, indigenous peoples, minorities, and even oppressed majorities who currently struggle to regain their lost countries, preserve their cultural identities, protect their basic human and economic rights and safeguard the natural environment.</td>
<td>Eisenhowerlaan 136 The Hague 2517 KN Postbox 85878 / 2508 CN The Hague, Netherlands Tel. +31(0)70 360N3318 Fax: +31(0)70 360–3346 E-mail: <a href="mailto:unponl@unpo.org">unponl@unpo.org</a> Web: <a href="http://www.unpo.org">http://www.unpo.org</a></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Women’s Centre for Legal Aid and Counselling—WCLAC</td>
<td>Created in 1991, this Jerusalem-based Palestinian NGO works to promote the legal and social status of Palestinian women.</td>
<td>Dahya Intersection al-Hirbawi Building, 3rd Floor P.O. Box 54262 Jerusalem 91516 via Israel Tel/Fax: +972 (0)2 234–2172 Tel : +972 (0)2 234–7438 E-mail: <a href="mailto:wclac@netvision.net.il">wclac@netvision.net.il</a> Web: <a href="http://www.WCLAC.org">http://www.WCLAC.org</a></td>
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ANNEX 10
Bibliography

The titles listed here are a mere sample of critical published works on the subjects raised in the course of the Palestine Solidarity Seminars. These were selected to provide some of the classic works on the Palestine question. Most are English-language citations; however, because of their prominence, many of these are likely to be available in other languages as well.

**Origins and Original Sins: The Genesis of Palestine:**
Palestinian history, and the evolution of the concept and demography of Palestine, including a clarification of who are the Palestinians are essential for putting the current colonisation of Palestine into perspective. “Biblical history” and “biblical archaeology” are scholarly disciplines that have obscured and effectively negated all Palestinian history that is not confirmed in the Hebrew Bible. Jews conquering Palestine is seen fulfilling the exclusive authenticity of the Bible:

Prior, Michael. *Bible and Colonialism* (Sheffield Academic Press, 1997);

**Israelite Colonisation as a Very American Issue:**
How the Bible passages served to justify colonisation and imbed the concept of “Israel” in the psyche of the Americas as a sacramental heritage to be replicated in colonized lands.

Drinnon, Richard. *Facing West: The Metaphysics of Indian-Hating and Empire-Building* (Minneapolis: Univ of Minnesota Press, 1980);
Jennings, Francis. *Empire of Fortune: Crown, Colonies, and Tribes in the Seven Years War in America* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, reprint 1990);
Jennings, Francis. *The Invasion of America: Indians, Colonialism, and the Cant of Conquest* (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1976);

**Jewish Migration and Diversity**
The following authors treat the historical theories of Hebrew migrations into Palestine and the spread of Judaism and Jewish communities in the Mediterranean and western Asia up to the rise of Christianity.
Berger, Elmer. *A Partisan History of Judaism* (New York: Devin Adair, 1951);
Miller, James Maxwell. *A History of Ancient Israel and Judah* (Westminster John Knox Press; (May 1986);

**The (European) Jewish Question and Palestine:**

_These titles analyse the complex origins and evolution of “the Jewish question” and anti-Semitism in Europe, a socio-economic analysis of the rise and continuum of European perceptions and treatment of Jews (and other minorities) in Europe, as a motivation for the rise of late-19th Century Zionism, the Nazi holocaust and its consequences in the colonization of Palestine._

Arendt, Hannah *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York: Harvest, 1973);
Fischman, Dennis K. *Political Discourse in Exile: Karl Marx and the Jewish Question* (Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 1991.);

**Historic bias**


**Zionism and Its Dissenters**

Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin. *Original Sins: Reflections on the History of Zionism and Israel* (Brooklyn: Interlink Pub Group, 1998);
Berger, Elmer. *The Jewish Dilemma* (Old Greenwich, CT: Devin-Adair, 1956);
Berger, Elmer. *Who Knows Better Must Say So* (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1970);
Berger, Elmer. *Memoirs of an Anti-Zionist Jew* (Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, June 1978);
Brenner, Lenni. *Zionism in the Age of Dictators* (New York: Lawrence Hill, 1983);
Herzl, Theodor. *The Jewish State* (Dover Publications, 1989);
Menuhin, Moshe. *The Decadence of Judaism in Our Time* (New York: Exposition Press, 1965);
Roselle Tekiner, Anti-Zionism: Analytical Reflections (Burlington VT: Amana Books, 1989);
Segev, Tom, ed. The Other Israel: Voices of Refusal and Dissent (New Press, 2002);
Segev, Tom, Arlen Neal Weinstein, transl., 1949, The First Israelis (Henry Holt, reprint 1998);
Shapira, Anita. Land and Power: The Zionist Resort to Force, 1881–1948 (Palo Alto: Stanford Univ. Press, September 1999);
Weinstock, Nathan, Alan Adler, transl., Zionism: False Messiah (Unwin Hyman; Ink Links, reprint 1989);

“The Holocaust Industry”
A reasoned presentation of how the Nazi holocaust has evolved as rationale and ideological engine for the Zionist colonisation of Palestine.
Finkelstein, Norman G. and Ruth Bettina Birn, A Nation on Trial: The Goldhagen Thesis and Historical Truth (Owl Books, 1998);

“From Haven to Conquest”: The dynamics of Zionist colonisation
The rise of Zionist/Jewish colonies in Palestine through purchase, conquest and struggle against the British Mandate, the Arab Revolt (1936–39), the British role, and the War of Conquest (1948):
Kamen, Charles S. Little Common Ground: Arab Agriculture and Jewish Settlement in Palestine, 1920-1948 (Pittsburgh: Univ of Pittsburgh, 1991);
Segev, Tom and others, One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate (Owl Books, 2001);
Tom Segev, Nathan and others, One Palestine, Complete: Jews and Arabs Under the British Mandate (Metropolitan Books, 2000);
Waltz, Viktoria. Die Erde habt Ihr uns genommen: 100 Jahre zionistische Siedlungspolitik in Palästina (Das Arabische Buch);

**The UN role and International Law:**

*The nature, composition and politics of the member states have effected the treatment of the Palestine question in the UN, from the GA vote on resolution 181 to the present.* The books listed here advocate that history and a legal framework for solutions:

Mallison, W. Thomas and Sally V. Mallison, *The Palestine Question in International Law and World Order* (London: Longman, 1986);

Mazzawi, Musa E. *Palestine and the Law: Guidelines for the Resolution of the Arab-Israel Conflict* (Ithaca; September 1997);


**“De-Arabization,” “Ethnic Cleansing” and Refugees:**

*Facts and consequences of the ethnic cleansing of Palestine, from the early evictions through the village demolitions, and the continuum of expulsions in the conduct of wars and in the interwar periods. These publications present the various dimensions/tactics used for dispossessing Palestinians of their lands, properties and livelihood. Included in this selection are titles dealing with the rights and prospects of refugee return/restitution/compensation:*

Abu Sitta, Salman. *The End of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict: From Refugees to Palestinians at Home* (London: Palestine Land Society & Palestinian Return Centre, 2001);


Forrest, Arthur C. *The Unholy Land* (New York: McClelland and Stewart, 1972);

Hadawi, Sami. *Bitter Harvest: A Modern History of Palestine* (Brooklyn: Interlink Pub Group, 1998);

Kabursi, Atif. *Palestinian Losses in 1948: The Quest for Precision* (Washington: Center for Policy Analysis


Perry, Glenn E. *Palestine: Continuing Dispossession* (Belmont MA: AAUG, 1986);
Institutionalised Racism: Israeli Apartheid

Inside the Green Line, the “national institutions,” nationality status, legal and judicial system, physical planning regime, and economic development policies institutionalise discrimination against the surviving Palestinians who remained to become citizens in the State of Israel. This key session provides an essential tool of analysis for understanding the nature of the State and the machinery that has been imposed in the OPTs.

Arab Association for Human Rights, The Palestinian Arab Minority in Israel: Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Nazareth: HRA, 1998);
Davis, Uri. Israel, Utopia incorporated: a study of class, state, and corporate kin control (London: Zed Press, 1977);
Davis, Uri. Israel: An Apartheid State (Boston: Zed Books, 1987);
Davis, Uri. Norton Mezvinsky, Documents from Israel (Evergreen Book Distribution, 1975);
Jiryis, Sabri. The Arabs in Israel (New York: Monthly Review Press, updated 1977);
Kretzmer, David. The Legal Status of the Arabs in Israel (Boulder CO: Westview Press, 1990);
Lehn, Walter with Uri Davis, The Jewish National Fund (London: Kegan Paul, 1988);
Peretz, Don. Israel and the Palestine Arabs, (AMS Press, reprint 1958);
Waltz, Viktoria. Die Erde habt Ihr uns genommen: 100 Jahre zionistische Siedlungspolitik in Palästina (Das Arabische Buch).

After 1967: the OPT and the Continuum of Dispossession:

The theme of land theft and denial of the means of subsistence persists with the common feature of implanting settlers, and constituting violations of an entire body of human rights and humanitarian law norms developed since the UN’s founding. The following references provide an overview:

Amnesty International, “Israel and the Occupied Territories—Demolition and dispossession: the destruction of Palestinian homes” (London: AI, December 1999);
Aronson, Geoffrey. Settlements & Israel Palestinian Negotiations: An Overview (Final Status Issues Paper) (Washington: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1996);
Aruri, Naseer. Occupation: Israel over Palestine (Boston: Zed Books, 1985);
Coon, Anthony. Town Planning under Military Occupation (Ramallah: al-Haq, 1992);
Friedman, Robert I. Zealots for Zion: Inside Israel's West Bank Settlement Movement (Rutgers University Press reprint, 1994);
Masalha, Nur. Imperial Israel and the Palestinians: The Politics of Expansion (Pluto Press, 2000);

Contradictions of Oslo:
The absence of an international law framework (in contrast to Dayton and other contemporary norms), the acceleration of the occupation practices, the role of the United States as sole mediator, and the marginalisation of the UN and international community are the simultaneous consequences of the Oslo-phase of occupation.

Aburish, Said K. Arafat: From Defender to Dictator (Bloomsbury USA, 1998);
Aruri, Naseer. Dishonest Broker: The US Role in Israel and Palestine (Cambridge MA: South End Press, 2003);
Brynen, Rex. A Very Political Economy: Peacebuilding and Foreign Aid in the West Bank and Gaza (United States Institute of Peace, July 2000);
Carey, Roane, ed., The New Intifada: Resisting Israel's Apartheid (New York: Verso Books, 2001);
Finkelstein, Norman G. Image and Reality of the Israel-Palestine Conflict (Verso Books; 2nd edition, 2001);
Hass, Amira et al, Drinking the Sea at Gaza: Days and Nights in a Land under Siege (2000);
Lang, Erica. The occupied territories: destruction or development? : a study of the problems and prospects for economic, social, and political development in a context of colonialism (University College of Wales Swansea, Centre for Development Studies, 19XX);
Said, Edward W. The End of the Peace Process: Oslo and After (New York: Knopf, 2001);
Tamari, Salim. Palestinian Refugee Negotiations: from Madrid to Oslo II (1996)

Israel's Global Role: The Other “Axis of Evil”

Broadly, these references treat the geostrategic and military relationships of Israel with the United States, apartheid South Africa and other like-minded regimes.

Beit-Hallahmi, Benjamin. The Israeli Connection: Who Israel Arms and Why (New York: Pantheon Books, 1987);
Ben-Menashe, Ari. Profits of War: Inside the Secret U.S.-Israeli Arms Network (Sheridan Square, 1992);
Chomsky, Noam. Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians (Vintage Books, 1992, reissue 1999);
Hunter, Jane. Israeli Foreign Policy: South Africa and Central America (Boston: South End, 1987);
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James Adams, The Unnatural Alliance (London: Quartet, 1984);
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Ostrovsky, Victor. By Way of Deception: The Making and Unmaking of a Mossad Officer (Wilshire Press, 2002);
Ostrovsky, Victor. The Other Side of Deception: A Rogue Agent Exposes the Mossad's Secret Agenda (HarperCollins, 1994);
Bias in the Media

The following critical analyses expose the ideological bias of the mainstream media in the United States, which has become an international standard for news organizations globally.

Findley, Paul. Silent No More: Confronting America’s False Images of Islam (Brattlesboro VT: Amana, 2001);


Israel in the United States

These titles cover a range of related issues, including the geopolitics of the U.S.-Israeli alliance, the Zionist lobby in the U.S. Congress and the evolution of U.S. public opinion toward Israel and Zionism:

Brenner, Lenni. Jews in America Today (Lyle Stuart, 1986);

Chomsky, Noam. Fateful Triangle: The United States, Israel, and the Palestinians (Vintage Books, 1992, reissued 1999);

Christison, Kathleen. Perceptions of Palestine: Their Influence on U.S. Middle East Policy (University of California Press, 1999);

Curtiss, Richard H. Stealth PACs: How Israel’s American Lobby Seeks to Control U.S. Middle East Policy (Washington: American Educational Trust, 1990);


Findley, Paul. They Dare to Speak Out: People and Institutions Confront Israel’s Lobby (A Cappella Books, 2nd edition 1989);

Grose, Peter. Israel in the Mind of America (Schocken Books, reprint 1984);


Lilenthal, Alfred M. The Zionist Connection II (Veritas Publishing, 1983);


Rubenberg, Cheryl A. Israel and the American National Interest: A Critical Examination (Chicago: Univ of Illinois Press, 1986);


Practical Solidarity

Examples of attempted and prospective measures to support the decolonisation of Palestine are found below:
Losman, Donald L. *International economic sanctions: the cases of Cuba, Israel, and Rhodesia* (University of New Mexico Press, 1979);